7 Network Working Group P. Riikonen
9 draft-riikonen-silc-spec-09.txt 15 January 2007
13 Secure Internet Live Conferencing (SILC),
14 Protocol Specification
15 <draft-riikonen-silc-spec-09.txt>
19 By submitting this Internet-Draft, each author represents that any
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41 This memo describes a Secure Internet Live Conferencing (SILC)
42 protocol which provides secure conferencing services over insecure
43 network channel. SILC provides advanced and feature rich conferencing
44 services with security as main design principal. Strong cryptographic
45 methods are used to protect SILC packets inside the SILC network.
46 Three other specifications relates very closely to this memo;
47 SILC Packet Protocol [SILC2], SILC Key Exchange and Authentication
48 Protocols [SILC3] and SILC Commands [SILC4].
60 Internet Draft 15 January 2007
65 1 Introduction .................................................. 3
66 1.1 Requirements Terminology .................................. 4
67 2 SILC Concepts ................................................. 4
68 2.1 SILC Network Topology ..................................... 5
69 2.2 Communication Inside a Cell ............................... 6
70 2.3 Communication in the Network .............................. 7
71 2.4 Channel Communication ..................................... 7
72 2.5 Router Connections ........................................ 8
73 3 SILC Specification ............................................ 9
74 3.1 Client .................................................... 9
75 3.1.1 Client ID ........................................... 10
76 3.2 Server .................................................... 11
77 3.2.1 Server's Local ID List .............................. 11
78 3.2.2 Server ID ........................................... 12
79 3.2.3 SILC Server Ports ................................... 12
80 3.3 Router .................................................... 13
81 3.3.1 Router's Local ID List .............................. 13
82 3.3.2 Router's Global ID List ............................. 14
83 3.3.3 Router's Server ID .................................. 15
84 3.4 Channels .................................................. 15
85 3.4.1 Channel ID .......................................... 16
86 3.5 Operators ................................................. 17
87 3.6 SILC Commands ............................................. 17
88 3.7 SILC Packets .............................................. 17
89 3.8 Packet Encryption ......................................... 18
90 3.8.1 Determination of the Source and the Destination ..... 18
91 3.8.2 Client To Client .................................... 19
92 3.8.3 Client To Channel ................................... 20
93 3.8.4 Server To Server .................................... 21
94 3.9 Key Exchange And Authentication ........................... 21
95 3.9.1 Authentication Payload .............................. 22
96 3.10 Algorithms ............................................... 24
97 3.10.1 Ciphers ............................................ 24
98 3.10.1.1 CBC Mode .................................. 24
99 3.10.1.2 CTR Mode .................................. 25
100 3.10.1.3 Randomized CBC Mode ....................... 27
101 3.10.2 Public Key Algorithms .............................. 27
102 3.10.2.1 Multi-Precision Integers .................. 28
103 3.10.3 Hash Functions ..................................... 28
104 3.10.4 MAC Algorithms ..................................... 28
105 3.10.5 Compression Algorithms ............................. 29
106 3.11 SILC Public Key .......................................... 29
107 3.12 SILC Version Detection ................................... 32
108 3.13 UTF-8 Strings in SILC .................................... 33
109 3.13.1 UTF-8 Identifier Strings ........................... 33
110 3.14 Backup Routers ........................................... 34
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119 3.14.1 Switching to Backup Router ......................... 36
120 3.14.2 Resuming Primary Router ............................ 37
121 4 SILC Procedures ............................................... 39
122 4.1 Creating Client Connection ................................ 39
123 4.2 Creating Server Connection ................................ 41
124 4.2.1 Announcing Clients, Channels and Servers ............ 42
125 4.3 Joining to a Channel ...................................... 43
126 4.4 Channel Key Generation .................................... 44
127 4.5 Private Message Sending and Reception ..................... 45
128 4.6 Private Message Key Generation ............................ 46
129 4.7 Channel Message Sending and Reception ..................... 47
130 4.8 Session Key Regeneration .................................. 47
131 4.9 Command Sending and Reception ............................. 48
132 4.10 Closing Connection ....................................... 49
133 4.11 Detaching and Resuming a Session ......................... 49
134 4.12 UDP/IP Connections ...................................... 51
135 5 Security Considerations ....................................... 52
136 6 References .................................................... 53
137 7 Author's Address .............................................. 55
138 Appendix A ...................................................... 55
139 Appendix B ...................................................... 56
140 Appendix C ...................................................... 57
141 Appendix D ...................................................... 57
142 Full Copyright Statement ........................................ 58
146 Figure 1: SILC Network Topology
147 Figure 2: Communication Inside cell
148 Figure 3: Communication Between Cells
149 Figure 4: Router Connections
150 Figure 5: SILC Public Key
151 Figure 6: Counter Block
152 Figure 7: CTR Mode Initialization Vector
157 This document describes a Secure Internet Live Conferencing (SILC)
158 protocol which provides secure conferencing services over insecure
159 network channel. SILC can be used as a secure conferencing service
160 that provides rich conferencing features. Some of the SILC features
161 are found in traditional chat protocols such as IRC [IRC] but many
162 of the SILC features can also be found in Instant Message (IM) style
163 protocols. SILC combines features from both of these chat protocol
164 styles, and can be implemented as either IRC-like system or IM-like
165 system. Some of the more advanced and secure features of the
166 protocol are new to all conferencing protocols. SILC also supports
172 Internet Draft 15 January 2007
175 multimedia messages and can also be implemented as a video and audio
178 Strong cryptographic methods are used to protect SILC packets inside
179 the SILC network. Three other specifications relates very closely
180 to this memo; SILC Packet Protocol [SILC2], SILC Key Exchange and
181 Authentication Protocols [SILC3] and SILC Commands [SILC4].
183 The protocol uses extensively packets as conferencing protocol
184 requires message and command sending. The SILC Packet Protocol is
185 described in [SILC2] and should be read to fully comprehend this
186 document and protocol. [SILC2] also describes the packet encryption
187 and decryption in detail. The SILC Packet Protocol provides secured
188 and authenticated packets, and the protocol is designed to be compact.
189 This makes SILC also suitable in environment of low bandwidth
190 requirements such as mobile networks. All packet payloads in SILC
191 can be also compressed.
193 The security of SILC protocol sessions are based on strong and secure
194 key exchange protocol. The SILC Key Exchange protocol is described
195 in [SILC3] along with connection authentication protocol and should
196 be read to fully comprehend this document and protocol.
198 The SILC protocol has been developed to work on both TCP/IP and UDP/IP
199 network protocols. However, typical implementation would use only TCP/IP
200 with SILC protocol. Typical implementation would be made in client-server
204 1.1 Requirements Terminology
206 The keywords MUST, MUST NOT, REQUIRED, SHOULD, SHOULD NOT, RECOMMENDED,
207 MAY, and OPTIONAL, when they appear in this document, are to be
208 interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
213 This section describes various SILC protocol concepts that forms the
214 actual protocol, and in the end, the actual SILC network. The mission
215 of the protocol is to deliver messages from clients to other clients
216 through servers and routers in secure manner. The messages may also
217 be delivered from one client to many clients forming a group, also
220 This section does not focus to security issues. Instead, basic network
221 concepts are introduced to make the topology of the SILC network
228 Internet Draft 15 January 2007
231 2.1 SILC Network Topology
233 SILC network forms a ring as opposed to tree style network topology that
234 conferencing protocols usually have. The network has a cells which are
235 constructed from a router and zero or more servers. The servers are
236 connected to the router in a star like network topology. Routers in the
237 network are connected to each other forming a ring. The rationale for
238 this is to have servers that can perform specific kind of tasks what
239 other servers cannot perform. This leads to two kinds of servers; normal
240 SILC servers and SILC router servers.
242 A difference between normal server and router server is that routers
243 knows all global information and keep the global network state up to date.
244 They also do the actual routing of the messages to the correct receiver
245 within the cell and between other cells. Normal servers knows only local
246 information and receive global information only when it is needed. They do
247 not need to keep the global network state up to date. This makes the
248 network faster and scalable as there are less servers that needs to
249 maintain global network state.
251 This, on the other hand, leads into a cellular like network, where
252 routers are in the center of the cell and servers are connected to the
255 The following diagram represents SILC network topology.
257 ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ----
258 | S8 | S5 | S4 | | S7 | S5 | S6 |
259 ----- ---- ----- ----- ---- -----
260 | S7 | S/R1 | S2 | --- | S8 | S/R2 | S4 |
261 ---- ------ ---- ---- ------ ----
262 | S6 | S3 | S1 | | S1 | S3 | S2 | ---- ----
263 ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- | S3 | S1 |
264 Cell 1. \ Cell 2. | \____ ----- -----
266 ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ------
267 | S7 | S4 | S2 | | S1 | S3 | S2 | | S2 | S5 |
268 ----- ---- ----- ----- ---- ----- ---- ----
269 | S6 | S/R3 | S1 | --- | S4 | S/R5 | S5 | ____/ Cell 4.
270 ---- ------ ---- ---- ------ ----
271 | S8 | S5 | S3 | | S6 | S7 | S8 | ... etc ...
272 ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ----
275 Figure 1: SILC Network Topology
278 A cell is formed when a server or servers connect to one router. In
284 Internet Draft 15 January 2007
287 SILC network normal server cannot directly connect to other normal
288 server. Normal server may only connect to SILC router which then
289 routes the messages to the other servers in the cell. Router servers
290 on the other hand may connect to other routers to form the actual SILC
291 network, as seen in above figure. However, router is also able to act
292 as normal SILC server; clients may connect to it the same way as to
293 normal SILC server. This, however is not a requirement and if needed
294 router servers may be hidden from users by not allowing direct client
295 connections. Normal server also cannot have active connections to more
296 than one router. Normal server cannot be connected to two different
297 cells. Router servers, on the other hand, may have as many router to
298 router connections as needed. Other direct routes between other routers
299 is also possible in addition of the mandatory ring connections. This
300 leads into a hybrid ring-mesh network topology.
302 There are many issues in this network topology that needs to be careful
303 about. Issues like routing, the size of the cells, the number of the
304 routers in the SILC network and the capacity requirements of the
305 routers. These issues should be discussed in the Internet Community
306 and additional documents on the issue may be written.
309 2.2 Communication Inside a Cell
311 It is always guaranteed that inside a cell message is delivered to the
312 recipient with at most two server hops. A client which is connected to
313 server in the cell and is talking on channel to other client connected
314 to other server in the same cell, will have its messages delivered from
315 its local server first to the router of the cell, and from the router
316 to the other server in the cell.
318 The following diagram represents this scenario:
328 Figure 2: Communication Inside cell
331 Example: Client 1. connected to Server 1. send message to
332 Client 4. connected to Server 2. travels from Server 1.
333 first to Router which routes the message to Server 2.
334 which then sends it to the Client 4. All the other
340 Internet Draft 15 January 2007
343 servers in the cell will not see the routed message.
346 If the client is connected directly to the router, as router is also normal
347 SILC server, the messages inside the cell are always delivered only with
348 one server hop. If clients communicating with each other are connected
349 to the same server, no router interaction is needed. This is the optimal
350 situation of message delivery in the SILC network.
353 2.3 Communication in the Network
355 If the message is destined to client that does not belong to local cell
356 the message is routed to the router server to which the destination
357 client belongs, if the local router is connected to destination router.
358 If there is no direct connection to the destination router, the local
359 router routes the message to its primary route. The following diagram
360 represents message sending between cells.
364 1 --- S1 S4 --- 5 S2 --- 1
365 S/R - - - - - - - - S/R
373 Figure 3: Communication Between Cells
376 Example: Client 5. connected to Server 4. in Cell 1. sends message
377 to Client 2. connected to Server 1. in Cell 2. travels
378 from Server 4. to Router which routes the message to
379 Router in Cell 2, which then routes the message to
380 Server 1. All the other servers and routers in the
381 network will not see the routed message.
384 The optimal case of message delivery from the client point of view is
385 when clients are connected directly to the routers and the messages
386 are delivered from one router to the other.
396 Internet Draft 15 January 2007
399 2.4 Channel Communication
401 Messages may be sent to group of clients as well. Sending messages to
402 many clients works the same way as sending messages point to point, from
403 message delivery point of view. Security issues are another matter
404 which are not discussed in this section.
406 Router server handles the message routing to multiple recipients. If
407 any recipient is not in the same cell as the sender the messages are
410 Server distributes the channel message to its local clients which are
411 joined to the channel. Router also distributes the message to its
412 local clients on the channel.
415 2.5 Router Connections
417 Router connections play very important role in making the SILC like
418 network topology to work. For example, sending broadcast packets in
419 SILC network require special connections between routers; routers must
420 be connected in a specific way.
422 Every router has their primary route which is a connection to another
423 router in the network. Unless there is only two routers in the network
424 must not routers use each other as their primary routes. The router
425 connections in the network must form a ring.
427 Example with three routers in the network:
430 S/R1 - < - < - < - < - < - < - S/R2
433 \ - > - > - S/R3 - > - > - /
436 Figure 4: Router Connections
439 Example: Network with three routers. Router 1. uses Router 2. as its
440 primary router. Router 2. uses Router 3. as its primary router,
441 and Router 3. uses Router 1. as its primary router. When there
442 are four or more routers in th enetwork, there may be other
443 direct connections between the routers but they must not be used
446 The above example is applicable to any amount of routers in the network
452 Internet Draft 15 January 2007
455 except for two routers. If there are only two routers in the network both
456 routers must be able to handle situation where they use each other as their
459 The issue of router connections are very important especially with SILC
460 broadcast packets. Usually all router wide information in the network is
461 distributed by SILC broadcast packets. This sort of ring network, with
462 ability to have other direct routes in the network can cause interesting
463 routing problems. The [SILC2] discusses the routing of packets in this
464 sort of network in more detail.
