SKE: Verify initiator's public key always
[silc.git] / lib / silcske / silcske.c
index 4db209868986ccd79ca41180a0d734e9423479e4..caf2579628bf9a1a426057a5179f2949dfa5d07e 100644 (file)
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
 
   Author: Pekka Riikonen <priikone@silcnet.org>
 
-  Copyright (C) 2000 - 2007 Pekka Riikonen
+  Copyright (C) 2000 - 2008 Pekka Riikonen
 
   This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
   it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
@@ -2026,15 +2026,9 @@ SILC_FSM_STATE(silc_ske_st_responder_phase2)
   silc_packet_free(ske->packet);
   ske->packet = NULL;
 
-  /* Verify the received public key and verify the signature if we are
-     doing mutual authentication. */
-  if (ske->start_payload &&
-      ske->start_payload->flags & SILC_SKE_SP_FLAG_MUTUAL) {
-
-    SILC_LOG_DEBUG(("We are doing mutual authentication"));
-
-    if (!recv_payload->pk_data && (ske->callbacks->verify_key ||
-                                  ske->repository)) {
+  /* Verify public key, except in rekey, when it is not sent */
+  if (!ske->rekey) {
+    if (!recv_payload->pk_data) {
       /** Public key not provided */
       SILC_LOG_ERROR(("Remote end did not send its public key (or "
                      "certificate), even though we require it"));
@@ -2044,8 +2038,7 @@ SILC_FSM_STATE(silc_ske_st_responder_phase2)
     }
 
     /* Decode the remote's public key */
-    if (recv_payload->pk_data &&
-       !silc_pkcs_public_key_alloc(recv_payload->pk_type,
+    if (!silc_pkcs_public_key_alloc(recv_payload->pk_type,
                                    recv_payload->pk_data,
                                    recv_payload->pk_len,
                                    &ske->prop->public_key)) {
@@ -2056,39 +2049,36 @@ SILC_FSM_STATE(silc_ske_st_responder_phase2)
       return SILC_FSM_CONTINUE;
     }
 
-    if (ske->prop->public_key && (ske->callbacks->verify_key ||
-                                 ske->repository)) {
-      SILC_LOG_DEBUG(("Verifying public key"));
+    SILC_LOG_DEBUG(("Verifying public key"));
 
-      /** Waiting public key verification */
-      silc_fsm_next(fsm, silc_ske_st_responder_phase4);
+    /** Waiting public key verification */
+    silc_fsm_next(fsm, silc_ske_st_responder_phase4);
 
-      /* If repository is provided, verify the key from there. */
-      if (ske->repository) {
-       SilcSKRFind find;
+    /* If repository is provided, verify the key from there. */
+    if (ske->repository) {
+      SilcSKRFind find;
 
-       find = silc_skr_find_alloc();
-       if (!find) {
-         ske->status = SILC_SKE_STATUS_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
-         silc_fsm_next(fsm, silc_ske_st_responder_error);
-         return SILC_FSM_CONTINUE;
-       }
-       silc_skr_find_set_pkcs_type(find,
-                                   silc_pkcs_get_type(ske->prop->public_key));
-       silc_skr_find_set_public_key(find, ske->prop->public_key);
-       silc_skr_find_set_usage(find, SILC_SKR_USAGE_KEY_AGREEMENT);
-
-       /* Find key from repository */
-       SILC_FSM_CALL(silc_skr_find(ske->repository,
-                                   silc_fsm_get_schedule(fsm), find,
-                                   silc_ske_skr_callback, ske));
-      } else {
-       /* Verify from application */
+      find = silc_skr_find_alloc();
+      if (!find) {
+       ske->status = SILC_SKE_STATUS_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
+       silc_fsm_next(fsm, silc_ske_st_responder_error);
+       return SILC_FSM_CONTINUE;
+      }
+      silc_skr_find_set_pkcs_type(find,
+                                 silc_pkcs_get_type(ske->prop->public_key));
+      silc_skr_find_set_public_key(find, ske->prop->public_key);
+      silc_skr_find_set_usage(find, SILC_SKR_USAGE_KEY_AGREEMENT);
+
+      /* Find key from repository */
+      SILC_FSM_CALL(silc_skr_find(ske->repository,
+                                 silc_fsm_get_schedule(fsm), find,
+                                 silc_ske_skr_callback, ske));
+    } else {
+      /* Verify from application */
+      if (ske->callbacks->verify_key)
        SILC_FSM_CALL(ske->callbacks->verify_key(ske, ske->prop->public_key,
                                                 ske->callbacks->context,
                                                 silc_ske_pk_verified, NULL));
-      }
-      /* NOT REACHED */
     }
   }
 
@@ -2129,7 +2119,7 @@ SILC_FSM_STATE(silc_ske_st_responder_phase4)
     unsigned char hash[SILC_HASH_MAXLEN];
     SilcUInt32 hash_len;
 
-    SILC_LOG_DEBUG(("Public key is authentic"));
+    SILC_LOG_DEBUG(("We are doing mutual authentication"));
 
     /* Compute the hash value */
     status = silc_ske_make_hash(ske, hash, &hash_len, TRUE);
@@ -3285,7 +3275,7 @@ SilcBool silc_ske_set_keys(SilcSKE ske,
                           SilcHmac *ret_hmac_receive,
                           SilcHash *ret_hash)
 {
-  unsigned char iv[32];
+  unsigned char iv[SILC_HASH_MAXLEN];
   SilcBool iv_included = (prop->flags & SILC_SKE_SP_FLAG_IV_INCLUDED);
 
