verify->completion_context = completion_context;
/* Verify public key from user. */
- client->ops->verify_public_key(client, ctx->sock->user_data,
- ctx->sock->type,
- pk_data, pk_len, pk_type,
- silc_client_verify_key_cb, verify);
+ client->internal->ops->verify_public_key(client, ctx->sock->user_data,
+ ctx->sock->type,
+ pk_data, pk_len, pk_type,
+ silc_client_verify_key_cb, verify);
}
/* Sets the negotiated key material into use for particular connection. */
SilcPKCS pkcs,
SilcHash hash,
SilcHmac hmac,
- SilcSKEDiffieHellmanGroup group)
+ SilcSKEDiffieHellmanGroup group,
+ bool is_responder)
{
SilcClientConnection conn = (SilcClientConnection)sock->user_data;
/* Allocate cipher to be used in the communication */
silc_cipher_alloc(cipher->cipher->name, &conn->send_key);
silc_cipher_alloc(cipher->cipher->name, &conn->receive_key);
-
- conn->send_key->cipher->set_key(conn->send_key->context,
- keymat->send_enc_key,
- keymat->enc_key_len);
- conn->send_key->set_iv(conn->send_key, keymat->send_iv);
- conn->receive_key->cipher->set_key(conn->receive_key->context,
- keymat->receive_enc_key,
- keymat->enc_key_len);
- conn->receive_key->set_iv(conn->receive_key, keymat->receive_iv);
+ silc_hmac_alloc((char *)silc_hmac_get_name(hmac), NULL, &conn->hmac_send);
+ silc_hmac_alloc((char *)silc_hmac_get_name(hmac), NULL, &conn->hmac_receive);
+
+ if (is_responder == TRUE) {
+ silc_cipher_set_key(conn->send_key, keymat->receive_enc_key,
+ keymat->enc_key_len);
+ silc_cipher_set_iv(conn->send_key, keymat->receive_iv);
+ silc_cipher_set_key(conn->receive_key, keymat->send_enc_key,
+ keymat->enc_key_len);
+ silc_cipher_set_iv(conn->receive_key, keymat->send_iv);
+ silc_hmac_set_key(conn->hmac_send, keymat->receive_hmac_key,
+ keymat->hmac_key_len);
+ silc_hmac_set_key(conn->hmac_receive, keymat->send_hmac_key,
+ keymat->hmac_key_len);
+ } else {
+ silc_cipher_set_key(conn->send_key, keymat->send_enc_key,
+ keymat->enc_key_len);
+ silc_cipher_set_iv(conn->send_key, keymat->send_iv);
+ silc_cipher_set_key(conn->receive_key, keymat->receive_enc_key,
+ keymat->enc_key_len);
+ silc_cipher_set_iv(conn->receive_key, keymat->receive_iv);
+ silc_hmac_set_key(conn->hmac_send, keymat->send_hmac_key,
+ keymat->hmac_key_len);
+ silc_hmac_set_key(conn->hmac_receive, keymat->receive_hmac_key,
+ keymat->hmac_key_len);
+ }
/* Rekey stuff */
conn->rekey = silc_calloc(1, sizeof(*conn->rekey));
- conn->rekey->send_enc_key =
- silc_calloc(keymat->enc_key_len / 8,
- sizeof(*conn->rekey->send_enc_key));
- memcpy(conn->rekey->send_enc_key,
- keymat->send_enc_key, keymat->enc_key_len / 8);
+ conn->rekey->send_enc_key = silc_memdup(keymat->send_enc_key,
+ keymat->enc_key_len / 8);
conn->rekey->enc_key_len = keymat->enc_key_len / 8;
if (ske->start_payload->flags & SILC_SKE_SP_FLAG_PFS)
conn->rekey->pfs = TRUE;
conn->rekey->ske_group = silc_ske_group_get_number(group);
- /* Save HMAC key to be used in the communication. */
- silc_hmac_alloc(hmac->hmac->name, NULL, &conn->hmac_send);
- silc_hmac_set_key(conn->hmac_send, keymat->hmac_key, keymat->hmac_key_len);
- conn->hmac_receive = conn->hmac_send;
-
/* Save the HASH function */
silc_hash_alloc(hash->hash->name, &conn->hash);
}
if (cp)
build = atoi(cp + 1);
- cp = client->silc_client_version + 9;
+ cp = client->internal->silc_client_version + 9;
if (!cp)
status = SILC_SKE_STATUS_BAD_VERSION;
if (maj != maj2)
status = SILC_SKE_STATUS_BAD_VERSION;
- if (min < min2)