467 3. SILC Specification
469 This section describes the SILC protocol. However, [SILC2] and
470 [SILC3] describes other important protocols that are part of this SILC
471 specification and must be read.
476 A client is a piece of software connecting to SILC server. SILC client
477 cannot be SILC server. Purpose of clients is to provide the user
478 interface of the SILC services for end user. Clients are distinguished
479 from other clients by unique Client ID. Client ID is a 128 bit ID that
480 is used in the communication in the SILC network. The client ID is
481 based on the user's IP address and nickname. User use logical nicknames
482 in communication which are then mapped to the corresponding Client ID.
483 Client IDs are low level identifications and should not be seen by the
486 Clients provide other information about the end user as well. Information
487 such as the nickname of the user, username and the host name of the end
488 user and user's real name. See section 3.2 Server for information of
489 the requirements of keeping this information.
491 The nickname selected by the user is not unique in the SILC network.
492 There can be 2^8 same nicknames for one IP address. As for comparison to
493 IRC [IRC] where nicknames are unique this is a fundamental difference
494 between SILC and IRC. This typically causes the server names or client's
495 host names to be used along with the nicknames on user interface to
496 identify specific users when sending messages. This feature of SILC
497 makes IRC style nickname-wars obsolete as no one owns their nickname;
498 there can always be someone else with the same nickname. Also, any kind
499 of nickname registering service becomes obsolete. See the section 3.13.1
500 for more information about nicknames.
508 Internet Draft 15 January 2007
513 Client ID is used to identify users in the SILC network. The Client ID
514 is unique to the extent that there can be 2^128 different Client IDs,
515 and IDs based on IPv6 addresses extends this to 2^224 different Client
516 IDs. Collisions are not expected to happen. The Client ID is defined
519 128 bit Client ID based on IPv4 addresses:
521 32 bit Server ID IP address (bits 1-32)
522 8 bit Random number or counter
523 88 bit Truncated MD5 hash value of the nickname
525 224 bit Client ID based on IPv6 addresses:
527 128 bit Server ID IP address (bits 1-128)
528 8 bit Random number or counter
529 88 bit Truncated MD5 hash value of the nickname
531 o Server ID IP address - Indicates the server where this
532 client is coming from. The IP address hence equals the
533 server IP address where the client is connected.
535 o Random number or counter - Random number to further
536 randomize the Client ID. Another choice is to use
537 a counter starting from the zero (0). This makes it
538 possible to have 2^8 same nicknames from the same
541 o MD5 hash - MD5 hash value of the case folded nickname is
542 truncated taking 88 bits from the start of the hash value.
543 This hash value is used to search the user's Client ID
544 from the ID lists. Note that the nickname MUST be prepared
545 using the stringprep [RFC3454] profile described in the
546 Appendix A before computing the MD5 hash. See also the
547 section 3.13.1 for more information.
549 Collisions could occur when more than 2^8 clients using same nickname
550 from the same server IP address is connected to the SILC network.
551 Server MUST be able to handle this situation by refusing to accept
552 anymore of that nickname.
554 Another possible collision may happen with the truncated hash value of
555 the nickname. It could be possible to have same truncated hash value
556 for two different nicknames. However, this is not expected to happen
557 nor cause any serious problems if it would occur. Nicknames are usually
558 logical and it is unlikely to have two distinct logical nicknames
564 Internet Draft 15 January 2007
567 produce same truncated hash value. Use of MD5 in nickname hash is not
573 Servers are the most important parts of the SILC network. They form the
574 basis of the SILC, providing a point to which clients may connect to.
575 There are two kinds of servers in SILC; normal servers and router servers.
576 This section focus on the normal server and router server is described
577 in the section 3.3 Router.
579 Normal servers MUST NOT directly connect to other normal server. Normal
580 servers may only directly connect to router server. If the message sent
581 by the client is destined outside the local server it is always sent to
582 the router server for further routing. Server may only have one active
583 connection to router on same port. Normal server MUST NOT connect to other
584 cell's router except in situations where its cell's router is unavailable.
587 3.2.1 Server's Local ID List
589 Normal server keeps various information about the clients and their end
590 users connected to it. Every normal server MUST keep list of all locally
591 connected clients, Client IDs, nicknames, usernames and host names and
592 user's real name. Normal servers only keeps local information and it
593 does not keep any global information. Hence, normal servers knows only
594 about their locally connected clients. This makes servers efficient as
595 they do not have to worry about global clients. Server is also responsible
596 of creating the Client IDs for their clients.
598 Normal server also keeps information about locally created channels and
601 Hence, local list for normal server includes:
603 server list - Router connection
611 client list - All clients in server
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628 channel list - All channels in server
631 o Client IDs on channel
632 o Client ID modes on channel
638 Servers are distinguished from other servers by unique 64 bit Server ID
639 (for IPv4) or 160 bit Server ID (for IPv6). The Server ID is used in
640 the SILC to route messages to correct servers. Server IDs also provide
641 information for Client IDs, see section 3.1.1 Client ID. Server ID is
644 64 bit Server ID based on IPv4 addresses:
646 32 bit IP address of the server
650 160 bit Server ID based on IPv6 addresses:
652 128 bit IP address of the server
656 o IP address of the server - This is the real IP address of
659 o Port - This is the port the server is bound to.
661 o Random number - This is used to further randomize the Server ID.
663 Collisions are not expected to happen in any conditions. The Server ID
664 is always created by the server itself and server is responsible of
665 distributing it to the router.
668 3.2.3 SILC Server Ports
670 The following ports has been assigned by IANA for the SILC protocol:
676 Internet Draft 15 January 2007
683 If there are needs to create new SILC networks in the future the port
684 numbers must be officially assigned by the IANA.
686 Server on network above privileged ports (>1023) SHOULD NOT be trusted
687 as they could have been set up by untrusted party.
692 Router server in SILC network is responsible for keeping the cell together
693 and routing messages to other servers and to other routers. Router server
694 may also act as normal server when clients may connect to it. This is not
695 requirement and router servers may be hidden from clients.
697 However, router servers have a lot of important tasks that normal servers
698 do not have. Router server knows everything and keeps the global state.
699 They know all clients currently on SILC, all servers and routers and all
700 channels in SILC. Routers are the only servers in SILC that care about
701 global information and keeping them up to date at all time.
704 3.3.1 Router's Local ID List
706 Router server as well MUST keep local list of connected clients and
707 locally created channels. However, this list is extended to include all
708 the informations of the entire cell, not just the server itself as for
711 However, on router this list is a lot smaller since routers do not need
712 to keep information about user's nickname, username and host name and real
713 name since these are not needed by the router. The router keeps only
714 information that it needs.
716 Hence, local list for router includes:
718 server list - All servers in the cell
725 client list - All clients in the cell
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735 channel list - All channels in the cell
737 o Client IDs on channel
738 o Client ID modes on channel
742 Note that locally connected clients and other information include all the
743 same information as defined in section section 3.2.1 Server's Local ID
744 List. Router MAY also cache same detailed information for other clients
748 3.3.2 Router's Global ID List
750 Router server MUST also keep global list. Normal servers do not have
751 global list as they know only about local information. Global list
752 includes all the clients on SILC, their Client IDs, all created channels
753 and their Channel IDs and all servers and routers on SILC and their
754 Server IDs. That is said, global list is for global information and the
755 list must not include the local information already on the router's local
758 Note that the global list does not include information like nicknames,
759 usernames and host names or user's real names. Router does not need to
760 keep these informations as they are not needed by the router. This
761 information is available from the client's server which maybe queried
764 Hence, global list includes:
766 server list - All servers in SILC
771 client list - All clients in SILC
774 channel list - All channels in SILC
776 o Client IDs on channel
777 o Client ID modes on channel
788 Internet Draft 15 January 2007
791 3.3.3 Router's Server ID
793 Router's Server ID is equivalent to normal Server ID. As routers are
794 normal servers same types of IDs applies for routers as well. See
795 section 3.2.2 Server ID.
802 A channel is a named group of one or more clients which will all receive
803 messages addressed to that channel. The channel is created when first
804 client requests JOIN command to the channel, and the channel ceases to
805 exist when the last client has left it. When channel exists, any client
806 can reference it using the Channel ID of the channel. If the channel has
807 a founder mode set and last client leaves the channel the channel does
808 not cease to exist. The founder mode can be used to make permanent
809 channels in the network. The founder of the channel can regain the
810 channel founder privileges on the channel later when he joins the
813 Channel names are unique although the real uniqueness comes from 64 bit
814 Channel ID. However, channel names are still unique and no two global
815 channels with same name may exist. See the section 3.13.1 for more
816 information about channel names.
818 Channels can have operators that can administrate the channel and operate
819 all of its modes. The following operators on channel exist on the
822 o Channel founder - When channel is created the joining client becomes
823 channel founder. Channel founder is channel operator with some more
824 privileges. Basically, channel founder can fully operate the channel
825 and all of its modes. The privileges are limited only to the
826 particular channel. There can be only one channel founder per
827 channel. Channel founder supersedes channel operator's privileges.
829 Channel founder privileges cannot be removed by any other operator on
830 channel. When channel founder leaves the channel there is no channel
831 founder on the channel. However, it is possible to set a mode for
832 the channel which allows the original channel founder to regain the
833 founder privileges even after leaving the channel. Channel founder
834 also cannot be removed by force from the channel.
836 o Channel operator - When client joins to channel that has not existed
837 previously it will become automatically channel operator (and channel
838 founder discussed above). Channel operator is able to administrate the
844 Internet Draft 15 January 2007
847 channel, set some modes on channel, remove a badly behaving client
848 from the channel and promote other clients to become channel
849 operator. The privileges are limited only to the particular channel.
851 Normal channel user may be promoted (opped) to channel operator
852 gaining channel operator privileges. Channel founder or other
853 channel operator may also demote (deop) channel operator to normal
861 Channels are distinguished from other channels by unique Channel ID.
862 The Channel ID is a 64 bit ID (for IPv4) or 160 bit ID (for IPv6), and
863 collisions are not expected to happen in any conditions. Channel names
864 are just for logical use of channels. The Channel ID is created by the
865 server where the channel is created. The Channel ID is defined as
868 64 bit Channel ID based on IPv4 addresses:
870 32 bit Router's Server ID IP address (bits 1-32)
871 16 bit Router's Server ID port (bits 33-48)
872 16 bit Random number or counter
874 160 bit Channel ID based on IPv6 addresses:
876 128 bit Router's Server ID IP address (bits 1-128)
877 16 bit Router's Server ID port (bits 129-144)
878 16 bit Random number or counter
880 o Router's Server ID IP address - Indicates the IP address of
881 the router of the cell where this channel is created. This is
882 taken from the router's Server ID. This way SILC routers know
883 where this channel resides in the SILC network.
885 o Router's Server ID port - Indicates the port of the channel on
886 the server. This is taken from the router's Server ID.
888 o Random number or counter - To further randomize the Channel ID.
889 Another choice is to use a counter starting from zero (0).
890 This makes sure that there are no collisions. This also means
891 that in a cell there can be 2^16 different channels.
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905 Operators are normal users with extra privileges to their server or
906 router. Usually these people are SILC server and router administrators
907 that take care of their own server and clients on them. The purpose of
908 operators is to administrate the SILC server or router. However, even
909 an operator with highest privileges is not able to enter invite-only
910 channels, to gain access to the contents of encrypted and authenticated
911 packets traveling in the SILC network or to gain channel operator
912 privileges on public channels without being promoted. They have the
913 same privileges as any normal user except they are able to administrate
914 their server or router.
919 Commands are very important part on SILC network especially for client
920 which uses commands to operate on the SILC network. Commands are used
921 to set nickname, join to channel, change modes and many other things.
923 Client usually sends the commands and server replies by sending a reply
924 packet to the command. Server MAY also send commands usually to serve
925 the original client's request. Usually server cannot send commands to
926 clients, however there MAY be commands that allow the server to send
927 commands to client. By default servers MAY send commands only to other
930 Note that the command reply is usually sent only after client has sent
931 the command request but server is allowed to send command reply packet
932 to client even if client has not requested the command. Client MAY
933 choose to ignore the command reply.
935 It is expected that some of the commands may be misused by clients
936 resulting various problems on the server side. Every implementation
937 SHOULD assure that commands may not be executed more than once, say,
938 in two (2) seconds. However, to keep response rate up, allowing for
939 example five (5) commands before limiting is allowed. It is RECOMMENDED
940 that commands such as SILC_COMMAND_NICK, SILC_COMMAND_JOIN,
941 SILC_COMMAND_LEAVE and SILC_COMMAND_KILL SHOULD be limited in all cases
942 as they require heavy operations. This should be sufficient to prevent
943 the misuse of commands.
945 SILC commands are described in [SILC4].
950 Packets are naturally the most important part of the protocol and the
956 Internet Draft 15 January 2007
959 packets are what actually makes the protocol. Packets in SILC network
960 are always encrypted using, usually the shared secret session key
961 or some other key, for example, channel key, when encrypting channel
962 messages. It is not possible to send a packet in SILC network without
963 encryption. The SILC Packet Protocol is a wide protocol and is described
964 in [SILC2]. This document does not define or describe details of
968 3.8 Packet Encryption
970 All packets passed in SILC network MUST be encrypted. This section
971 gives generic description of how packets must be encrypted in the SILC
972 network. The detailed description of the actual encryption process
973 of the packets are described in [SILC2].