   /* Allocate ciphers to be used in the communication */
@@ -3312,6 +3302,12 @@ SilcBool silc_ske_set_keys(SilcSKE ske,
       return FALSE;
   }
 
+  /* Allocate hash */
+  if (ret_hash) {
+    if (!silc_hash_alloc(silc_hash_get_name(prop->hash), ret_hash))
+      return FALSE;
+  }
+
   /* Set key material */
   memset(iv, 0, sizeof(iv));
   if (ske->responder) {
@@ -3320,10 +3316,24 @@ SilcBool silc_ske_set_keys(SilcSKE ske,
                          keymat->enc_key_len, TRUE);
 
       if (silc_cipher_get_mode(*ret_send_key) == SILC_CIPHER_MODE_CTR) {
-        memcpy(iv, ske->hash, 4);
-        memcpy(iv + 4, keymat->receive_iv, iv_included ? 4 : 8);
+       /* Counter mode */
+       if (!ske->rekeying) {
+         /* Set IV. */
+         memcpy(iv, ske->hash, 4);
+         if (!iv_included)
+           memcpy(iv + 4, keymat->receive_iv, 8);
+       } else {
+         /* Rekey, recompute the truncated hash value. */
+         silc_hash_make(prop->hash, keymat->receive_iv, 8, iv);
+         if (!iv_included)
+           memcpy(iv + 4, keymat->receive_iv, 8);
+         else
+           memset(iv + 4, 0, 12);
+       }
+
         silc_cipher_set_iv(*ret_send_key, iv);
       } else {
+       /* Other modes */
        silc_cipher_set_iv(*ret_send_key, keymat->receive_iv);
       }
     }
@@ -3332,10 +3342,24 @@ SilcBool silc_ske_set_keys(SilcSKE ske,
                          keymat->enc_key_len, FALSE);
 
       if (silc_cipher_get_mode(*ret_receive_key) == SILC_CIPHER_MODE_CTR) {
-        memcpy(iv, ske->hash, 4);
-        memcpy(iv + 4, keymat->send_iv, iv_included ? 4 : 8);
+       /* Counter mode */
+       if (!ske->rekeying) {
+         /* Set IV. */
+         memcpy(iv, ske->hash, 4);
+         if (!iv_included)
+           memcpy(iv + 4, keymat->send_iv, 8);
+       } else {
+         /* Rekey, recompute the truncated hash value. */
+         silc_hash_make(prop->hash, keymat->send_iv, 8, iv);
+         if (!iv_included)
+           memcpy(iv + 4, keymat->send_iv, 8);
+         else
+           memset(iv + 4, 0, 12);
+       }
+
         silc_cipher_set_iv(*ret_receive_key, iv);
       } else {
+       /* Other modes */
        silc_cipher_set_iv(*ret_receive_key, keymat->send_iv);
       }
     }
@@ -3351,10 +3375,24 @@ SilcBool silc_ske_set_keys(SilcSKE ske,
                          keymat->enc_key_len, TRUE);
 
       if (silc_cipher_get_mode(*ret_send_key) == SILC_CIPHER_MODE_CTR) {
-        memcpy(iv, ske->hash, 4);
-        memcpy(iv + 4, keymat->send_iv, iv_included ? 4 : 8);
+       /* Counter mode */
+       if (!ske->rekeying) {
+         /* Set IV. */
+         memcpy(iv, ske->hash, 4);
+         if (!iv_included)
+           memcpy(iv + 4, keymat->send_iv, 8);
+       } else {
+         /* Rekey, recompute the truncated hash value. */
+         silc_hash_make(prop->hash, keymat->send_iv, 8, iv);
+         if (!iv_included)
+           memcpy(iv + 4, keymat->send_iv, 8);
+         else
+           memset(iv + 4, 0, 12);
+       }
+
        silc_cipher_set_iv(*ret_send_key, iv);
       } else {
+       /* Other modes */
        silc_cipher_set_iv(*ret_send_key, keymat->send_iv);
       }
     }
@@ -3363,10 +3401,25 @@ SilcBool silc_ske_set_keys(SilcSKE ske,
                          keymat->enc_key_len, FALSE);
 
       if (silc_cipher_get_mode(*ret_receive_key) == SILC_CIPHER_MODE_CTR) {
-        memcpy(iv, ske->hash, 4);
-        memcpy(iv + 4, keymat->receive_iv, iv_included ? 4 : 8);
+       /* Counter mode */
+       if (!ske->rekeying) {
+         /* Set IV.  If IV Included flag was negotiated we only set the
+            truncated hash value. */
+         memcpy(iv, ske->hash, 4);
+         if (!iv_included)
+           memcpy(iv + 4, keymat->receive_iv, 8);
+       } else {
+         /* Rekey, recompute the truncated hash value. */
+         silc_hash_make(prop->hash, keymat->receive_iv, 8, iv);
+         if (!iv_included)
+           memcpy(iv + 4, keymat->receive_iv, 8);
+         else
+           memset(iv + 4, 0, 12);
+       }
+
        silc_cipher_set_iv(*ret_receive_key, iv);
       } else {
+       /* Other modes */
        silc_cipher_set_iv(*ret_receive_key, keymat->receive_iv);
       }
     }
@@ -3378,12 +3431,6 @@ SilcBool silc_ske_set_keys(SilcSKE ske,
                        keymat->hmac_key_len);
   }
 
-  /* Allocate hash */
-  if (ret_hash) {
-    if (!silc_hash_alloc(silc_hash_get_name(prop->hash), ret_hash))
-      return FALSE;
-  }
-
   return TRUE;
 }