- status = SILC_SKE_STATUS_BAD_VERSION;
+
+ /* XXX backward support for 0.6.1 */
+ if (maj == 0 && min == 6 && build < 2)
+ ske->backward_version = 1;
if (status != SILC_SKE_STATUS_OK)
- client->ops->say(client, conn, SILC_CLIENT_MESSAGE_AUDIT,
- "We don't support server version `%s'", version);
+ client->internal->ops->say(client, conn, SILC_CLIENT_MESSAGE_AUDIT,
+ "We don't support server version `%s'",
+ version);
return status;
}
SILC_LOG_DEBUG(("Start"));
if (ske->status != SILC_SKE_STATUS_OK) {
- if (ske->status == SILC_SKE_STATUS_UNSUPPORTED_PUBLIC_KEY) {
- client->ops->say(client, conn, SILC_CLIENT_MESSAGE_AUDIT,
- "Received unsupported server %s public key",
- ctx->sock->hostname);
- } else if (ske->status == SILC_SKE_STATUS_PUBLIC_KEY_NOT_PROVIDED) {
- client->ops->say(client, conn, SILC_CLIENT_MESSAGE_AUDIT,
- "Remote host did not send its public key, even though "
- "it must send it");
- } else {
- client->ops->say(client, conn, SILC_CLIENT_MESSAGE_ERROR,
- "Error during key exchange protocol with server %s",
- ctx->sock->hostname);
- }
-
+ /* Call failure client operation */
+ client->internal->ops->failure(client, conn, protocol,
+ (void *)ske->status);
protocol->state = SILC_PROTOCOL_STATE_ERROR;
silc_protocol_execute(protocol, client->schedule, 0, 0);
return;
SilcSKE ske;
/* Allocate Key Exchange object */
- ske = silc_ske_alloc();
- ctx->ske = ske;
- ske->rng = client->rng;
- ske->user_data = (void *)client;
+ ctx->ske = ske = silc_ske_alloc(client->rng, client);
silc_ske_set_callbacks(ske, ctx->send_packet, NULL,
ctx->verify,
if (ctx->responder == TRUE) {
/* Start the key exchange by processing the received security
properties packet from initiator. */
- status = silc_ske_responder_start(ske, ctx->rng, ctx->sock,
- client->silc_client_version,
- ctx->packet->buffer, TRUE);
+ status =
+ silc_ske_responder_start(ske, ctx->rng, ctx->sock,
+ client->internal->silc_client_version,
+ ctx->packet->buffer, TRUE);
} else {
SilcSKEStartPayload *start_payload;
/* Assemble security properties. */
- silc_ske_assemble_security_properties(ske, SILC_SKE_SP_FLAG_NONE,
- client->silc_client_version,
- &start_payload);
+ silc_ske_assemble_security_properties(
+ ske, SILC_SKE_SP_FLAG_MUTUAL,
+ client->internal->silc_client_version,
+ &start_payload);
/* Start the key exchange by sending our security properties
to the remote end. */
*/
if (ctx->responder == TRUE) {
/* Sends the selected security properties to the initiator. */
- status =
- silc_ske_responder_phase_1(ctx->ske,
- ctx->ske->start_payload);
+ status = silc_ske_responder_phase_1(ctx->ske);
} else {
/* Call Phase-1 function. This processes the Key Exchange Start
paylaod reply we just got from the responder. The callback
Key Exhange 1 Payload to the responder. */
status = silc_ske_initiator_phase_2(ctx->ske,
client->public_key,
- client->private_key);
+ client->private_key,
+ SILC_SKE_PK_TYPE_SILC);
protocol->state++;
}
if (status != SILC_SKE_STATUS_OK) {
if (status == SILC_SKE_STATUS_UNSUPPORTED_PUBLIC_KEY) {
- client->ops->say(client, conn, SILC_CLIENT_MESSAGE_AUDIT,
- "Received unsupported server %s public key",
- ctx->sock->hostname);
+ client->internal->ops->say(
+ client, conn, SILC_CLIENT_MESSAGE_AUDIT,
+ "Received unsupported server %s public key",
+ ctx->sock->hostname);
} else {
- client->ops->say(client, conn, SILC_CLIENT_MESSAGE_AUDIT,
+ client->internal->ops->say(
+ client, conn, SILC_CLIENT_MESSAGE_AUDIT,