975 Client and its server shares secret symmetric session key which is
976 established by the SILC Key Exchange Protocol, described in [SILC3].
977 Every packet sent from client to server, with exception of packets for
978 channels, are encrypted with this session key.
980 Channels have a channel key that are shared by every client on the channel.
981 However, the channel keys are cell specific thus one cell does not know
982 the channel key of the other cell, even if that key is for same channel.
983 Channel key is also known by the routers and all servers that have clients
984 on the channel. However, channels MAY have channel private keys that are
985 entirely local setting for the client. All clients on the channel MUST
986 know the channel private key beforehand to be able to talk on the
987 channel. In this case, no server or router knows the key for the channel.
989 Server shares secret symmetric session key with router which is
990 established by the SILC Key Exchange Protocol. Every packet passed from
991 server to router, with exception of packets for channels, are encrypted
992 with the shared session key. Same way, router server shares secret
993 symmetric key with its primary router. However, every packet passed
994 from router to other router, including packets for channels, are
995 encrypted with the shared session key. Every router connection MUST
996 have their own session keys.
999 3.8.1 Determination of the Source and the Destination
1001 The source and the destination of the packet needs to be determined
1002 to be able to route the packets to correct receiver. This information
1003 is available in the SILC Packet Header which is included in all packets
1004 sent in SILC network. The SILC Packet Header is described in [SILC2].
1006 The header MUST be encrypted with the session key of who is the next
1012 Internet Draft 15 January 2007
1015 receiver of the packet along the route. The receiver of the packet, for
1016 example a router along the route, is able to determine the sender and the
1017 destination of the packet by decrypting the SILC Packet Header and
1018 checking the IDs attached to the header. The IDs in the header will
1019 tell to where the packet needs to be sent and where it is coming from.
1021 The header in the packet MUST NOT change during the routing of the
1022 packet. The original sender, for example client, assembles the packet
1023 and the packet header and server or router between the sender and the
1024 receiver MUST NOT change the packet header. Note however, that some
1025 packets such as commands may be resent by a server to serve the client's
1026 original command. In this case the command packet sent by the server
1027 includes the server's IDs as it is a different packet. When server
1028 or router receives a packet it MUST verify that the Source ID is
1029 valid and correct ID for that sender.
1031 Note that the packet and the packet header may be encrypted with
1032 different keys. For example, packets to channels are encrypted with
1033 the channel key, however, the header is encrypted with the session key
1034 as described above. Most other packets have both header and packet
1035 payload encrypted with the same key, such as command packets.
1038 3.8.2 Client To Client
1040 The process of message delivery and encryption from client to another
1041 client is as follows.
1043 Example: Private message from client to another client on different
1044 servers. Clients do not share private message delivery
1045 keys; normal session keys are used.
1047 o Client 1 sends encrypted packet to its server. The packet is
1048 encrypted with the session key shared between client and its
1051 o Server determines the destination of the packet and decrypts
1052 the packet. Server encrypts the packet with session key shared
1053 between the server and its router, and sends the packet to the
1056 o Router determines the destination of the packet and decrypts
1057 the packet. Router encrypts the packet with session key
1058 shared between the router and the destination server, and sends
1059 the packet to the server.
1061 o Server determines the client to which the packet is destined
1062 to and decrypts the packet. Server encrypts the packet with
1068 Internet Draft 15 January 2007
1071 session key shared between the server and the destination client,
1072 and sends the packet to the client.
1074 o Client 2 decrypts the packet.
1077 Example: Private message from client to another client on different
1078 servers. Clients have established a secret shared private
1079 message delivery key with each other and that is used in
1080 the message encryption.
1082 o Client 1 sends encrypted packet to its server. The packet header
1083 is encrypted with the session key shared between the client and
1084 server, and the private message payload is encrypted with the
1085 private message delivery key shared between clients.
1087 o Server determines the destination of the packet and sends the
1088 packet to the router. Header is encrypted with the session key.
1090 o Router determines the destination of the packet and sends the
1091 packet to the server. Header is encrypted with the session key.
1093 o Server determines the client to which the packet is destined
1094 to and sends the packet to the client. Header is encrypted with
1097 o Client 2 decrypts the packet with the secret shared key.
1099 If clients share secret key with each other the private message
1100 delivery is much simpler since servers and routers between the
1101 clients do not need to decrypt and re-encrypt the entire packet.
1102 The packet header however is always encrypted with session key and
1103 is decrypted and re-encrypted with the session key of next recipient.
1105 The process for clients on same server is much simpler as there is
1106 no need to send the packet to the router. The process for clients
1107 on different cells is same as above except that the packet is routed
1108 outside the cell. The router of the destination cell routes the
1109 packet to the destination same way as described above.
1112 3.8.3 Client To Channel
1114 Process of message delivery from client on channel to all the clients
1117 Example: Channel of four users; two on same server, other two on
1118 different cells. Client sends message to the channel.
1124 Internet Draft 15 January 2007
1127 Packet header is encrypted with the session key, message
1128 data is encrypted with channel key.
1130 o Client 1 encrypts the packet with channel key and sends the
1131 packet to its server.
1133 o Server determines local clients on the channel and sends the
1134 packet to the Client on the same server. Server then sends
1135 the packet to its router for further routing.
1137 o Router determines local clients on the channel, if found
1138 sends packet to the local clients. Router determines global
1139 clients on the channel and sends the packet to its primary
1140 router or fastest route.
1142 o (Other router(s) do the same thing and sends the packet to
1145 o Server determines local clients on the channel and sends the
1146 packet to the client.
1148 o All clients receiving the packet decrypts it.
1151 3.8.4 Server To Server
1153 Server to server packet delivery and encryption is described in above
1154 examples. Router to router packet delivery is analogous to server to
1155 server. However, some packets, such as channel packets, are processed
1156 differently. These cases are described later in this document and
1157 more in detail in [SILC2].
1160 3.9 Key Exchange And Authentication
1162 Key exchange is done always when for example client connects to server
1163 but also when server and router, and router and another router connect
1164 to each other. The purpose of key exchange protocol is to provide secure
1165 key material to be used in the communication. The key material is used
1166 to derive various security parameters used to secure SILC packets. The
1167 SILC Key Exchange protocol is described in detail in [SILC3].
1169 Authentication is done after key exchange protocol has been successfully
1170 completed. The purpose of authentication is to authenticate for example
1171 client connecting to the server. However, clients MAY be accepted
1172 to connect to server without explicit authentication. Servers are
1173 REQUIRED to use authentication protocol when connecting. The
1174 authentication may be based on passphrase (pre-shared secret) or public
1180 Internet Draft 15 January 2007
1183 key based on digital signatures. All passphrases sent in SILC protocol
1184 MUST be UTF-8 [RFC3629] encoded. The connection authentication protocol
1185 is described in detail in [SILC3].
1188 3.9.1 Authentication Payload
1190 Authentication Payload is used separately from the SKE and the Connection
1191 Authentication protocols. It can be used during the session to
1192 authenticate with a remote. For example, a client can authenticate
1193 itself to a server to become server operator. In this case,
1194 Authentication Payload is used.
1196 The format of the Authentication Payload is as follows:
1199 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
1200 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
1201 | Payload Length | Authentication Method |
1202 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
1203 | Public Data Length | |
1204 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +
1208 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
1209 | Authentication Data Length | |
1210 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +
1212 ~ Authentication Data ~
1214 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
1216 Figure 5: Authentication Payload
1219 o Payload Length (2 bytes) - Length of the entire payload.
1221 o Authentication Method (2 bytes) - The method of the
1222 authentication. The authentication methods are defined
1223 in [SILC2] in the Connection Auth Request Payload. The NONE
1224 authentication method SHOULD NOT be used.
1226 o Public Data Length (2 bytes) - Indicates the length of
1227 the Public Data field.
1229 o Public Data (variable length) - This is defined only if
1230 the authentication method is public key. If it is any other
1236 Internet Draft 15 January 2007
1239 this field MAY include random data for padding purposes.
1240 However, in this case the field MUST be ignored by the
1243 When the authentication method is public key this includes
1244 128 to 4096 bytes of non-zero random data that is used in
1245 the signature process, described subsequently.
1247 o Authentication Data Length (2 bytes) - Indicates the
1248 length of the Authentication Data field. If zero (0)
1249 value is found in this field the payload MUST be
1252 o Authentication Data (variable length) - Authentication
1253 method dependent authentication data.
1256 If the authentication method is passphrase-based, the Authentication
1257 Data field includes the plaintext UTF-8 encoded passphrase. It is safe
1258 to send plaintext passphrase since the entire payload is encrypted. In
1259 this case the Public Data Length is set to zero (0), but MAY also include
1260 random data for padding purposes. It is also RECOMMENDED that maximum
1261 amount of padding is applied to SILC packet when using passphrase-based
1262 authentication. This way it is not possible to approximate the length
1263 of the passphrase from the encrypted packet.
1265 If the authentication method is public key based (or certificate)
1266 the Authentication Data is computed as follows:
1268 HASH = hash(random bytes | ID | public key (or certificate));
1269 Authentication Data = sign(HASH);
1271 The hash() and the sign() are the hash function and the public key
1272 cryptography function selected in the SKE protocol, unless otherwise
1273 stated in the context where this payload is used. The public key
1274 is SILC style public key unless certificates are used. The ID is the
1275 entity's ID (Client or Server ID) which is authenticating itself. The
1276 ID encoding is described in [SILC2]. The random bytes are non-zero
1277 random bytes of length between 128 and 4096 bytes, and will be included
1278 into the Public Data field as is.
1280 The receiver will compute the signature using the random data received
1281 in the payload, the ID associated to the connection and the public key
1282 (or certificate) received in the SKE protocol. After computing the
1283 receiver MUST verify the signature. Also in case of public key
1284 authentication this payload is always encrypted. This payload is
1285 always sent as part of some other payload.
1292 Internet Draft 15 January 2007
1297 This section defines all the allowed algorithms that can be used in
1298 the SILC protocol. This includes mandatory cipher, mandatory public
1299 key algorithm and MAC algorithms.
1304 Cipher is the encryption algorithm that is used to protect the data
1305 in the SILC packets. See [SILC2] for the actual encryption process and
1306 definition of how it must be done. SILC has a mandatory algorithm that
1307 must be supported in order to be compliant with this protocol.
1309 The following ciphers are defined in SILC protocol:
1311 aes-256-cbc AES in CBC mode, 256 bit key (REQUIRED)
1312 aes-256-ctr AES in CTR mode, 256 bit key (RECOMMENDED)
1313 aes-256-rcbc AES in randomized CBC mode, 256 bit key (OPTIONAL)
1314 aes-192-<mode> AES in <mode> mode, 192 bit key (OPTIONAL)
1315 aes-128-<mode> AES in <mode> mode, 128 bit key (RECOMMENDED)
1316 twofish-256-<mode> Twofish in <mode> mode, 256 bit key (OPTIONAL)
1317 twofish-192-<mode> Twofish in <mode> mode, 192 bit key (OPTIONAL)
1318 twofish-128-<mode> Twofish in <mode> mode, 128 bit key (OPTIONAL)
1319 cast-256-<mode> CAST-256 in <mode> mode, 256 bit key (OPTIONAL)
1320 cast-192-<mode> CAST-256 in <mode> mode, 192 bit key (OPTIONAL)
1321 cast-128-<mode> CAST-256 in <mode> mode, 128 bit key (OPTIONAL)
1322 serpent-<len>-<mode> Serpent in <mode> mode, <len> bit key (OPTIONAL)
1323 rc6-<len>-<mode> RC6 in <mode> mode, <len> bit key (OPTIONAL)
1324 mars-<len>-<mode> MARS in <mode> mode, <len> bit key (OPTIONAL)
1325 none No encryption (OPTIONAL)
1327 The <mode> is either "cbc", "ctr" or "rcbc". Other encryption modes MAY
1328 be defined to be used in SILC using the same name format. The <len> is
1329 either 256, 192 or 128 bit key length. Also, additional ciphers MAY be
1330 defined to be used in SILC by using the same name format as above.
1332 Algorithm "none" does not perform any encryption process at all and
1333 thus is not recommended to be used. It is recommended that no client
1334 or server implementation would accept "none" algorithm except in special
1340 The "cbc" encryption mode is the standard cipher-block chaining mode.
1341 The very first IV is derived from the SILC Key Exchange protocol.
1342 Subsequent IVs for encryption is the previous ciphertext block. The very
1348 Internet Draft 15 January 2007
1351 first IV MUST be random and is generated as described in [SILC3].
1356 The "ctr" encryption mode is Counter Mode (CTR). The CTR mode in SILC is
1357 stateful in encryption and decryption. Both sender and receiver maintain
1358 the counter for the CTR mode and thus can precompute the key stream for
1359 encryption and decryption. By default, CTR mode does not require
1360 plaintext padding, however implementations MAY apply padding to the
1361 packets. If the last key block is larger than the last plaintext block
1362 the resulted value is truncated to the size of the plaintext block and
1363 the most significant bits are used. When sending authentication data
1364 inside packets the maximum amount of padding SHOULD be applied with
1367 In CTR mode only the encryption operation of the cipher is used. The
1368 decryption operation is not needed since both encryption and decryption
1369 process is simple XOR with the plaintext block and the key stream block.
