protocol.c
- Author: Pekka Riikonen <priikone@poseidon.pspt.fi>
+ Author: Pekka Riikonen <priikone@silcnet.org>
Copyright (C) 1997 - 2001 Pekka Riikonen
* Key Exhange protocol functions
*/
+static bool
+silc_verify_public_key_internal(SilcServer server, SilcSocketConnection sock,
+ SilcSocketType conn_type,
+ unsigned char *pk, uint32 pk_len,
+ SilcSKEPKType pk_type)
+{
+ char file[256], filename[256], *fingerprint;
+ struct stat st;
+
+ if (pk_type != SILC_SKE_PK_TYPE_SILC) {
+ SILC_LOG_WARNING(("We don't support %s (%s) port %d public key type %d",
+ sock->hostname, sock->ip, sock->port, pk_type));
+ return FALSE;
+ }
+
+ /* Accept client keys without verification */
+ if (conn_type == SILC_SOCKET_TYPE_CLIENT) {
+ SILC_LOG_DEBUG(("Accepting client public key without verification"));
+ return TRUE;
+ }
+
+ /* XXX For now, accept server keys without verification too. We are
+ currently always doing mutual authentication so the proof of posession
+ of the private key is verified, and if server is authenticated in
+ conn auth protocol with public key we MUST have the key already. */
+ return TRUE;
+ /* Rest is unreachable code! */
+
+ memset(filename, 0, sizeof(filename));
+ memset(file, 0, sizeof(file));
+ snprintf(file, sizeof(file) - 1, "serverkey_%s_%d.pub", sock->hostname,
+ sock->port);
+ snprintf(filename, sizeof(filename) - 1, SILC_ETCDIR "/serverkeys/%s",
+ file);
+
+ /* Create serverkeys directory if it doesn't exist. */
+ if (stat(SILC_ETCDIR "/serverkeys", &st) < 0) {
+ /* If dir doesn't exist */
+ if (errno == ENOENT) {
+ if (mkdir(SILC_ETCDIR "/serverkeys", 0755) < 0) {
+ SILC_LOG_ERROR(("Couldn't create `%s' directory\n",
+ SILC_ETCDIR "/serverkeys"));
+ return TRUE;
+ }
+ } else {
+ SILC_LOG_ERROR(("%s\n", strerror(errno)));
+ return TRUE;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Take fingerprint of the public key */
+ fingerprint = silc_hash_fingerprint(NULL, pk, pk_len);
+ SILC_LOG_DEBUG(("Received server %s (%s) port %d public key (%s)",
+ sock->hostname, sock->ip, sock->port, fingerprint));
+ silc_free(fingerprint);
+
+ /* Check whether this key already exists */
+ if (stat(filename, &st) < 0) {
+ /* We don't have it, then cache it. */
+ SILC_LOG_DEBUG(("New public key from server"));
+
+ silc_pkcs_save_public_key_data(filename, pk, pk_len,
+ SILC_PKCS_FILE_PEM);
+ return TRUE;
+ } else {
+ /* The key already exists, verify it. */
+ SilcPublicKey public_key;
+ unsigned char *encpk;
+ uint32 encpk_len;
+
+ SILC_LOG_DEBUG(("We have the public key saved locally"));
+
+ /* Load the key file */
+ if (!silc_pkcs_load_public_key(filename, &public_key,
+ SILC_PKCS_FILE_PEM))
+ if (!silc_pkcs_load_public_key(filename, &public_key,
+ SILC_PKCS_FILE_BIN)) {
+ SILC_LOG_WARNING(("Could not load local copy of the %s (%s) port %d "
+ "server public key", sock->hostname, sock->ip,
+ sock->port));
+
+ /* Save the key for future checking */
+ unlink(filename);
+ silc_pkcs_save_public_key_data(filename, pk, pk_len,
+ SILC_PKCS_FILE_PEM);
+ return TRUE;
+ }
+
+ /* Encode the key data */
+ encpk = silc_pkcs_public_key_encode(public_key, &encpk_len);
+ if (!encpk) {
+ SILC_LOG_WARNING(("Local copy of the server %s (%s) port %d public key "
+ "is malformed", sock->hostname, sock->ip, sock->port));
+
+ /* Save the key for future checking */
+ unlink(filename);
+ silc_pkcs_save_public_key_data(filename, pk, pk_len, SILC_PKCS_FILE_PEM);
+ return TRUE;
+ }
+
+ if (memcmp(pk, encpk, encpk_len)) {
+ SILC_LOG_WARNING(("%s (%s) port %d server public key does not match "
+ "with local copy", sock->hostname, sock->ip,
+ sock->port));
+ SILC_LOG_WARNING(("It is possible that the key has expired or changed"));
+ SILC_LOG_WARNING(("It is also possible that some one is performing "
+ "man-in-the-middle attack"));
+ SILC_LOG_WARNING(("Will not accept the server %s (%s) port %d public "
+ "key",
+ sock->hostname, sock->ip, sock->port));
+ return FALSE;
+ }
+
+ /* Local copy matched */
+ return TRUE;
+ }
+}
+
+/* Callback that is called when we have received KE2 payload from
+ responder. We try to verify the public key now. */
+
+static void
+silc_server_protocol_ke_verify_key(SilcSKE ske,
+ unsigned char *pk_data,
+ uint32 pk_len,
+ SilcSKEPKType pk_type,
+ void *context,
+ SilcSKEVerifyCbCompletion completion,
+ void *completion_context)
+{
+ SilcProtocol protocol = (SilcProtocol)context;
+ SilcServerKEInternalContext *ctx =
+ (SilcServerKEInternalContext *)protocol->context;
+ SilcServer server = (SilcServer)ctx->server;
+
+ SILC_LOG_DEBUG(("Start"));
+
+ if (silc_verify_public_key_internal(server, ctx->sock,
+ (ctx->responder == FALSE ?