"Error during key exchange protocol with server %s",
ctx->sock->hostname);
}
break;
}
- client->ops->say(client, conn, SILC_CLIENT_MESSAGE_INFO,
- "Password authentication required by server %s",
- ctx->sock->hostname);
- client->ops->ask_passphrase(client, conn,
- silc_client_conn_auth_continue,
- protocol);
+ client->internal->ops->say(
+ client, conn, SILC_CLIENT_MESSAGE_INFO,
+ "Password authentication required by server %s",
+ ctx->sock->hostname);
+ client->internal->ops->ask_passphrase(client, conn,
+ silc_client_conn_auth_continue,
+ protocol);
return;
break;
silc_cipher_set_key(conn->send_key, keymat->receive_enc_key,
keymat->enc_key_len);
silc_cipher_set_iv(conn->send_key, keymat->receive_iv);
+ silc_hmac_set_key(conn->hmac_send, keymat->receive_hmac_key,
+ keymat->hmac_key_len);
} else {
silc_cipher_set_key(conn->receive_key, keymat->send_enc_key,
keymat->enc_key_len);
silc_cipher_set_iv(conn->receive_key, keymat->send_iv);
+ silc_hmac_set_key(conn->hmac_receive, keymat->send_hmac_key,
+ keymat->hmac_key_len);
}
} else {
if (send) {
silc_cipher_set_key(conn->send_key, keymat->send_enc_key,
keymat->enc_key_len);
silc_cipher_set_iv(conn->send_key, keymat->send_iv);
+ silc_hmac_set_key(conn->hmac_send, keymat->send_hmac_key,
+ keymat->hmac_key_len);
} else {
silc_cipher_set_key(conn->receive_key, keymat->receive_enc_key,
keymat->enc_key_len);
silc_cipher_set_iv(conn->receive_key, keymat->receive_iv);
+ silc_hmac_set_key(conn->hmac_receive, keymat->receive_hmac_key,
+ keymat->hmac_key_len);
}
}
- if (send) {
- silc_hmac_alloc(conn->hmac_receive->hmac->name, NULL, &conn->hmac_send);
- silc_hmac_set_key(conn->hmac_send, keymat->hmac_key,
- keymat->hmac_key_len);
- } else {
- silc_hmac_free(conn->hmac_receive);
- conn->hmac_receive = conn->hmac_send;
- }
-
/* Save the current sending encryption key */
if (!send) {
memset(conn->rekey->send_enc_key, 0, conn->rekey->enc_key_len);
silc_free(conn->rekey->send_enc_key);
- conn->rekey->send_enc_key =
- silc_calloc(keymat->enc_key_len / 8,
- sizeof(*conn->rekey->send_enc_key));
- memcpy(conn->rekey->send_enc_key, keymat->send_enc_key,
- keymat->enc_key_len / 8);
+ conn->rekey->send_enc_key = silc_memdup(keymat->send_enc_key,
+ keymat->enc_key_len / 8);
conn->rekey->enc_key_len = keymat->enc_key_len / 8;
}
}
silc_protocol_execute(protocol, client->schedule, 0, 300000);
}
- ctx->ske = silc_ske_alloc();
- ctx->ske->rng = client->rng;
+ ctx->ske = silc_ske_alloc(client->rng, client);
ctx->ske->prop = silc_calloc(1, sizeof(*ctx->ske->prop));
- silc_ske_get_group_by_number(conn->rekey->ske_group,
+ silc_ske_group_get_by_number(conn->rekey->ske_group,
&ctx->ske->prop->group);
silc_ske_set_callbacks(ctx->ske,
* Use Perfect Forward Secrecy, ie. negotiate the key material
* using the SKE protocol.
*/
- ctx->ske = silc_ske_alloc();
- ctx->ske->rng = client->rng;
+ ctx->ske = silc_ske_alloc(client->rng, client);
ctx->ske->prop = silc_calloc(1, sizeof(*ctx->ske->prop));
- silc_ske_get_group_by_number(conn->rekey->ske_group,
+ silc_ske_group_get_by_number(conn->rekey->ske_group,
&ctx->ske->prop->group);
silc_ske_set_callbacks(ctx->ske,
NULL, NULL, NULL, silc_ske_check_version,
context);
- status = silc_ske_initiator_phase_2(ctx->ske, NULL, NULL);
+ status = silc_ske_initiator_phase_2(ctx->ske, NULL, NULL, 0);
if (status != SILC_SKE_STATUS_OK) {
SILC_LOG_WARNING(("Error (type %d) during Re-key (PFS)",
status));
projects / silc.git / blobdiff