1371 The counter block is used to create the key for the CTR mode. The format
1372 of the 128 bit counter block is as follows:
1375 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
1376 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
1377 | Truncated HASH from SKE |
1378 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
1379 | Sending/Receiving IV from SKE |
1380 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
1382 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
1384 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
1386 Figure 6: Counter Block
1388 o Truncated HASH from SKE (4 bytes) - This value is the first 4
1389 bytes from the HASH value that was computed as a result of SKE
1390 protocol. This acts as session identifier and each rekey MUST
1391 produce a new HASH value.
1393 o Sending/Receiving IV from SKE (4 bytes) - If the CTR mode is fully
1394 stateful this field MUST include the first 4 bytes from the Sending
1395 IV or Receiving IV generated in SKE protocol. When this mode is
1396 used to encrypt sending traffic the Sending IV is used, when used
1397 to decrypt receiving traffic the Receiving IV is used. This assures
1398 that two parties of the protocol use different IV for sending
1404 Internet Draft 15 January 2007
1407 traffic. Each rekey MUST produce a new value.
1409 If the IV Included flag is negotiated in SKE or CTR mode is used
1410 where the IV is included in the data payload, this field is the
1411 Nonce field from the IV received in the packet, defined below.
1413 o Packet Counter (4 bytes) - This is MSB first ordered monotonically
1414 increasing packet counter. It is set value 1 for first packet and
1415 increases for subsequent packets. After rekey the counter MUST
1418 If the IV Included flag is negotiated in SKE or CTR mode is used
1419 where the IV is included in the data payload, this field is the
1420 Packet Counter field from the IV received in the packet, defined
1423 o Block Counter (4 bytes) - This is an MSB first ordered block
1424 counter starting from 1 for first block and increasing for
1425 subsequent blocks. The counter is always set to value 1 for
1428 CTR mode MUST NOT be used with "none" MAC. Implementations also MUST
1429 assure that the same counter block is not used to encrypt more than
1430 one block. None of the counters must be allowed to wrap without rekey.
1431 Also, the key material used with CTR mode MUST be fresh key material.
1432 Static keys (pre-shared keys) MUST NOT be used with CTR mode. For this
1433 reason using CTR mode to encrypt for example channel messages or private
1434 messages with a pre-shared key is inappropriate. For private messages,
1435 the Key Agreement [SILC2] could be performed to produce fresh key material.
1437 If the IV Included flag was negotiated in SKE, or CTR mode is used to
1438 protect channel messages where the IV will be included in the Message
1439 Payload, the Initialization Vector (IV) to be used is a 64-bit block
1440 containing randomness and packet counter. Also note, that in this case
1441 the decryption process is not stateful and receiver cannot precompute
1442 the key stream. Hence, the Initialization Vector (IV) when CTR mode is
1446 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
1447 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
1449 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
1451 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
1453 Figure 7: CTR Mode Initialization Vector
1460 Internet Draft 15 January 2007
1463 o Nonce (4 bytes) - This field should be random or otherwise not
1464 easily determinable and SHOULD change for each packet.
1466 o Packet Counter (4 bytes) - This is MSB first ordered monotonically
1467 increasing packet counter. It is set value 1 for first packet and
1468 increases for subsequent packets. After rekey the counter MUST
1471 When decrypting the packet the Counter Block is assembled by concatenating
1472 the truncated hash, with the received nonce and packet counter, and with
1473 the block counter. The Counter Block is then used to compute the key
1474 stream to perform the decryption.
1477 3.10.1.3 Randomized CBC Mode
1479 The "rcbc" encryption mode is CBC mode with randomized IV. This means
1480 that each IV for each packet MUST be chosen randomly. When encrypting
1481 more than one block the normal IV chaining is used, but for the first
1482 block new random IV is selected in each packet. In this mode the IV
1483 is appended to the ciphertext. If this mode is used to secure the SILC
1484 session, the IV Included flag must be negotiated in SILC Key Exchange
1485 protocol. It may also be used to secure Message Payloads which can
1486 deliver the IV to the recipient.
1489 3.10.2 Public Key Algorithms
1491 Public keys are used in SILC to authenticate entities in SILC network
1492 and to perform other tasks related to public key cryptography. The
1493 public keys are also used in the SILC Key Exchange protocol [SILC3].
1495 The following public key algorithms are defined in SILC protocol:
1500 DSS is described in [Menezes]. The RSA MUST be implemented according
1501 PKCS #1 [PKCS1]. When using SILC Public Key version 2 the PKCS #1
1502 implementation MUST be compliant with PKCS #1 version 1.5. The signatures
1503 are computed with appendix; the hash OID is included in the signature.
1504 The user may always select the hash algorithm for the signatures. When
1505 using SILC Public Key version 1 the PKCS #1 implementation MUST be
1506 compliant with PKCS #1 version 1.5 where signatures are computed without
1507 appendix; the hash OID is not present in the signature. The hash
1508 algorithm used is specified separately or the default hash algorithm is
1509 used, as defined below.
1516 Internet Draft 15 January 2007
1519 Additional public key algorithms MAY be defined to be used in SILC.
1521 When signatures are computed in SILC the computing of the signature is
1522 denoted as sign(). The signature computing procedure is dependent of
1523 the public key algorithm, and the public key or certificate encoding.
1524 When using SILC public key the signature is computed as described in
1525 previous paragraph for RSA and DSS keys. If the hash function is not
1526 specified separately for signing process SHA-1 MUST be used, except with
1527 SILC public key version 2 and RSA algorithm when the user MAY always
1528 select the hash algorithm. In this case the hash algorithm is included
1529 in the signature and can be retrieved during verification. When using
1530 SSH2 public keys the signature is computed as described in [SSH-TRANS].
1531 When using X.509 version 3 certificates the signature is computed as
1532 described in [PKCS7]. When using OpenPGP certificates the signature is
1533 computed as described in [PGP] and the PGP signature type used is 0x00.
1536 3.10.2.1 Multi-Precision Integers
1538 Multi-Precision (MP) integers in SILC are encoded and decoded as defined
1539 in PKCS #1 [PKCS1]. MP integers are unsigned, encoded with the exact
1540 octet length of the integer. No extra leading zero octets may appear.
1541 The actual length of the integer is the bit size of the integer not
1542 counting any leading zero bits. The octet length is derived by calculating
1543 (bit_length + 7) / 8.
1546 3.10.3 Hash Functions
1548 Hash functions are used as part of MAC algorithms defined in the next
1549 section. They are also used in the SILC Key Exchange protocol defined
1552 The following Hash algorithm are defined in SILC protocol:
1554 sha1 SHA-1, length = 20 bytes (REQUIRED)
1555 sha256 SHA-256, length = 32 bytes (RECOMMENDED)
1556 md5 MD5, length = 16 bytes (RECOMMENDED)
1559 3.10.4 MAC Algorithms
1561 Data integrity is protected by computing a message authentication code
1562 (MAC) of the packet data. See [SILC2] for details how to compute the
1565 The following MAC algorithms are defined in SILC protocol:
1572 Internet Draft 15 January 2007
1575 hmac-sha1-96 HMAC-SHA1, length = 12 bytes (REQUIRED)
1576 hmac-sha256-96 HMAC-SHA256, length = 12 bytes (RECOMMENDED)
1577 hmac-md5-96 HMAC-MD5, length = 12 bytes (OPTIONAL)
1578 hmac-sha1 HMAC-SHA1, length = 20 bytes (OPTIONAL)
1579 hmac-sha256 HMAC-SHA256, length = 32 bytes (OPTIONAL)
1580 hmac-md5 HMAC-MD5, length = 16 bytes (OPTIONAL)
1581 none No MAC (OPTIONAL)
1583 The "none" MAC is not recommended to be used as the packet is not
1584 authenticated when MAC is not computed. It is recommended that no
1585 client or server would accept none MAC except in special debugging
1588 The HMAC algorithm is described in [HMAC]. The hash algorithms used
1589 in HMACs, the SHA-1 is described in [RFC3174] and MD5 is described
1590 in [RFC1321]. The SHA-256 algorithm and its used with HMAC is described
1593 Additional MAC algorithms MAY be defined to be used in SILC.
1596 3.10.5 Compression Algorithms
1598 SILC protocol supports compression that may be applied to unencrypted
1599 data. It is recommended to use compression on slow links as it may
1600 significantly speed up the data transmission. By default, SILC does not
1601 use compression which is the mode that must be supported by all SILC
1604 The following compression algorithms are defined:
1606 none No compression (REQUIRED)
1607 zlib GNU ZLIB (LZ77) compression (OPTIONAL)
1609 Additional compression algorithms MAY be defined to be used in SILC.
1612 3.11 SILC Public Key
1614 This section defines the type and format of the SILC public key. All
1615 implementations MUST support this public key type. See [SILC3] for
1616 other optional public key and certificate types allowed in the SILC
1617 protocol. Public keys in SILC may be used to authenticate entities
1618 and to perform other tasks related to public key cryptography.
1620 The format of the SILC Public Key is as follows:
1628 Internet Draft 15 January 2007
1632 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
1633 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
1634 | Public Key Length |
1635 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
1636 | Algorithm Name Length | |
1637 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +
1641 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
1642 | Identifier Length | |
1643 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +
1647 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
1651 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
1653 Figure 5: SILC Public Key
1656 o Public Key Length (4 bytes) - Indicates the full length
1657 of the SILC Public Key, not including this field.
1659 o Algorithm Name Length (2 bytes) - Indicates the length
1660 of the Algorithm Length field, not including this field.
1662 o Algorithm name (variable length) - Indicates the name
1663 of the public key algorithm that the key is. See the
1664 section 3.10.2 Public Key Algorithms for defined names.
1666 o Identifier Length (2 bytes) - Indicates the length of
1667 the Identifier field, not including this field.
1669 o Identifier (variable length) - Indicates the identifier
1670 of the public key. This data can be used to identify the
1671 owner of the key. The identifier may be of the following
1675 HN Host name or IP address
1684 Internet Draft 15 January 2007
1690 Examples of an identifier:
1692 `UN=priikone, HN=poseidon.pspt.fi, E=priikone@poseidon.pspt.fi'
1694 `UN=sam, HN=dummy.fi, RN=Sammy Sam, C=Finland, V=2'
1696 At least user name (UN) and host name (HN) MUST be provided as
1697 identifier. The fields are separated by commas (`,'). If
1698 comma is in the identifier string it must be escaped as `\,',
1699 for example, `O=Company XYZ\, Inc.'. Other characters that
1700 require escaping are listed in [RFC2253] and are to be escaped
1701 as defined therein. The Version (V) may only be a decimal digit.
1703 o Public Data (variable length) - Includes the actual
1704 public data of the public key.
1706 The format of this field for RSA algorithm is
1715 The format of this field for DSS algorithm is
1727 The variable length fields are multiple precession
1728 integers encoded as strings in both examples.
1730 Other algorithms must define their own type of this
1731 field if they are used.
1733 The SILC Public Key is version is 2. If the Version (V) identifier is
1734 not present the SILC Public Key version is expected to be 1. All new
1740 Internet Draft 15 January 2007
1743 implementations SHOULD support version 1 but SHOULD only generate version 2.
1744 In this case the Version (V) identifier MUST be present.
1746 All fields in the public key are in MSB (most significant byte first)
1747 order. All strings in the public key MUST be UTF-8 encoded.
1749 If an external protocol needs to refer to SILC Public Key by name, the
1750 names "silc-rsa" and "silc-dss" for SILC Public Key based on RSA algorithm
1751 and SILC Public Key based on DSS algorithm, respectively, are to be used.
1752 However, this SILC specification does not use these names directly, and
1753 they are defined here for external protocols (protocols that may like
1754 to use SILC Public Key).
1756 A fingerprint from SILC Public Key is computed from the whole encoded
1757 public key data block. All fields are included in computation. Compliant
1758 implementations MUST support computing a 160-bit SHA-1 fingerprint.
1761 3.12 SILC Version Detection
1763 The version detection of both client and server is performed at the
1764 connection phase while executing the SILC Key Exchange protocol. The
1765 version identifier is exchanged between initiator and responder. The
1766 version identifier is of the following format:
1768 SILC-<protocol version>-<software version>
1770 The version strings are of the following format:
1772 protocol version = <major>.<minor>
1773 software version = <major>[.<minor>[.<build or vendor string>]]
1775 Protocol version MUST provide both major and minor version. Currently
1776 implementations MUST set the protocol version and accept at least the
1777 protocol version as SILC-1.2-<software version>. If new protocol version
1778 causes incompatibilities with older version the <minor> version number
1779 MUST be incremented. The <major> is incremented if new protocol version
1780 is fully incompatible.
1782 Software version MAY provide major, minor and build (vendor) version.
1783 The software version MAY be freely set and accepted. The version string
1784 MUST consist of printable US-ASCII characters.
1786 Thus, the version strings could be, for example:
1790 SILC-1.2-1.0.VendorXYZ
1796 Internet Draft 15 January 2007
1799 SILC-1.2-2.4.5 Vendor Limited
1802 3.13 UTF-8 Strings in SILC
1804 By default all strings that are sent in SILC protocol MUST be UTF-8
1805 [RFC3269] encoded, unless otherwise defined. This means that any string
1806 sent inside for example, command, command reply, notify or any packet
1807 payload is UTF-8 encoded. Also nicknames, channel names, server names,
1808 and hostnames are UTF-8 encoded. This definition does not affect
1809 messages sent in SILC, as the Message Payload provides its own mechanism
1810 to indicate whether a message is UTF-8 text message, data message, which
1811 may use its own character encoding, or pure binary message [SILC2].