+ SILC_SOCKET_TYPE_ROUTER:
+ ctx->sconfig ? SILC_SOCKET_TYPE_SERVER :
+ ctx->rconfig ? SILC_SOCKET_TYPE_ROUTER :
+ SILC_SOCKET_TYPE_CLIENT),
+ pk_data, pk_len, pk_type))
+ completion(ske, SILC_SKE_STATUS_OK, completion_context);
+ else
+ completion(ske, SILC_SKE_STATUS_UNSUPPORTED_PUBLIC_KEY,
+ completion_context);
+}
+
/* Packet sending callback. This function is provided as packet sending
routine to the Key Exchange functions. */
/* Sets the negotiated key material into use for particular connection. */
-int silc_server_protocol_ke_set_keys(SilcSKE ske,
+int silc_server_protocol_ke_set_keys(SilcServer server,
+ SilcSKE ske,
SilcSocketConnection sock,
SilcSKEKeyMaterial *keymat,
SilcCipher cipher,
return FALSE;
}
+ if (!silc_hmac_alloc((char *)silc_hmac_get_name(hmac), NULL,
+ &idata->hmac_send)) {
+ silc_cipher_free(idata->send_key);
+ silc_cipher_free(idata->receive_key);
+ silc_free(conn_data);
+ return FALSE;
+ }
+
+ if (!silc_hmac_alloc((char *)silc_hmac_get_name(hmac), NULL,
+ &idata->hmac_receive)) {
+ silc_cipher_free(idata->send_key);
+ silc_cipher_free(idata->receive_key);
+ silc_hmac_free(idata->hmac_send);
+ silc_free(conn_data);
+ return FALSE;
+ }
+
if (is_responder == TRUE) {
silc_cipher_set_key(idata->send_key, keymat->receive_enc_key,
keymat->enc_key_len);
silc_cipher_set_key(idata->receive_key, keymat->send_enc_key,
keymat->enc_key_len);
silc_cipher_set_iv(idata->receive_key, keymat->send_iv);
+ silc_hmac_set_key(idata->hmac_send, keymat->receive_hmac_key,
+ keymat->hmac_key_len);
+ silc_hmac_set_key(idata->hmac_receive, keymat->send_hmac_key,
+ keymat->hmac_key_len);
} else {
silc_cipher_set_key(idata->send_key, keymat->send_enc_key,
keymat->enc_key_len);
silc_cipher_set_key(idata->receive_key, keymat->receive_enc_key,
keymat->enc_key_len);
silc_cipher_set_iv(idata->receive_key, keymat->receive_iv);
+ silc_hmac_set_key(idata->hmac_send, keymat->send_hmac_key,
+ keymat->hmac_key_len);
+ silc_hmac_set_key(idata->hmac_receive, keymat->receive_hmac_key,
+ keymat->hmac_key_len);
}
idata->rekey = silc_calloc(1, sizeof(*idata->rekey));
- idata->rekey->send_enc_key =
- silc_calloc(keymat->enc_key_len / 8,
- sizeof(*idata->rekey->send_enc_key));
- memcpy(idata->rekey->send_enc_key,
- keymat->send_enc_key, keymat->enc_key_len / 8);
+ idata->rekey->send_enc_key = silc_memdup(keymat->send_enc_key,
+ keymat->enc_key_len / 8);
idata->rekey->enc_key_len = keymat->enc_key_len / 8;
- if (ske->start_payload->flags & SILC_SKE_SP_FLAG_PFS)
+ if (ske->prop->flags & SILC_SKE_SP_FLAG_PFS)
idata->rekey->pfs = TRUE;
idata->rekey->ske_group = silc_ske_group_get_number(group);
- /* Save the remote host's public key */
- silc_pkcs_public_key_decode(ske->ke1_payload->pk_data,
- ske->ke1_payload->pk_len, &idata->public_key);
-
/* Save the hash */
if (!silc_hash_alloc(hash->hash->name, &idata->hash)) {
silc_cipher_free(idata->send_key);
silc_cipher_free(idata->receive_key);
+ silc_hmac_free(idata->hmac_send);
+ silc_hmac_free(idata->hmac_receive);
silc_free(conn_data);
return FALSE;
}
- /* Save HMAC key to be used in the communication. */
- if (!silc_hmac_alloc(hmac->hmac->name, NULL, &idata->hmac)) {
- silc_cipher_free(idata->send_key);
- silc_cipher_free(idata->receive_key);
- silc_hash_free(idata->hash);
- silc_free(conn_data);
- return FALSE;
- }
- silc_hmac_set_key(idata->hmac, keymat->hmac_key, keymat->hmac_key_len);
+ /* Save the remote host's public key */