1813 Certain limitations are imposed on the UTF-8 encoded strings in SILC.
1814 The UTF-8 encoded strings MUST NOT include any characters that are
1815 marked in the Unicode standard as control codes, noncharacters,
1816 reserved or private range characters, or any other illegal Unicode
1817 characters. Also the BOM (Byte-Order Mark) MUST NOT be used as byte
1818 order signature in UTF-8 encoded strings. A string containing these
1819 characters MUST be treated as malformed UTF-8 encoding.
1821 The Unicode standard defines that malformed sequences shall be signalled
1822 by replacing the sequence with a replacement character. Even though,
1823 in case of SILC these strings may not be malformed UTF-8 encodings
1824 they MUST be treated as malformed strings. Implementation MAY use
1825 a replacement character, however, the character Unicode standard defines
1826 MUST NOT be used, but another character must be chosen. It is, however,
1827 RECOMMENDED that an error is returned instead of using replacement
1828 character if it is possible. For example, when setting a nickname
1829 with SILC_COMMAND_NICK command, implementation is able to send error
1830 indication back to the command sender. It must be noted that on server
1831 implementation if a character sequence is merely outside of current
1832 character subset, but is otherwise valid character, it MUST NOT be
1833 replaced by a replacement character.
1835 On user interface where UTF-8 strings are displayed the implementation
1836 is RECOMMENDED to escape any character that it is unable to render
1837 properly. The escaping may be done for example as described in
1838 [RFC2253]. The escaping makes it possible to retrieve the original
1839 UTF-8 encoding. Alternatively, a replacement character may be used
1840 if it does not cause practical problems to the implementation.
1843 3.13.1 UTF-8 Identifier Strings
1845 Identifier strings are special strings in SILC protocol that require
1846 more careful processing, than the general UTF-8 strings described in the
1852 Internet Draft 15 January 2007
1855 previous section. These strings include the nicknames, server names,
1856 hostnames and some other identifier strings. These strings are prepared
1857 using the stringprep [RFC3454] standard. The Appendix A defines the
1858 stringprep profile for SILC identifier strings and conforming
1859 implementation MUST use the profile to prepare any identifier string.
1861 The stringprep profile describes how identifier strings are prepared,
1862 what characters they may include, and which characters are prohibited.
1863 Identifier strings with prohibited characters MUST be treated as
1866 The channel name is also special identifier strings with some slight
1867 differences to other identifier strings. The Appendix B defines the
1868 stringprep profile for the channel name strings and conforming
1869 implementation MUST use the profile to prepare any channel name string.
1871 Because of the profile the identifier strings in SILC may generally
1872 include only letters, numbers, most punctuation characters, and some
1873 other characters. For practical reasons most symbol characters and
1874 many other special characters are prohibited. All identifier strings
1875 are case folded and comparing the identifier strings MUST be done as
1878 In general, the identifier strings does not have a maximum length.
1879 However, the length of a nickname string MUST NOT exceed 128 bytes, and
1880 the length of a channel name string MUST NOT exceed 256 bytes. Since
1881 these strings are UTF-8 encoded the length of one character may be
1882 longer than one byte. This means that the character length of these
1883 strings may be shorter than the maximum length of the string in bytes.
1884 The minimum length of an identifier string MUST be at least one character,
1885 which may be one byte or more in length. Implementation MAY limit the
1886 maximum length of an identifier string, with exception of the nickname
1887 and channel name strings which has the explicit length definition.
1892 Backup routers may exist in the cell in addition to the primary router.
1893 However, they must not be active routers or act as routers in the cell.
1894 Only one router may be acting as primary router in the cell. In the case
1895 of failure of the primary router one of the backup routers becomes active.
1896 The purpose of backup routers are in case of failure of the primary router
1897 to maintain working connections inside the cell and outside the cell and
1900 Backup routers are normal servers in the cell that are prepared to take
1901 over the tasks of the primary router if needed. They need to have at
1902 least one direct and active connection to the primary router of the cell.
1908 Internet Draft 15 January 2007
1911 This communication channel is used to send the router information to
1912 the backup router. When the backup router connects to the primary router
1913 of the cell it MUST present itself as router server in the Connection
1914 Authentication protocol, even though it is normal server as long as the
1915 primary router is available. Reason for this is that the configuration
1916 needed in the responder end requires usually router connection level
1917 configuration. The responder, however must understand and treat the
1918 connection as normal server (except when feeding router level data to
1921 Backup router must know everything that the primary router knows to be
1922 able to take over the tasks of the primary router. It is the primary
1923 router's responsibility to feed the data to the backup router. If the
1924 backup router does not know all the data in the case of failure some
1925 connections may be lost. The primary router of the cell must consider
1926 the backup router being an actual router server when it feeds the data
1929 In addition to having direct connection to the primary router of the
1930 cell, the backup router must also have connection to the same router
1931 to which the primary router of the cell is connected. However, it must
1932 not be the active router connection meaning that the backup router must
1933 not use that channel as its primary route and it must not notify the
1934 router about having connected servers, channels and clients behind it.
1935 It merely connects to the router. This sort of connection is later
1936 referred to as being a passive connection. Some keepalive actions may
1937 be needed by the router to keep the connection alive.
1939 It is required that other normal servers have passive connections to
1940 the backup router(s) in the cell. Some keepalive actions may be needed
1941 by the server to keep the connection alive. After they notice the
1942 failure of the primary router they must start using the connection to
1943 the first backup router as their primary route.
1945 Also, if any other router in the network is using the cell's primary
1946 router as its own primary router, it must also have passive connection
1947 to the cell's backup router. It too is prepared to switch to use the
1948 backup router as its new primary router as soon as the original primary
1949 router becomes unresponsive.
1951 All of the parties of this protocol know which one is the backup router
1952 of the cell from their local configuration. Each of the entities must
1953 be configured accordingly and care must be taken when configuring the
1954 backup routers, servers and other routers in the network.
1956 It must be noted that some of the channel messages and private messages
1957 may be lost during the switch to the backup router, unless the message
1958 flag SILC_MESSAGE_FLAG_ACK is set in the message. The announcements
1964 Internet Draft 15 January 2007
1967 assure that the state of the network is not lost during the switch.
1969 It is RECOMMENDED that there would be at least one backup router in
1970 the cell. It is NOT RECOMMENDED to have all servers in the cell acting
1971 as backup routers as it requires establishing several connections to
1972 several servers in the cell. Large cells can easily have several
1973 backup routers in the cell.
1975 The order of the backup routers are decided at the local configuration
1976 phase. All the parties of this protocol must be configured accordingly to
1977 understand the order of the backup routers. It is not required that the
1978 backup server is actually an active server in the cell. The backup router
1979 may be a redundant server in the cell that does not accept normal client
1980 connections at all. It may be reserved purely for the backup purposes.
1982 If also the first backup router is down as well and there is another
1983 backup router in the cell then it will start acting as the primary
1984 router as described above.
1987 3.14.1 Switching to Backup Router
1989 When the primary router of the cell becomes unresponsive, for example
1990 by sending EOF to the connection, all the parties of this protocol MUST
1991 replace the old connection to the primary router with first configured
1992 backup router. The backup router usually needs to do local modifications
1993 to its database in order to update all the information needed to maintain
1994 working routes. The backup router must understand that clients that
1995 were originated from the primary router are now originated from some of
1996 the existing server connections and must update them accordingly. It
1997 must also remove those clients that were owned by the primary router
1998 since those connections were lost when the primary router became
2001 All the other parties of the protocol must also update their local
2002 database to understand that the route to the primary router will now go
2003 to the backup router.
2005 Servers connected to the backup router MUST send SILC_PACKET_RESUME_ROUTER
2006 packet with type value 21, to indicate that the server will start using
2007 the backup router as primary router. The backup router MUST NOT allow
2008 this action if it detects that primary is still up and running. If
2009 backup router knows that primary is up and running it MUST send
2010 SILC_PACKET_FAILURE with type value 21 (4 bytes, MSB first order) back
2011 to the server. The server then MUST NOT use the backup as primary
2012 router, but must try to establish connection back to the primary router.
2013 If the action is allowed type value 21 is sent back to the server from
2014 the backup router. It is RECOMMENDED that implementations use the
2020 Internet Draft 15 January 2007
2023 SILC_COMMAND_PING command to detect whether primary router is responsive.
2024 If the backup router notices that the primary router is unresponsive
2025 it SHOULD NOT start sending data to server links before the server has
2026 sent the SILC_PACKET_RESUME_ROUTER with type value 21.
2028 The servers connected to the backup router must then announce their
2029 clients, channels, channel users, channel user modes, channel modes,
2030 topics and other information to the backup router. This is to assure
2031 that none of the important notify packets were lost during the switch
2032 to the backup router. The backup router must check which of these
2033 announced entities it already has and distribute the new ones to the
2036 The backup router too must announce its servers, clients, channels
2037 and other information to the new primary router. The primary router
2038 of the backup router too must announce its information to the backup
2039 router. Both must process only the ones they do not know about. If
2040 any of the announced modes do not match then they are enforced in
2041 normal manner as defined in section 4.2.1 Announcing Clients, Channels
2045 3.14.2 Resuming Primary Router
2047 Usually the primary router is unresponsive only a short period of time
2048 and it is intended that the original router of the cell will resume
2049 its position as primary router when it comes back online. The backup
2050 router that is now acting as primary router of the cell must constantly
2051 try to connect to the original primary router of the cell. It is
2052 RECOMMENDED that it would try to reconnect in 30 second intervals to
2055 When the connection is established to the primary router the backup
2056 resuming protocol is executed. The protocol is advanced as follows:
2058 1. Backup router sends SILC_PACKET_RESUME_ROUTER packet with type
2059 value 1 to the primary router that came back online. The packet
2060 will indicate the primary router has been replaced by the backup
2061 router. After sending the packet the backup router will announce
2062 all of its channels, channel users, modes etc. to the primary
2065 If the primary knows that it has not been replaced (for example
2066 the backup itself disconnected from the primary router and thinks
2067 that it is now primary in the cell) the primary router send
2068 SILC_PACKET_FAILURE with the type value 1 (4 bytes, MSB first
2069 order) back to the backup router. If backup receives this it
2070 MUST NOT continue with the backup resuming protocol.
2076 Internet Draft 15 January 2007
2079 2. Backup router sends SILC_PACKET_RESUME_ROUTER packet with type
2080 value 1 to its current primary router to indicate that it will
2081 resign as being primary router. Then, backup router sends the
2082 SILC_PACKET_RESUME_ROUTER packet with type value 1 to all
2083 connected servers to also indicate that it will resign as being
2086 3. Backup router also send SILC_PACKET_RESUME_ROUTER packet with
2087 type value 1 to the router that is using the backup router
2088 currently as its primary router.
2090 4. Any server and router that receives the SILC_PACKET_RESUME_ROUTER
2091 with type value 1 must reconnect immediately to the primary
2092 router of the cell that came back online. After they have created
2093 the connection they MUST NOT use that connection as active primary
2094 route but still route all packets to the backup router. After
2095 the connection is created they MUST send SILC_PACKET_RESUME_ROUTER
2096 with type value 2 back to the backup router. The session ID value
2097 found in the first packet MUST be set in this packet.
2099 5. Backup router MUST wait for all packets with type value 2 before
2100 it continues with the protocol. It knows from the session ID values
2101 set in the packet when it has received all packets. The session
2102 value should be different in all packets it has sent earlier.
2103 After the packets are received the backup router sends the
2104 SILC_PACKET_RESUME_ROUTER packet with type value 3 to the
2105 primary router that came back online. This packet will indicate
2106 that the backup router is now ready to resign as being primary
2107 router. The session ID value in this packet MUST be the same as
2108 in the first packet sent to the primary router. During this time
2109 the backup router must still route all packets it is receiving
2110 from server connections.
2112 6. The primary router receives the packet and send the packet
2113 SILC_PACKET_RESUME_ROUTER with type value 4 to all connected servers
2114 including the backup router. It also sends the packet with type
2115 value 4 to its primary router, and to the router that is using
2116 it as its primary router. The Session ID value in these packets
2119 7. Any server and router that receives the SILC_PACKET_RESUME_ROUTER
2120 packet with type value 4 must switch their primary route to the new
2121 primary router and remove the route for the backup router, since
2122 it is no longer the primary router of the cell. They must also
2123 update their local database to understand that the clients are
2124 not originated from the backup router but from the locally connected
2125 servers. After that they MUST announce their channels, channel
2126 users, modes etc. to the primary router. They MUST NOT use the
2132 Internet Draft 15 January 2007
2135 backup router connection after this and the connection is considered
2136 to be a passive connection. The implementation SHOULD be able
2137 to disable the connection without closing the actual link.
2139 After this protocol is executed the backup router is now again a normal
2140 server in the cell that has the backup link to the primary router. The
2141 primary router feeds the router specific data again to the backup router.
2142 All server connections to the backup router are considered passive
2145 When the primary router of the cell comes back online and connects
2146 to its remote primary router, the remote primary router MUST send the
2147 SILC_PACKET_RESUME_ROUTER packet with type value 20 indicating that the
2148 connection is not allowed since the router has been replaced by an
2149 backup router in the cell. The session ID value in this packet SHOULD be
2150 zero (0). When the primary router receives this packet it MUST NOT use
2151 the connection as active connection but must understand that it cannot
2152 act as primary router in the cell, until the backup resuming protocol has
2155 The following type values has been defined for SILC_PACKET_RESUME_ROUTER
2158 1 SILC_SERVER_BACKUP_START
2159 2 SILC_SERVER_BACKUP_START_CONNECTED
2160 3 SILC_SERVER_BACKUP_START_ENDING
2161 4 SILC_SERVER_BACKUP_START_RESUMED
2162 20 SILC_SERVER_BACKUP_START_REPLACED
2163 21 SILC_SERVER_BACKUP_START_USE
2165 If any other value is found in the type field the packet MUST be
2166 discarded. The SILC_PACKET_RESUME_ROUTER packet and its payload
2167 is defined in [SILC2].
2172 This section describes various SILC procedures such as how the
2173 connections are created and registered, how channels are created and
2174 so on. The references [SILC2], [SILC3] and [SILC4] permeate this
2175 section's definitions.
2178 4.1 Creating Client Connection
2180 This section describes the procedure when a client connects to SILC
2181 server. When client connects to server the server MUST perform IP
2182 address lookup and reverse IP address lookup to assure that the origin
2188 Internet Draft 15 January 2007
2191 host really is who it claims to be. Client, a host, connecting to server
2192 SHOULD have both valid IP address and fully qualified domain name (FQDN).
2194 After that the client and server performs SILC Key Exchange protocol
2195 which will provide the key material used later in the communication.
2196 The key exchange protocol MUST be completed successfully before the
2197 connection registration may continue. The SILC Key Exchange protocol
2198 is described in [SILC3].
2200 Typical server implementation would keep a list of connections that it
2201 allows to connect to the server. The implementation would check, for
2202 example, the connecting client's IP address from the connection list
2203 before the SILC Key Exchange protocol has been started. The reason for
2204 this is that if the host is not allowed to connect to the server there
2205 is no reason to perform the key exchange protocol.
2207 After successful key exchange protocol the client and server perform
2208 connection authentication protocol. The purpose of the protocol is to
2209 authenticate the client connecting to the server. Flexible
2210 implementation could also accept the client to connect to the server
2211 without explicit authentication. However, if authentication is
2212 desired for a specific client it may be based on passphrase or
2213 public key authentication. If authentication fails the connection
2214 MUST be terminated. The connection authentication protocol is described
2217 After successful key exchange and authentication protocol the client
2218 MUST register itself by sending SILC_PACKET_NEW_CLIENT packet to the
2219 server. This packet includes various information about the client
2220 that the server uses to register the client. Server registers the
2221 client and sends SILC_PACKET_NEW_ID to the client which includes the
2222 created Client ID that the client MUST start using after that. After
2223 that all SILC packets from the client MUST have the Client ID as the
2224 Source ID in the SILC Packet Header, described in [SILC2].
2226 Client MUST also get the server's Server ID that is to be used as
2227 Destination ID in the SILC Packet Header when communicating with
2228 the server (for example when sending commands to the server). The
2229 ID may be resolved in two ways. Client can take the ID from an
2230 previously received packet from server that MUST include the ID,
2231 or to send SILC_COMMAND_INFO command and receive the Server ID as
2234 Server MAY choose not to use the information received in the
2235 SILC_PACKET_NEW_CLIENT packet. For example, if public key or
2236 certificate were used in the authentication, server MAY use that
2237 information rather than what it received from client. This is a suitable
2238 way to get the true information about client if it is available.
2244 Internet Draft 15 January 2007
2247 The nickname of client is initially set to the username sent in the
2248 SILC_PACKET_NEW_CLIENT packet. User may set the nickname to something
2249 more desirable by sending SILC_COMMAND_NICK command. However, this is
2250 not required as part of registration process.
2252 Server MUST also distribute the information about newly registered
2253 client to its router (or if the server is router, to all routers in
2254 the SILC network). More information about this in [SILC2].
2256 Router server MUST also check whether some client in the local cell
2257 is watching for the nickname this new client has, and send the
2258 SILC_NOTIFY_TYPE_WATCH to the watcher.
2261 4.2 Creating Server Connection
2263 This section describes the procedure when server connects to its
2264 router (or when router connects to other router, the cases are
2265 equivalent). The procedure is very much alike to when a client
2266 connects to the server thus it is not repeated here.
2268 One difference is that server MUST perform connection authentication
2269 protocol with proper authentication. A proper authentication is based
2270 on passphrase authentication or public key authentication based on
2273 After server and router have successfully performed the key exchange
2274 and connection authentication protocol, the server MUST register itself
2275 to the router by sending SILC_PACKET_NEW_SERVER packet. This packet
2276 includes the server's Server ID that it has created by itself and
2277 other relevant information about the server. The router receiving the
2278 ID MUST verify that the IP address in the Server ID is same as the
2279 server's real IP address.
2281 After router has received the SILC_PACKET_NEW_SERVER packet it
2282 distributes the information about newly registered server to all routers
2283 in the SILC network. More information about this is in [SILC2].
2285 As the client needed to resolve the destination ID this MUST be done by
2286 the server that connected to the router, as well. The way to resolve it
2287 is to get the ID from previously received packet. The server MAY also
2288 use SILC_COMMAND_INFO command to resolve the ID. Server MUST also start
2289 using its own Server ID as Source ID in SILC Packet Header and the
2290 router's Server ID as Destination when communicating with the router.
2300 Internet Draft 15 January 2007
2303 4.2.1 Announcing Clients, Channels and Servers
2305 After server or router has connected to the remote router, and it already
2306 has connected clients and channels it MUST announce them to the router.
2307 If the server is router server, also all the local servers in the cell
2310 All clients are announced by compiling a list of ID Payloads into the
2311 SILC_PACKET_NEW_ID packet. All channels are announced by compiling a
2312 list of Channel Payloads into the SILC_PACKET_NEW_CHANNEL packet.
2313 Channels' mode, founder public key, channel public keys, and other
2314 channel mode specific data is announced by sending the
2315 SILC_NOTIFY_TYPE_CMODE_CHANGE notify list.
2317 The channel public keys that are announced are compiled in Argument
2318 List Payload where the argument type is 0x03, and each argument is
2319 Public Key Payload containing one public key or certificate.
2321 Also, the channel users on the channels must be announced by compiling
2322 a list of Notify Payloads with the SILC_NOTIFY_TYPE_JOIN notify type
2323 into the SILC_PACKET_NOTIFY packet. The users' modes on the channel
2324 must also be announced by compiling list of Notify Payloads with the
2325 SILC_NOTIFY_TYPE_CUMODE_CHANGE notify type into the SILC_PACKET_NOTIFY
2328 The router MUST also announce the local servers by compiling list of
2329 ID Payloads into the SILC_PACKET_NEW_ID packet.
2331 Also, clients' modes (user modes in SILC) MUST be announced. This is
2332 done by compiling a list of Notify Payloads with SILC_NOTIFY_UMODE_CHANGE
2333 notify type into the SILC_PACKET_NOTIFY packet. Also, channels' topics
2334 MUST be announced by compiling a list of Notify Payloads with the
2335 SILC_NOTIFY_TOPIC_SET notify type into the SILC_PACKET_NOTIFY packet.
2336 Also, channel's invite and ban lists MUST be announced by compiling list
2337 of Notify Payloads with the SILC_NOTIFY_TYPE_INVITE and
2338 SILC_NOTIFY_TYPE_BAN notify types, respectively, into the
2339 SILC_PACKET_NOTIFY packet.
2341 The router which receives these lists MUST process them and broadcast
2342 the packets to its primary router. When processing the announced channels
2343 and channel users the router MUST check whether a channel exists already
2344 with the same name. If channel exists with the same name it MUST check
2345 whether the Channel ID is different. If the Channel ID is different the
2346 router MUST send the notify type SILC_NOTIFY_TYPE_CHANNEL_CHANGE to the
2347 server to force the channel ID change to the ID the router has. If the
2348 mode of the channel is different the router MUST send the notify type
2349 SILC_NOTIFY_TYPE_CMODE_CHANGE to the server to force the mode change
2350 to the mode that the router has.
2356 Internet Draft 15 January 2007
2359 The router MUST also generate new channel key and distribute it to the
2360 channel. The key MUST NOT be generated if the SILC_CMODE_PRIVKEY mode
2363 If the channel has a channel founder already on the router, the router
2364 MUST send the notify type SILC_NOTIFY_TYPE_CUMODE_CHANGE to the server
2365 to force the mode change for the channel founder on the server. The
2366 channel founder privileges MUST be removed on the server.
2368 If the channel public keys are already set on the on router, the router
2369 MUST ignore the received channel public key list and send the notify
2370 type SILC_NOTIFY_TYPE_CUMODE_CHANGE to the server which includes the
2371 channel public key list that is on router. The server MUST change the
2372 list to the one it receives from router.
2374 The router processing the channels MUST also compile a list of
2375 Notify Payloads with the SILC_NOTIFY_TYPE_JOIN notify type into the
2376 SILC_PACKET_NOTIFY and send the packet to the server. This way the
2377 server (or router) will receive the clients on the channel that
2381 4.3 Joining to a Channel
2383 This section describes the procedure when client joins to a channel.
2384 Client joins to channel by sending command SILC_COMMAND_JOIN to the
2385 server. If the receiver receiving join command is normal server the
2386 server MUST check its local list whether this channel already exists
2387 locally. This would indicate that some client connected to the server
2388 has already joined to the channel. If this is the case, the client is
2389 joined to the channel, new channel key is created and information about
2390 newly joined channel is sent to the router. The router is informed
2391 by sending SILC_NOTIFY_TYPE_JOIN notify type. The notify type MUST
2392 also be sent to the local clients on the channel. The new channel key
2393 is also sent to the router and to local clients on the channel.
2395 If the channel does not exist in the local list the client's command
2396 MUST be sent to the router which will then perform the actual joining
2397 procedure. When server receives the reply to the command from the
2398 router it MUST be sent to the client which sent the command originally.
2399 Server will also receive the channel key from the server that it MUST
2400 send to the client which originally requested the join command. The
2401 server MUST also save the channel key.
2403 If the receiver of the join command is router it MUST first check its
2404 local list whether anyone in the cell has already joined to the channel.
2405 If this is the case, the client is joined to the channel and reply is
2406 sent to the client. If the command was sent by server the command reply
2412 Internet Draft 15 January 2007
2415 is sent to the server which sent it. Then the router MUST also create
2416 new channel key and distribute it to all clients on the channel and
2417 all servers that have clients on the channel. Router MUST also send
2418 the SILC_NOTIFY_TYPE_JOIN notify type to local clients on the channel
2419 and to local servers that have clients on the channel.
2421 If the channel does not exist on the router's local list it MUST
2422 check the global list whether the channel exists at all. If it does
2423 the client is joined to the channel as described previously. If
2424 the channel does not exist the channel is created and the client
2425 is joined to the channel. The channel key is also created and
2426 distributed as previously described. The client joining to the created
2427 channel is made automatically channel founder and both channel founder
2428 and channel operator privileges are set for the client.
2430 If the router created the channel in the process, information about the
2431 new channel MUST be broadcast to all routers. This is done by
2432 broadcasting SILC_PACKET_NEW_CHANNEL packet to the router's primary
2433 route. When the router joins the client to the channel it MUST also
2434 send information about newly joined client to all routers in the SILC
2435 network. This is done by broadcasting the SILC_NOTIFY_TYPE_JOIN notify
2436 type to the router's primary route.
2438 It is important to note that new channel key is created always when
2439 new client joins to channel, whether the channel has existed previously
2440 or not. This way the new client on the channel is not able to decrypt
2441 any of the old traffic on the channel. Client which receives the reply to
2442 the join command MUST start using the received Channel ID in the channel
2443 message communication thereafter. Client also receives the key for the
2444 channel in the command reply. Note that the channel key is never
2445 generated or distributed if the SILC_CMODE_PRIVKEY mode is set.
2448 4.4 Channel Key Generation
2450 Channel keys are created by router which creates the channel by taking
2451 enough randomness from cryptographically strong random number generator.
2452 The key is generated always when channel is created, when new client
2453 joins a channel and after the key has expired. Key could expire for
2456 The key MUST also be re-generated whenever some client leaves a channel.
2457 In this case the key is created from scratch by taking enough randomness
2458 from the random number generator. After that the key is distributed to
2459 all clients on the channel. However, channel keys are cell specific thus
2460 the key is created only on the cell where the client, which left the
2461 channel, exists. While the server or router is creating the new channel
2462 key, no other client may join to the channel. Messages that are sent
2468 Internet Draft 15 January 2007
2471 while creating the new key are still processed with the old key. After
2472 server has sent the SILC_PACKET_CHANNEL_KEY packet client MUST start
2473 using the new key. If server creates the new key the server MUST also
2474 send the new key to its router. See [SILC2] for more information about
2475 how channel messages must be encrypted and decrypted when router is
2478 If the key changes very often due to joining traffic on the channel it
2479 is RECOMMENDED that client implementation would cache some of the old
2480 channel keys for short period of time so that it is able to decrypt all
2481 channel messages it receives. It is possible that on a heavy traffic
2482 channel a message encrypted with channel key that was just changed
2483 is received by client after the new key was set into use. This is
2484 possible because not all clients may receive the new key at the same
2485 time, and may still be sending messages encrypted with the old key.