+ silc_pkcs_public_key_decode(ske->ke1_payload->pk_data,
+ ske->ke1_payload->pk_len, &idata->public_key);
+ if (ske->prop->flags & SILC_SKE_SP_FLAG_MUTUAL)
+ silc_hash_make(server->sha1hash, ske->ke1_payload->pk_data,
+ ske->ke1_payload->pk_len, idata->fingerprint);
sock->user_data = (void *)conn_data;
+ SILC_LOG_INFO(("%s (%s) security properties: %s %s %s",
+ sock->hostname, sock->ip,
+ idata->send_key->cipher->name,
+ (char *)silc_hmac_get_name(idata->hmac_send),
+ idata->hash->hash->name));
+
return TRUE;
}
/* Check remote host version string */
SilcSKEStatus silc_ske_check_version(SilcSKE ske, unsigned char *version,
- uint32 len)
+ uint32 len, void *context)
{
SilcSKEStatus status = SILC_SKE_STATUS_OK;
+ char *cp;
+ int maj = 0, min = 0, build = 0, maj2 = 0, min2 = 0, build2 = 0;
SILC_LOG_INFO(("%s (%s) is version %s", ske->sock->hostname,
ske->sock->ip, version));
/* Check software version */
- if (len < strlen(silc_version_string))
+ cp = version + 9;
+ if (!cp)
status = SILC_SKE_STATUS_BAD_VERSION;
- /* XXX for now there is no other tests due to the abnormal version
- string that is used */
+ maj = atoi(cp);
+ cp = strchr(cp, '.');
+ if (cp) {
+ min = atoi(cp + 1);
+ cp++;
+ }
+ if (cp) {
+ cp = strchr(cp, '.');
+ if (cp)
+ build = atoi(cp + 1);
+ }
+
+ cp = silc_version_string + 9;
+ if (!cp)
+ status = SILC_SKE_STATUS_BAD_VERSION;
+
+ maj2 = atoi(cp);
+ cp = strchr(cp, '.');
+ if (cp) {
+ min2 = atoi(cp + 1);
+ cp++;
+ }
+ if (cp) {
+ cp = strchr(cp, '.');
+ if (cp)
+ build2 = atoi(cp + 1);
+ }
+
+ if (maj != maj2)
+ status = SILC_SKE_STATUS_BAD_VERSION;
+#if 0
+ if (min > min2)
+ status = SILC_SKE_STATUS_BAD_VERSION;
+#endif
+
+ /* XXX < 0.6 is not allowed */
+ if (maj == 0 && min < 5)
+ status = SILC_SKE_STATUS_BAD_VERSION;
+
+ /* XXX backward support for 0.6.1 */
+ if (maj == 0 && min == 6 && build < 2)
+ ske->backward_version = 1;
return status;
}
+/* Callback that is called by the SKE to indicate that it is safe to
+ continue the execution of the protocol. This is used only if we are
+ initiator. Is given as argument to the silc_ske_initiator_finish or
+ silc_ske_responder_phase_2 functions. This is called due to the fact
+ that the public key verification process is asynchronous and we must
+ not continue the protocl until the public key has been verified and
+ this callback is called. */
+
+static void silc_server_protocol_ke_continue(SilcSKE ske, void *context)
+{
+ SilcProtocol protocol = (SilcProtocol)context;
+ SilcServerKEInternalContext *ctx =
+ (SilcServerKEInternalContext *)protocol->context;
+ SilcServer server = (SilcServer)ctx->server;
+
+ SILC_LOG_DEBUG(("Start"));
+
+ if (ske->status != SILC_SKE_STATUS_OK) {
+ SILC_LOG_WARNING(("Error (%s) during Key Exchange protocol",
+ silc_ske_map_status(ske->status)));
+ SILC_LOG_DEBUG(("Error (%s) during Key Exchange protocol",
+ silc_ske_map_status(ske->status)));
+
+ protocol->state = SILC_PROTOCOL_STATE_ERROR;
+ silc_protocol_execute(protocol, server->schedule, 0, 300000);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ /* Send Ok to the other end. We will end the protocol as responder
+ sends Ok to us when we will take the new keys into use. */
+ if (ctx->responder == FALSE) {
+ silc_ske_end(ctx->ske);
+
+ /* End the protocol on the next round */
+ protocol->state = SILC_PROTOCOL_STATE_END;
+ }
+
+ /* Advance protocol state and call the next state if we are responder.
+ This happens when this callback was sent to silc_ske_responder_phase_2
+ function. */
+ if (ctx->responder == TRUE) {
+ protocol->state++;
+ silc_protocol_execute(protocol, server->schedule, 0, 100000);
+ }
+}
+
/* Performs key exchange protocol. This is used for both initiator
and responder key exchange. This is performed always when accepting
new connection to the server. This may be called recursively. */
SilcServerKEInternalContext *ctx =
(SilcServerKEInternalContext *)protocol->context;
SilcServer server = (SilcServer)ctx->server;
- SilcSKEStatus status = 0;
+ SilcSKEStatus status = SILC_SKE_STATUS_OK;
SILC_LOG_DEBUG(("Start"));
SilcSKE ske;
/* Allocate Key Exchange object */
- ske = silc_ske_alloc();
- ctx->ske = ske;
- ske->rng = server->rng;
+ ctx->ske = ske = silc_ske_alloc(server->rng, server);
+
+ silc_ske_set_callbacks(ske, silc_server_protocol_ke_send_packet, NULL,
+ silc_server_protocol_ke_verify_key,
+ silc_server_protocol_ke_continue,
+ silc_ske_check_version, context);
if (ctx->responder == TRUE) {
/* Start the key exchange by processing the received security
properties packet from initiator. */
status = silc_ske_responder_start(ske, ctx->rng, ctx->sock,
silc_version_string,
- ctx->packet->buffer, FALSE,
- NULL, NULL);
+ ctx->packet->buffer, ctx->flags);
} else {
SilcSKEStartPayload *start_payload;
/* Assemble security properties. */
- silc_ske_assemble_security_properties(ske, SILC_SKE_SP_FLAG_NONE,
+ silc_ske_assemble_security_properties(ske, ctx->flags,
silc_version_string,
&start_payload);
/* Start the key exchange by sending our security properties
to the remote end. */
status = silc_ske_initiator_start(ske, ctx->rng, ctx->sock,
- start_payload,
- silc_server_protocol_ke_send_packet,
- context);
+ start_payload);
}
+ /* Return now if the procedure is pending. */
+ if (status == SILC_SKE_STATUS_PENDING)
+ return;
+
if (status != SILC_SKE_STATUS_OK) {
- SILC_LOG_WARNING(("Error (type %d) during Key Exchange protocol",
- status));
- SILC_LOG_DEBUG(("Error (type %d) during Key Exchange protocol",
- status));
+ SILC_LOG_WARNING(("Error (%s) during Key Exchange protocol",
+ silc_ske_map_status(status)));
+ SILC_LOG_DEBUG(("Error (%s) during Key Exchange protocol",
+ silc_ske_map_status(status)));
protocol->state = SILC_PROTOCOL_STATE_ERROR;
- protocol->execute(server->timeout_queue, 0, protocol, fd, 0, 300000);
+ silc_protocol_execute(protocol, server->schedule, 0, 300000);
return;
}
/* Advance protocol state and call the next state if we are responder */
protocol->state++;
if (ctx->responder == TRUE)
- protocol->execute(server->timeout_queue, 0, protocol, fd, 0, 100000);
+ silc_protocol_execute(protocol, server->schedule, 0, 100000);
}
break;
case 2:
*/
if (ctx->responder == TRUE) {
/* Sends the selected security properties to the initiator. */
- status =
- silc_ske_responder_phase_1(ctx->ske,
- ctx->ske->start_payload,
- silc_server_protocol_ke_send_packet,
- context);
+ status = silc_ske_responder_phase_1(ctx->ske);
} else {
/* Call Phase-1 function. This processes the Key Exchange Start
paylaod reply we just got from the responder. The callback
function will receive the processed payload where we will
save it. */
- status = silc_ske_initiator_phase_1(ctx->ske, ctx->packet->buffer,
- NULL, NULL);
+ status = silc_ske_initiator_phase_1(ctx->ske, ctx->packet->buffer);
}
+ /* Return now if the procedure is pending. */
+ if (status == SILC_SKE_STATUS_PENDING)
+ return;
+
if (status != SILC_SKE_STATUS_OK) {
- SILC_LOG_WARNING(("Error (type %d) during Key Exchange protocol",
- status));
- SILC_LOG_DEBUG(("Error (type %d) during Key Exchange protocol",
- status));
+ SILC_LOG_WARNING(("Error (%s) during Key Exchange protocol",
+ silc_ske_map_status(status)));
+ SILC_LOG_DEBUG(("Error (%s) during Key Exchange protocol",
+ silc_ske_map_status(status)));
protocol->state = SILC_PROTOCOL_STATE_ERROR;
- protocol->execute(server->timeout_queue, 0, protocol, fd, 0, 300000);
+ silc_protocol_execute(protocol, server->schedule, 0, 300000);
return;
}
/* Advance protocol state and call next state if we are initiator */
protocol->state++;
if (ctx->responder == FALSE)
- protocol->execute(server->timeout_queue, 0, protocol, fd, 0, 100000);
+ silc_protocol_execute(protocol, server->schedule, 0, 100000);
}
break;
case 3:
if (ctx->responder == TRUE) {
/* Process the received Key Exchange 1 Payload packet from
the initiator. This also creates our parts of the Diffie
- Hellman algorithm. */
- status = silc_ske_responder_phase_2(ctx->ske, ctx->packet->buffer,
- NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+ Hellman algorithm. The silc_server_protocol_ke_continue
+ will be called after the public key has been verified. */
+ status = silc_ske_responder_phase_2(ctx->ske, ctx->packet->buffer);