2487 When client receives the SILC_PACKET_CHANNEL_KEY packet with the
2488 Channel Key Payload it MUST process the key data to create encryption
2489 and decryption key, and to create the MAC key that is used to compute
2490 the MACs of the channel messages. The processing is as follows:
2492 channel_key = raw key data
2493 MAC key = hash(raw key data)
2495 The raw key data is the key data received in the Channel Key Payload.
2496 It is used for both encryption and decryption. The hash() is the hash
2497 function used with the HMAC of the channel. Note that the server also
2498 MUST save the channel key.
2501 4.5 Private Message Sending and Reception
2503 Private messages are sent point to point. Client explicitly destine
2504 a private message to specific client that is delivered to only to that
2505 client. No other client may receive the private message. The receiver
2506 of the private message is destined in the SILC Packet Header as in any
2507 other packet as well. The Source ID in the SILC Packet Header MUST be
2508 the ID of the sender of the message.
2510 If the sender of a private message does not know the receiver's Client
2511 ID, it MUST resolve it from server. There are two ways to resolve the
2512 client ID from server; it is RECOMMENDED that client implementations
2513 send SILC_COMMAND_IDENTIFY command to receive the Client ID. Client
2514 MAY also send SILC_COMMAND_WHOIS command to receive the Client ID.
2515 If the sender has received earlier a private message from the receiver
2516 it should have cached the Client ID from the SILC Packet Header.
2518 If server receives a private message packet which includes invalid
2524 Internet Draft 15 January 2007
2527 destination Client ID the server MUST send SILC_NOTIFY_TYPE_ERROR
2528 notify to the client with error status indicating that such Client ID
2531 See [SILC2] for description of private message encryption and decryption
2535 4.6 Private Message Key Generation
2537 Private message MAY be protected with a key generated by the client.
2538 One way to generate private message key is to use static or pre-shared
2539 keys in the client implementation. Client that wants to indicate other
2540 client on the network that a private message key should be set, the
2541 client MAY send SILC_PACKET_PRIVATE_MESSAGE_KEY packet to indicate this.
2542 The actual key material has to be transferred outside the SILC network,
2543 or it has to be pre-shared key. The client receiving this packet knows
2544 that the sender wishes to use private message key in private message
2545 communication. In case of static or pre-shared keys the IV used in
2546 the encryption SHOULD be chosen randomly. Sending the
2547 SILC_PACKET_PRIVATE_MESSAGE_KEY is not mandatory, and clients may
2548 naturally agree to use a key without sending the packet.
2550 Another choice to use private message keys is to negotiate fresh key
2551 material by performing the Key Agreement. The SILC_PACKET_KEY_AGREEMENT
2552 packet MAY be used to negotiate the fresh key material. In this case
2553 the resulting key material is used to secure the private messages.
2554 Also, the IV used in encryption is used as defined in [SILC3], unless
2555 otherwise stated by the encryption mode used. By performing Key
2556 Agreement the clients can also negotiate the cipher and HMAC to be used
2557 in the private message encryption and to negotiate additional security
2558 parameters. The actual Key Agreement [SILC2] is performed by executing
2559 the SILC Key Exchange protocol [SILC3], peer to peer. Because of NAT
2560 devices in the network, it might be impossible to perform the Key
2561 Agreement. In this case using static or pre-shared key and sending the
2562 SILC_PACKET_PRIVATE_MESSAGE_KEY to indicate the use of a private message
2563 key is a working alternative.
2565 If the key is pre-shared key or other key material not generated by
2566 Key Agreement, then the key material SHOULD be processed as defined
2567 in [SILC3]. In the processing, however, the HASH, as defined in [SILC3]
2568 MUST be ignored. After processing the key material it is employed as
2569 defined in [SILC3]. If the SILC_PACKET_PRIVATE_MESSAGE_KEY was sent,
2570 then it defines the cipher and HMAC to be used. The hash algorithm to be
2571 used in the key material processing is the one that HMAC algorithm is
2572 defined to use. If the SILC_PACKET_PRIVATE_MESSAGE_KEY was not sent at
2573 all, then the hash algorithm to be used SHOULD be SHA1. In this case
2574 also, implementations SHOULD use the SILC protocol's mandatory cipher
2580 Internet Draft 15 January 2007
2583 and HMAC in private message encryption.
2586 4.7 Channel Message Sending and Reception
2588 Channel messages are delivered to a group of users. The group forms a
2589 channel and all clients on the channel receives messages sent to the
2590 channel. The Source ID in the SILC Packet Header MUST be the ID
2591 of the sender of the message.
2593 Channel messages are destined to a channel by specifying the Channel ID
2594 as Destination ID in the SILC Packet Header. The server MUST then
2595 distribute the message to all clients, except to the original sender,
2596 on the channel by sending the channel message destined explicitly to a
2597 client on the channel. However, the Destination ID MUST still remain
2600 If server receives a channel message packet which includes invalid
2601 destination Channel ID the server MUST send SILC_NOTIFY_TYPE_ERROR
2602 notify to the sender with error status indicating that such Channel ID
2605 See the [SILC2] for description of channel message routing for router
2606 servers, and channel message encryption and decryption process.
2609 4.8 Session Key Regeneration
2611 Session keys MUST be regenerated periodically, say, once in an hour.
2612 The re-key process is started by sending SILC_PACKET_REKEY packet to
2613 other end, to indicate that re-key must be performed. The initiator
2614 of the connection SHOULD initiate the re-key.
2616 If perfect forward secrecy (PFS) flag was selected in the SILC Key
2617 Exchange protocol [SILC3] the re-key MUST cause new key exchange with
2618 SKE protocol. In this case the protocol is secured with the old key
2619 and the protocol results to new key material. See [SILC3] for more
2620 information. After the SILC_PACKET_REKEY packet is sent the sender
2621 will perform the SKE protocol.
2623 If PFS flag was set the resulted key material is processed as described
2624 in the section Processing the Key Material in [SILC3]. The difference
2625 with re-key in the processing is that the initial data for the hash
2626 function is just the resulted key material and not the HASH as it
2627 is not computed at all with re-key. Other than that, the key processing
2628 it equivalent to normal SKE negotiation.
2630 If PFS flag was not set, which is the default case, then re-key is done
2636 Internet Draft 15 January 2007
2639 without executing SKE protocol. In this case, the new key is created by
2640 providing the current sending encryption key to the SKE protocol's key
2641 processing function. The process is described in the section Processing
2642 the Key Material in [SILC3]. The difference in the processing is that
2643 the initial data for the hash function is the current sending encryption
2644 key and not the SKE's KEY and HASH values. Other than that, the key
2645 processing is equivalent to normal SKE negotiation.
2647 After both parties have regenerated the session key, both MUST send
2648 SILC_PACKET_REKEY_DONE packet to each other. These packets are still
2649 secured with the old key. After these packets, the subsequent packets
2650 MUST be protected with the new key. Note that, in case SKE was performed
2651 again the SILC_PACKET_SUCCESS is not sent. The SILC_PACKET_REKEY_DONE
2652 is sent in its stead.
2655 4.9 Command Sending and Reception
2657 Client usually sends the commands in the SILC network. In this case
2658 the client simply sends the command packet to server and the server
2659 processes it and replies with command reply packet. See the [SILC4]
2660 for detailed description of all commands.
2662 However, if the server is not able to process the command, it is sent to
2663 the server's router. This is case for example with commands such as
2664 SILC_COMMAND_JOIN and SILC_COMMAND_WHOIS commands. However, there are
2665 other commands as well [SILC4]. For example, if client sends the WHOIS
2666 command requesting specific information about some client the server must
2667 send the WHOIS command to router so that all clients in SILC network are
2668 searched. The router, on the other hand, sends the WHOIS command further
2669 to receive the exact information about the requested client. The WHOIS
2670 command travels all the way to the server which owns the client and it
2671 replies with command reply packet. Finally, the server which sent the
2672 command receives the command reply and it must be able to determine which
2673 client sent the original command. The server then sends command reply to
2674 the client. Implementations should have some kind of cache to handle, for
2675 example, WHOIS information. Servers and routers along the route could all
2676 cache the information for faster referencing in the future.
2678 The commands sent by server may be sent hop by hop until someone is able
2679 to process the command. However, it is preferred to destine the command
2680 as precisely as it is possible. In this case, other routers en route
2681 MUST route the command packet by checking the true sender and true
2682 destination of the packet. However, servers and routers MUST NOT route
2683 command reply packets to clients coming from other servers. Client
2684 MUST NOT accept command reply packet originated from anyone else but
2685 from its own server.
2692 Internet Draft 15 January 2007
2695 4.10 Closing Connection
2697 When remote client connection is closed the server MUST send the notify
2698 type SILC_NOTIFY_TYPE_SIGNOFF to its primary router and to all channels
2699 the client was joined. The server MUST also save the client's information
2700 for a period of time for history purposes.
2702 When remote server or router connection is closed the server or router
2703 MUST also remove all the clients that was behind the server or router
2704 from the SILC Network. The server or router MUST also send the notify
2705 type SILC_NOTIFY_TYPE_SERVER_SIGNOFF to its primary router and to all
2706 local clients that are joined on the same channels with the remote
2707 server's or router's clients.
2709 Router server MUST also check whether some client in the local cell
2710 is watching for the nickname this client has, and send the
2711 SILC_NOTIFY_TYPE_WATCH to the watcher, unless the client which left
2712 the network has the SILC_UMODE_REJECT_WATCHING user mode set.
2715 4.11 Detaching and Resuming a Session
2717 SILC protocol provides a possibility for a client to detach itself from
2718 the network without actually signing off from the network. The client
2719 connection to the server is closed but the client remains as valid client
2720 in the network. The client may then later resume its session back from
2721 any server in the network.
2723 When client wishes to detach from the network it MUST send the
2724 SILC_COMMAND_DETACH command to its server. The server then MUST set
2725 SILC_UMODE_DETACHED mode to the client and send SILC_NOTIFY_UMODE_CHANGE
2726 notify to its primary router, which then MUST broadcast it further
2727 to other routers in the network. This user mode indicates that the
2728 client is detached from the network. Implementations MUST NOT use
2729 the SILC_UMODE_DETACHED flag to determine whether a packet can be sent
2730 to the client. All packets MUST still be sent to the client even if
2731 client is detached from the network. Only the server that originally
2732 had the active client connection is able to make the decision after it
2733 notices that the network connection is not active. In this case the
2734 default case is to discard the packet.
2736 The SILC_UMODE_DETACHED flag cannot be set by client itself directly
2737 with SILC_COMMAND_UMODE command, but only implicitly by sending the
2738 SILC_COMMAND_DETACH command. The flag also cannot be unset by the
2739 client, server or router with SILC_COMMAND_UMODE command, but only
2740 implicitly by sending and receiving the SILC_PACKET_RESUME_CLIENT
2748 Internet Draft 15 January 2007
2751 When the client wishes to resume its session in the SILC Network it
2752 connects to a server in the network, which MAY also be a different
2753 from the original server, and performs normal procedures regarding
2754 creating a connection as described in section 4.1. After the SKE
2755 and the Connection Authentication protocols has been successfully
2756 completed the client MUST NOT send SILC_PACKET_NEW_CLIENT packet, but
2757 MUST send SILC_PACKET_RESUME_CLIENT packet. This packet is used to
2758 perform the resuming procedure. The packet MUST include the detached
2759 client's Client ID, which the client must know. It also includes
2760 Authentication Payload which includes signature computed with the
2761 client's private key. The signature is computed as defined in the
2762 section 3.9.1. Thus, the authentication method MUST be based in
2763 public key authentication.
2765 When server receive the SILC_PACKET_RESUME_CLIENT packet it MUST
2766 do the following: Server checks that the Client ID is valid client
2767 and that it has the SILC_UMODE_DETACHED mode set. Then it verifies
2768 the Authentication Payload with the detached client's public key.
2769 If it does not have the public key it retrieves it by sending
2770 SILC_COMMAND_GETKEY command to the server that has the public key from
2771 the original client connection. The server MUST NOT use the public
2772 key received in the SKE protocol for this connection. If the
2773 signature is valid the server unsets the SILC_UMODE_DETACHED flag,
2774 and sends the SILC_PACKET_RESUME_CLIENT packet to its primary router.
2775 The routers MUST broadcast the packet and unset the SILC_UMODE_DETACHED
2776 flag when the packet is received. If the server is router server it
2777 also MUST send the SILC_PACKET_RESUME_CLIENT packet to the original
2778 server whom owned the detached client.
2780 The servers and routers that receives the SILC_PACKET_RESUME_CLIENT
2781 packet MUST know whether the packet already has been received for
2782 the client. It is a protocol error to attempt to resume the client
2783 session from more than one server. The implementations could set
2784 internal flag that indicates that the client is resumed. If router
2785 receive SILC_PACKET_RESUME_CLIENT packet for client that is already
2786 resumed the client MUST be killed from the network. This would
2787 indicate that the client is attempting to resume the session more
2788 than once which is a protocol error. In this case the router sends
2789 SILC_NOTIFY_TYPE_KILLED to the client. All routers that detect
2790 the same situation MUST also send the notify for the client.
2792 The servers and routers that receive the SILC_PACKET_RESUME_CLIENT
2793 must also understand that the client may not be found behind the
2794 same server that it originally came from. They must update their
2795 caches according to this. The server that now owns the client session
2796 MUST check whether the Client ID of the resumed client is based
2797 on the server's Server ID. If it is not it creates a new Client
2798 ID and send SILC_NOTIFY_TYPE_NICK_CHANGE to the network. It MUST
2804 Internet Draft 15 January 2007
2807 also send the channel keys of all channels that the client has
2808 joined to the client since it does not have them. Whether the
2809 Client ID was changed or not the server MUST send SILC_PACKET_NEW_ID
2810 packet to the client. Only after this is the client resumed back
2811 to the network and may start sending packets and messages.
2813 It is also possible that the server did not know about the global
2814 channels before the client resumed. In this case it joins the client
2815 to the channels, generates new channel keys and distributes the keys
2816 to the channels as described in section 4.4.
2818 It is an implementation issue for how long servers keep detached client
2819 sessions. It is RECOMMENDED that the detached sessions would be
2820 persistent as long as the server is running.
2824 4.12 UDP/IP Connections
2826 SILC protocol allows the use of UDP/IP instead of TCP/IP. There may be
2827 many reasons to use UDP, such as video and audio conferencing might
2828 be more efficient with UDP.
2830 When UDP/IP is used, in the SILC Key Exchange protocol the IV Included
2831 flag MUST be set and the first 16-bits of the Cookie field in the Key
2832 Exchange Start Payload MUST include the port that the other end will use
2833 as the SILC session port. The port is in MSB first order. Both initiator
2834 and responder will set the port they are going to use and all packets
2835 after the SKE has been completed with the SILC_PACKET_SUCCESS packet MUST
2836 be sent to the specified port. Initiator will send them to the port
2837 responder specified and vice versa. When verifying the cookie for
2838 modifications the first two bytes are to be ignored in case IV Included
2841 The default SILC port or port where the SILC server is listenning for
2842 incoming packets is used only during initial key exchange protocol. After
2843 SKE has been completed all packets are sent to the specified ports,
2844 including connection authentication packets and rekey packets even when
2845 PFS is used in rekey.
2847 Changing the ports during SILC session is possible only by first detaching
2848 from the server (with client-server connections) and then performing the
2849 SILC Key Exchange protocol from the beginning and resuming the detached
2852 Since the UDP is unreliable transport the SKE packets may not arrive to
2853 the recipient. Implementation should support retransmission of SKE
2854 packets by using exponential backoff algorithm. Also other SILC packets
2860 Internet Draft 15 January 2007
2863 such as messages may drop en route. With message packets only way to
2864 assure reliable delivery is to use message acking and retransmit the
2865 message by using for example exponential backoff algorithm. With SKE
2866 packets the initial timeout value should be no more than 1000
2867 milliseconds. With message packets the initial timeout value should be
2868 around 5000 milliseconds.
2871 5 Security Considerations
2873 Security is central to the design of this protocol, and these security
2874 considerations permeate the specification. Common security considerations
2875 such as keeping private keys truly private and using adequate lengths for
2876 symmetric and asymmetric keys must be followed in order to maintain the
2877 security of this protocol.
2879 Special attention must also be paid to the servers and routers that are
2880 running the SILC service. The SILC protocol's security depends greatly
2881 on the security and the integrity of the servers and administrators that
2882 are running the service. It is recommended that some form of registration
2883 is required by the server and router administrator prior to acceptance to
2884 the SILC Network. Even though the SILC protocol is secure in a network
2885 of mutual distrust between clients, servers, routers and administrators
2886 of the servers, the client should be able to trust the servers they are
2887 using if they wish to do so.
2889 It however must be noted that if the client requires absolute security
2890 by not trusting any of the servers or routers in the SILC Network, it can
2891 be accomplished by negotiating private secret keys outside the SILC
2892 Network, either using SKE or some other key exchange protocol, or to use
2893 some other external means for distributing the keys. This applies for
2894 all messages, private messages and channel messages.
2896 It is important to note that SILC, like any other security protocol, is
2897 not a foolproof system; the SILC servers and routers could very well be
2898 compromised. However, to provide an acceptable level of security and
2899 usability for end users, the protocol uses many times session keys or
2900 other keys generated by the servers to secure the messages. This is an
2901 intentional design feature to allow ease of use for end users. This way
2902 the network is still usable, and remains encrypted even if the external
2903 means of distributing the keys is not working. The implementation,
2904 however, may like to not follow this design feature, and may always
2905 negotiate the keys outside SILC network. This is an acceptable solution
2906 and many times recommended. The implementation still must be able to
2907 work with the server generated keys.
2909 If this is unacceptable for the client or end user, the private keys
2910 negotiated outside the SILC Network should always be used. In the end
2916 Internet Draft 15 January 2007
2919 it is the implementor's choice whether to negotiate private keys by
2920 default or whether to use the keys generated by the servers.
2922 It is also recommended that router operators in the SILC Network would
2923 form a joint forum to discuss the router and SILC Network management
2924 issues. Also, router operators along with the cell's server operators
2925 should have a forum to discuss the cell management issues.
2930 [SILC2] Riikonen, P., "SILC Packet Protocol", Internet Draft,
2933 [SILC3] Riikonen, P., "SILC Key Exchange and Authentication
2934 Protocols", Internet Draft, January 2007.
2936 [SILC4] Riikonen, P., "SILC Commands", Internet Draft, January 2007.
2938 [IRC] Oikarinen, J., and Reed D., "Internet Relay Chat Protocol",
2941 [IRC-ARCH] Kalt, C., "Internet Relay Chat: Architecture", RFC 2810,
2944 [IRC-CHAN] Kalt, C., "Internet Relay Chat: Channel Management", RFC
2947 [IRC-CLIENT] Kalt, C., "Internet Relay Chat: Client Protocol", RFC
2950 [IRC-SERVER] Kalt, C., "Internet Relay Chat: Server Protocol", RFC
2953 [SSH-TRANS] Ylonen, T., et al, "SSH Transport Layer Protocol",
2956 [PGP] Callas, J., et al, "OpenPGP Message Format", RFC 2440,
2959 [SPKI] Ellison C., et al, "SPKI Certificate Theory", RFC 2693,
2962 [PKIX-Part1] Housley, R., et al, "Internet X.509 Public Key
2963 Infrastructure, Certificate and CRL Profile", RFC 2459,
2966 [Schneier] Schneier, B., "Applied Cryptography Second Edition",
2972 Internet Draft 15 January 2007
2975 John Wiley & Sons, New York, NY, 1996.
2977 [Menezes] Menezes, A., et al, "Handbook of Applied Cryptography",
2980 [OAKLEY] Orman, H., "The OAKLEY Key Determination Protocol",
2981 RFC 2412, November 1998.
2983 [ISAKMP] Maughan D., et al, "Internet Security Association and
2984 Key Management Protocol (ISAKMP)", RFC 2408, November
2987 [IKE] Harkins D., and Carrel D., "The Internet Key Exchange
2988 (IKE)", RFC 2409, November 1998.
2990 [HMAC] Krawczyk, H., "HMAC: Keyed-Hashing for Message
2991 Authentication", RFC 2104, February 1997.
2993 [PKCS1] Kalinski, B., and Staddon, J., "PKCS #1 RSA Cryptography
2994 Specifications, Version 2.0", RFC 2437, October 1998.
2996 [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key Words for use in RFCs to Indicate
2997 Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
2999 [RFC3629] Yergeau, F., "UTF-8, a transformation format of ISO
3000 10646", RFC 3629, November 2003.
3002 [RFC1321] Rivest R., "The MD5 Message-Digest Algorithm", RFC 1321,
3005 [RFC3174] Eastlake, F., et al., "US Secure Hash Algorithm 1 (SHA1)",
3006 RFC 3174, September 2001.
3008 [PKCS7] Kalinski, B., "PKCS #7: Cryptographic Message Syntax,
3009 Version 1.5", RFC 2315, March 1998.
3011 [RFC2253] Wahl, M., et al., "Lightweight Directory Access Protocol
3012 (v3): UTF-8 String Representation of Distinguished Names",
3013 RFC 2253, December 1997.
3015 [RFC3454] Hoffman, P., et al., "Preparation of Internationalized
3016 Strings ("stringprep")", RFC 3454, December 2002.
3018 [SHA256] Eastlake 3rd, D., et al., "US Secure Hash Algorithms (SHA
3019 and HMAC-SHA)", RFC 4634, July 2006.
3028 Internet Draft 15 January 2007
3037 EMail: priikone@iki.fi
3042 This appendix defines the stringprep [RFC3454] profile for string
3043 identifiers in SILC protocol. Compliant implementation MUST use this
3044 profile to prepare the identifier strings in the SILC protocol. The
3045 profile defines the following as required by [RFC3454].
3047 - Intended applicability of the profile: the following identifiers in
3048 the SILC Protocol; nicknames, usernames, server names, hostnames,
3049 service names, algorithm names and other security property names [SILC3],
3050 and SILC Public Key name.
3052 - The character repertoire that is the input and output to
3053 stringprep: Unicode 3.2 with the list of unassigned code points
3054 being the Table A.1, as defined in [RFC3454].
3056 - The mapping tables used: the following tables are used, in order,
3057 as defined in [RFC3454].
3062 The mandatory case folding is done using the Table B.2 which includes
3063 the characters for the normalization form KC.
3065 - The Unicode normalization used: the Unicode normalization form
3066 KC is used, as defined in [RFC3454].
3068 - The prohibited characters as output: the following tables are used
3069 to prohibit characters, as defined in [RFC3454];
3084 Internet Draft 15 January 2007
3091 - Additional prohibited characters as output: in addition, the following
3092 tables are used to prohibit characters, as defined in this document;
3097 - The bidirectional string testing used: bidirectional string testing
3098 is ignored in this profile.
3100 This profile is to be maintained in the IANA registry for stringprep
3101 profiles. The name of this profile is "silc-identifier-prep" and this
3102 document defines the profile. This document defines the first version of
3108 This appendix defines the stringprep [RFC3454] profile for channel name
3109 strings in SILC protocol. Compliant implementation MUST use this profile
3110 to prepare the channel name strings in the SILC protocol. The profile
3111 defines the following as required by [RFC3454].
3113 - Intended applicability of the profile: channel names.
3115 - The character repertoire that is the input and output to
3116 stringprep: Unicode 3.2 with the list of unassigned code points
3117 being the Table A.1, as defined in [RFC3454].
3119 - The mapping tables used: the following tables are used, in order,
3120 as defined in [RFC3454].
3125 The mandatory case folding is done using the Table B.2 which includes
3126 the characters for the normalization form KC.
3128 - The Unicode normalization used: the Unicode normalization form
3129 KC is used, as defined in [RFC3454].
3131 - The prohibited characters as output: the following tables are used
3132 to prohibit characters, as defined in [RFC3454];
3140 Internet Draft 15 January 2007
3154 - Additional prohibited characters as output: in addition, the following
3155 tables are used to prohibit characters, as defined in this document;
3159 - The bidirectional string testing used: bidirectional string testing
3160 is ignored in this profile.
3162 This profile is to be maintained in the IANA registry for stringprep
3163 profiles. The name of this profile is "silc-identifier-ch-prep" and this
3164 document defines the profile. This document defines the first version of
3170 This appendix defines additional prohibited characters in the identifier
3171 strings as defined in the stringprep profile in Appendix A.
3173 Reserved US-ASCII characters
3174 0021 002A 002C 003F 0040
3179 This appendix defines additional prohibited characters in the identifier
3180 strings as defined in the stringprep profile in Appendix A and Appendix B.
3181 Note that the prohibited character tables listed in the Appendix A and
3182 Appendix B may include some of the same characters listed in this
3185 Symbol characters and other symbol like characters
3186 00A2-00A9 00AC 00AE 00AF 00B0 00B1 00B4 00B6 00B8 00D7 00F7
3187 02C2-02C5 02D2-02FF 0374 0375 0384 0385 03F6 0482 060E 060F
3188 06E9 06FD 06FE 09F2 09F3 09FA 0AF1 0B70 0BF3-0BFA 0E3F
3189 0F01-0F03 0F13-0F17 0F1A-0F1F 0F34 0F36 0F38 0FBE 0FBF
3190 0FC0-0FC5 0FC7-0FCF 17DB 1940 19E0-19FF 1FBD 1FBF-1FC1
3196 Internet Draft 15 January 2007
3199 1FCD-1FCF 1FDD-1FDF 1FED-1FEF 1FFD 1FFE 2044 2052 207A-207C
3200 208A-208C 20A0-20B1 2100-214F 2150-218F 2190-21FF 2200-22FF
3201 2300-23FF 2400-243F 2440-245F 2460-24FF 2500-257F 2580-259F
3202 25A0-25FF 2600-26FF 2700-27BF 27C0-27EF 27F0-27FF 2800-28FF
3203 2900-297F 2980-29FF 2A00-2AFF 2B00-2BFF 2E9A 2EF4-2EFF
3204 2FF0-2FFF 303B-303D 3040 3095-3098 309F-30A0 30FF-3104
3205 312D-3130 318F 31B8-31FF 321D-321F 3244-325F 327C-327E
3206 32B1-32BF 32CC-32CF 32FF 3377-337A 33DE-33DF 33FF 4DB6-4DFF
3207 9FA6-9FFF A48D-A48F A4A2-A4A3 A4B4 A4C1 A4C5 A4C7-ABFF
3208 D7A4-D7FF FA2E-FAFF FFE0-FFEE FFFC 10000-1007F 10080-100FF
3209 10100-1013F 1D000-1D0FF 1D100-1D1FF 1D300-1D35F 1D400-1D7FF
3215 Full Copyright Statement
3217 Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2007).
3219 This document is subject to the rights, licenses and restrictions
3220 contained in BCP 78, and except as set forth therein, the authors
3221 retain all their rights.
3223 This document and the information contained herein are provided on an
3224 "AS IS" basis and THE CONTRIBUTOR, THE ORGANIZATION HE/SHE REPRESENTS
3225 OR IS SPONSORED BY (IF ANY), THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET
3226 ENGINEERING TASK FORCE DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED,
3227 INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE
3228 INFORMATION HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED
3229 WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.