} else {
/* Call the Phase-2 function. This creates Diffie Hellman
key exchange parameters and sends our public part inside
Key Exhange 1 Payload to the responder. */
- status =
- silc_ske_initiator_phase_2(ctx->ske,
- server->public_key,
- server->private_key,
- silc_server_protocol_ke_send_packet,
- context);
+ status = silc_ske_initiator_phase_2(ctx->ske,
+ server->public_key,
+ server->private_key,
+ SILC_SKE_PK_TYPE_SILC);
+ protocol->state++;
}
+ /* Return now if the procedure is pending. */
+ if (status == SILC_SKE_STATUS_PENDING)
+ return;
+
if (status != SILC_SKE_STATUS_OK) {
- SILC_LOG_WARNING(("Error (type %d) during Key Exchange protocol",
- status));
- SILC_LOG_DEBUG(("Error (type %d) during Key Exchange protocol",
- status));
+ SILC_LOG_WARNING(("Error (%s) during Key Exchange protocol",
+ silc_ske_map_status(status)));
+ SILC_LOG_DEBUG(("Error (%s) during Key Exchange protocol",
+ silc_ske_map_status(status)));
protocol->state = SILC_PROTOCOL_STATE_ERROR;
- protocol->execute(server->timeout_queue, 0, protocol, fd, 0, 300000);
+ silc_protocol_execute(protocol, server->schedule, 0, 300000);
return;
}
-
- /* Advance protocol state and call the next state if we are responder */
- protocol->state++;
- if (ctx->responder == TRUE)
- protocol->execute(server->timeout_queue, 0, protocol, fd, 0, 100000);
}
break;
case 4:
if (ctx->responder == TRUE) {
/* This creates the key exchange material and sends our
public parts to the initiator inside Key Exchange 2 Payload. */
- status =
- silc_ske_responder_finish(ctx->ske,
- server->public_key, server->private_key,
- SILC_SKE_PK_TYPE_SILC,
- silc_server_protocol_ke_send_packet,
- context);
+ status = silc_ske_responder_finish(ctx->ske,
+ server->public_key,
+ server->private_key,
+ SILC_SKE_PK_TYPE_SILC);
+
+ /* End the protocol on the next round */
+ protocol->state = SILC_PROTOCOL_STATE_END;
} else {
/* Finish the protocol. This verifies the Key Exchange 2 payload
- sent by responder. */
- status = silc_ske_initiator_finish(ctx->ske, ctx->packet->buffer,
- NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+ sent by responder. The silc_server_protocol_ke_continue will
+ be called after the public key has been verified. */
+ status = silc_ske_initiator_finish(ctx->ske, ctx->packet->buffer);
}
+ /* Return now if the procedure is pending. */
+ if (status == SILC_SKE_STATUS_PENDING)
+ return;
+
if (status != SILC_SKE_STATUS_OK) {
- SILC_LOG_WARNING(("Error (type %d) during Key Exchange protocol",
- status));
- SILC_LOG_DEBUG(("Error (type %d) during Key Exchange protocol",
- status));
+ SILC_LOG_WARNING(("Error (%s) during Key Exchange protocol",
+ silc_ske_map_status(status)));
+ SILC_LOG_DEBUG(("Error (%s) during Key Exchange protocol",
+ silc_ske_map_status(status)));
protocol->state = SILC_PROTOCOL_STATE_ERROR;
- protocol->execute(server->timeout_queue, 0, protocol, fd, 0, 300000);
+ silc_protocol_execute(protocol, server->schedule, 0, 300000);
return;
}
-
- /* Send Ok to the other end. We will end the protocol as responder
- sends Ok to us when we will take the new keys into use. */
- if (ctx->responder == FALSE)
- silc_ske_end(ctx->ske, silc_server_protocol_ke_send_packet, context);
-
- /* End the protocol on the next round */
- protocol->state = SILC_PROTOCOL_STATE_END;
}
break;
keymat);
if (status != SILC_SKE_STATUS_OK) {
protocol->state = SILC_PROTOCOL_STATE_ERROR;
- protocol->execute(server->timeout_queue, 0, protocol, fd, 0, 300000);
+ silc_protocol_execute(protocol, server->schedule, 0, 300000);
silc_ske_free_key_material(keymat);
return;
}
/* Send Ok to the other end if we are responder. If we are initiator
we have sent this already. */
if (ctx->responder == TRUE)
- silc_ske_end(ctx->ske, silc_server_protocol_ke_send_packet, context);
+ silc_ske_end(ctx->ske);
/* Unregister the timeout task since the protocol has ended.
This was the timeout task to be executed if the protocol is
not completed fast enough. */
if (ctx->timeout_task)
- silc_task_unregister(server->timeout_queue, ctx->timeout_task);
+ silc_schedule_task_del(server->schedule, ctx->timeout_task);
+
+ /* Assure that after calling final callback there cannot be pending
+ executions for this protocol anymore. This just unregisters any
+ timeout callbacks for this protocol. */
+ silc_protocol_cancel(protocol, server->schedule);
/* Call the final callback */
if (protocol->final_callback)
- protocol->execute_final(server->timeout_queue, 0, protocol, fd);
+ silc_protocol_execute_final(protocol, server->schedule);
else
silc_protocol_free(protocol);
}
*/
/* Send abort notification */
- silc_ske_abort(ctx->ske, ctx->ske->status,
- silc_server_protocol_ke_send_packet,
- context);
+ silc_ske_abort(ctx->ske, ctx->ske->status);
/* Unregister the timeout task since the protocol has ended.
This was the timeout task to be executed if the protocol is
not completed fast enough. */
if (ctx->timeout_task)
- silc_task_unregister(server->timeout_queue, ctx->timeout_task);
+ silc_schedule_task_del(server->schedule, ctx->timeout_task);
+
+ /* Assure that after calling final callback there cannot be pending
+ executions for this protocol anymore. This just unregisters any
+ timeout callbacks for this protocol. */
+ silc_protocol_cancel(protocol, server->schedule);
/* On error the final callback is always called. */
if (protocol->final_callback)
- protocol->execute_final(server->timeout_queue, 0, protocol, fd);
+ silc_protocol_execute_final(protocol, server->schedule);
else
silc_protocol_free(protocol);
break;
This was the timeout task to be executed if the protocol is
not completed fast enough. */
if (ctx->timeout_task)
- silc_task_unregister(server->timeout_queue, ctx->timeout_task);
+ silc_schedule_task_del(server->schedule, ctx->timeout_task);
+ /* Assure that after calling final callback there cannot be pending
+ executions for this protocol anymore. This just unregisters any
+ timeout callbacks for this protocol. */
+ silc_protocol_cancel(protocol, server->schedule);
+
/* On error the final callback is always called. */
if (protocol->final_callback)
- protocol->execute_final(server->timeout_queue, 0, protocol, fd);
+ silc_protocol_execute_final(protocol, server->schedule);
else
silc_protocol_free(protocol);
break;
*/
static int
-silc_server_password_authentication(SilcServer server, char *auth1,
- char *auth2)
+silc_server_password_authentication(SilcServer server, char *remote_auth,
+ char *local_auth)
{
- if (!auth1 || !auth2)
+ if (!remote_auth || !local_auth)
return FALSE;
- if (!memcmp(auth1, auth2, strlen(auth1)))
+ if (!memcmp(remote_auth, local_auth, strlen(local_auth)))
return TRUE;
return FALSE;
SILC_STR_END);
/* Verify signature */
- if (silc_pkcs_verify(pkcs, sign, sign_len, auth->data, auth->len)) {
+ if (silc_pkcs_verify_with_hash(pkcs, ske->prop->hash, sign, sign_len,
+ auth->data, auth->len)) {
silc_pkcs_free(pkcs);
silc_buffer_free(auth);
return TRUE;
static int
silc_server_get_public_key_auth(SilcServer server,
- SilcPublicKey pub_key,
- unsigned char *auth_data,
+ unsigned char **auth_data,
uint32 *auth_data_len,
SilcSKE ske)
{
SilcPKCS pkcs;
SilcBuffer auth;
- if (!pub_key)
- return FALSE;
-
- silc_pkcs_alloc(pub_key->name, &pkcs);
- if (!silc_pkcs_public_key_set(pkcs, pub_key)) {
- silc_pkcs_free(pkcs);
- return FALSE;
- }
+ pkcs = server->pkcs;
/* Make the authentication data. Protocol says it is HASH plus
KE Start Payload. */
ske->start_payload_copy->len),
SILC_STR_END);
- if (silc_pkcs_sign(pkcs, auth->data, auth->len, auth_data, auth_data_len)) {
- silc_pkcs_free(pkcs);
+ *auth_data = silc_calloc(silc_pkcs_get_key_len(pkcs), sizeof(**auth_data));
+ if (silc_pkcs_sign_with_hash(pkcs, ske->prop->hash, auth->data,
+ auth->len, *auth_data, auth_data_len)) {
silc_buffer_free(auth);
return TRUE;
}
- silc_pkcs_free(pkcs);
+ silc_free(*auth_data);
silc_buffer_free(auth);
return FALSE;
}
+/* Function that actually performs the authentication to the remote. This
+ supports both passphrase and public key authentication. */
+
+static bool
+silc_server_get_authentication(SilcServerConnAuthInternalContext *ctx,
+ char *local_passphrase,
+ void *local_publickey,
+ unsigned char *remote_auth,
+ uint32 remote_auth_len)
+{
+ SilcServer server = (SilcServer)ctx->server;
+ SilcSKE ske = ctx->ske;
+ bool result = FALSE;
+
+ /* If we don't have authentication data set at all we do not require
+ authentication at all */
+ if (!local_passphrase && !local_publickey) {
+ SILC_LOG_DEBUG(("No authentication required"));
+ return TRUE;
+ }
+
+ /* If both passphrase and public key is provided then we'll try both of
+ them and see which one of them authenticates. If only one of them is
+ set, then try only that. */
+
+ /* Try first passphrase (as it is faster to check) */
+ if (local_passphrase) {
+ SILC_LOG_DEBUG(("Password authentication"));
+ result = silc_server_password_authentication(server, local_passphrase,
+ remote_auth);
+ }
+
+ /* Try public key authenetication */
+ if (!result && local_publickey) {
+ SILC_LOG_DEBUG(("Public key authentication"));
+ result = silc_server_public_key_authentication(server,
+ local_publickey,
+ remote_auth,
+ remote_auth_len,
+ ske);
+ }
+
+ return result;
+}
+
/* Performs connection authentication protocol. If responder, we
authenticate the remote data received. If initiator, we will send
authentication data to the remote end. */
if (ret == -1) {
SILC_LOG_DEBUG(("Bad payload in authentication packet"));
protocol->state = SILC_PROTOCOL_STATE_ERROR;
- protocol->execute(server->timeout_queue, 0, protocol, fd, 0, 300000);
+ silc_protocol_execute(protocol, server->schedule, 0, 300000);
return;
}
if (payload_len != ctx->packet->buffer->len) {
SILC_LOG_DEBUG(("Bad payload in authentication packet"));
protocol->state = SILC_PROTOCOL_STATE_ERROR;
- protocol->execute(server->timeout_queue, 0, protocol, fd, 0, 300000);
+ silc_protocol_execute(protocol, server->schedule, 0, 300000);
return;
}
conn_type > SILC_SOCKET_TYPE_ROUTER) {
SILC_LOG_ERROR(("Bad connection type %d", conn_type));
protocol->state = SILC_PROTOCOL_STATE_ERROR;
- protocol->execute(server->timeout_queue, 0, protocol, fd, 0, 300000);
+ silc_protocol_execute(protocol, server->schedule, 0, 300000);
return;
}
if (ret == -1) {
SILC_LOG_DEBUG(("Bad payload in authentication packet"));
protocol->state = SILC_PROTOCOL_STATE_ERROR;
- protocol->execute(server->timeout_queue, 0,
- protocol, fd, 0, 300000);
+ silc_protocol_execute(protocol, server->schedule, 0, 300000);
return;
}
}
/* Remote end is client */
if (conn_type == SILC_SOCKET_TYPE_CLIENT) {
- SilcServerConfigSectionClientConnection *client = NULL;
- client = silc_server_config_find_client_conn(server->config,
- ctx->sock->ip,
- ctx->sock->port);
- if (!client)
- client = silc_server_config_find_client_conn(server->config,
- ctx->sock->hostname,
- ctx->sock->port);
+ SilcServerConfigClient *client = ctx->cconfig;
if (client) {
- switch(client->auth_meth) {
- case SILC_AUTH_NONE:
- /* No authentication required */
- SILC_LOG_DEBUG(("No authentication required"));
- break;
-
- case SILC_AUTH_PASSWORD:
- /* Password authentication */
- SILC_LOG_DEBUG(("Password authentication"));
- ret = silc_server_password_authentication(server, auth_data,
- client->auth_data);
-
- if (ret)
- break;
-
+ ret = silc_server_get_authentication(ctx, client->passphrase,
+ client->publickey,
+ auth_data, payload_len);
+ if (!ret) {
/* Authentication failed */
SILC_LOG_ERROR(("Authentication failed"));
SILC_LOG_DEBUG(("Authentication failed"));
silc_free(auth_data);
protocol->state = SILC_PROTOCOL_STATE_ERROR;
- protocol->execute(server->timeout_queue, 0,
- protocol, fd, 0, 300000);
- return;
- break;
-
- case SILC_AUTH_PUBLIC_KEY:
- /* Public key authentication */
- SILC_LOG_DEBUG(("Public key authentication"));
- ret = silc_server_public_key_authentication(server,
- client->auth_data,
- auth_data,
- payload_len,
- ctx->ske);
-
- if (ret)
- break;
-
- SILC_LOG_ERROR(("Authentication failed"));
- SILC_LOG_DEBUG(("Authentication failed"));
- silc_free(auth_data);
- protocol->state = SILC_PROTOCOL_STATE_ERROR;
- protocol->execute(server->timeout_queue, 0,
- protocol, fd, 0, 300000);
+ silc_protocol_execute(protocol, server->schedule, 0, 300000);
return;
}
} else {
- SILC_LOG_DEBUG(("No configuration for remote connection"));
- SILC_LOG_ERROR(("Remote connection not configured"));
+ SILC_LOG_DEBUG(("No configuration for remote client connection"));
+ SILC_LOG_ERROR(("Remote client connection not configured"));
SILC_LOG_ERROR(("Authentication failed"));
silc_free(auth_data);
protocol->state = SILC_PROTOCOL_STATE_ERROR;
- protocol->execute(server->timeout_queue, 0,
- protocol, fd, 0, 300000);
+ silc_protocol_execute(protocol, server->schedule,
+ 0, 300000);
return;
}
}
/* Remote end is server */
if (conn_type == SILC_SOCKET_TYPE_SERVER) {
- SilcServerConfigSectionServerConnection *serv = NULL;
- serv = silc_server_config_find_server_conn(server->config,
- ctx->sock->ip,
- ctx->sock->port);
- if (!serv)
- serv = silc_server_config_find_server_conn(server->config,
- ctx->sock->hostname,
- ctx->sock->port);
-
+ SilcServerConfigServer *serv = ctx->sconfig;
+
if (serv) {
- switch(serv->auth_meth) {
- case SILC_AUTH_NONE:
- /* No authentication required */
- SILC_LOG_DEBUG(("No authentication required"));
- break;
-
- case SILC_AUTH_PASSWORD:
- /* Password authentication */
- SILC_LOG_DEBUG(("Password authentication"));
- ret = silc_server_password_authentication(server, auth_data,
- serv->auth_data);
-
- if (ret)
- break;
-
+ ret = silc_server_get_authentication(ctx, serv->passphrase,
+ serv->publickey,
+ auth_data, payload_len);
+ if (!ret) {
/* Authentication failed */
SILC_LOG_ERROR(("Authentication failed"));
SILC_LOG_DEBUG(("Authentication failed"));
silc_free(auth_data);
protocol->state = SILC_PROTOCOL_STATE_ERROR;
- protocol->execute(server->timeout_queue, 0,
- protocol, fd, 0, 300000);
- return;
- break;
-
- case SILC_AUTH_PUBLIC_KEY:
- /* Public key authentication */
- SILC_LOG_DEBUG(("Public key authentication"));
- ret = silc_server_public_key_authentication(server,
- serv->auth_data,
- auth_data,
- payload_len,
- ctx->ske);
-
- if (ret)
- break;
-
- SILC_LOG_ERROR(("Authentication failed"));
- SILC_LOG_DEBUG(("Authentication failed"));
- silc_free(auth_data);
- protocol->state = SILC_PROTOCOL_STATE_ERROR;
- protocol->execute(server->timeout_queue, 0,
- protocol, fd, 0, 300000);
+ silc_protocol_execute(protocol, server->schedule, 0, 300000);
return;
}
} else {
- SILC_LOG_DEBUG(("No configuration for remote connection"));
- SILC_LOG_ERROR(("Remote connection not configured"));
+ SILC_LOG_DEBUG(("No configuration for remote server connection"));
+ SILC_LOG_ERROR(("Remote server connection not configured"));
SILC_LOG_ERROR(("Authentication failed"));
protocol->state = SILC_PROTOCOL_STATE_ERROR;
- protocol->execute(server->timeout_queue, 0,
- protocol, fd, 0, 300000);
+ silc_protocol_execute(protocol, server->schedule,
+ 0, 300000);
silc_free(auth_data);
return;
}
/* Remote end is router */
if (conn_type == SILC_SOCKET_TYPE_ROUTER) {
- SilcServerConfigSectionServerConnection *serv = NULL;
- serv = silc_server_config_find_router_conn(server->config,
- ctx->sock->ip,
- ctx->sock->port);
- if (!serv)
- serv = silc_server_config_find_router_conn(server->config,
- ctx->sock->hostname,
- ctx->sock->port);
-
+ SilcServerConfigRouter *serv = ctx->rconfig;
+
if (serv) {
- switch(serv->auth_meth) {
- case SILC_AUTH_NONE:
- /* No authentication required */
- SILC_LOG_DEBUG(("No authentication required"));
- break;
-
- case SILC_AUTH_PASSWORD:
- /* Password authentication */
- SILC_LOG_DEBUG(("Password authentication"));
- ret = silc_server_password_authentication(server, auth_data,
- serv->auth_data);
-
- if (ret)
- break;
-
+ ret = silc_server_get_authentication(ctx, serv->passphrase,
+ serv->publickey,
+ auth_data, payload_len);
+ if (!ret) {
/* Authentication failed */
SILC_LOG_ERROR(("Authentication failed"));
SILC_LOG_DEBUG(("Authentication failed"));
silc_free(auth_data);
protocol->state = SILC_PROTOCOL_STATE_ERROR;
- protocol->execute(server->timeout_queue, 0,
- protocol, fd, 0, 300000);
- return;
- break;
-
- case SILC_AUTH_PUBLIC_KEY:
- /* Public key authentication */
- SILC_LOG_DEBUG(("Public key authentication"));
- ret = silc_server_public_key_authentication(server,
- serv->auth_data,
- auth_data,
- payload_len,
- ctx->ske);
-
- if (ret)
- break;
-
- SILC_LOG_ERROR(("Authentication failed"));
- SILC_LOG_DEBUG(("Authentication failed"));
- silc_free(auth_data);
- protocol->state = SILC_PROTOCOL_STATE_ERROR;
- protocol->execute(server->timeout_queue, 0,
- protocol, fd, 0, 300000);
+ silc_protocol_execute(protocol, server->schedule, 0, 300000);
return;
}
} else {
- SILC_LOG_DEBUG(("No configuration for remote connection"));
- SILC_LOG_ERROR(("Remote connection not configured"));
+ SILC_LOG_DEBUG(("No configuration for remote router connection"));
+ SILC_LOG_ERROR(("Remote router connection not configured"));
SILC_LOG_ERROR(("Authentication failed"));
silc_free(auth_data);
protocol->state = SILC_PROTOCOL_STATE_ERROR;
- protocol->execute(server->timeout_queue, 0,
- protocol, fd, 0, 300000);
+ silc_protocol_execute(protocol, server->schedule,
+ 0, 300000);
return;
}
}
/* Advance protocol state. */
protocol->state = SILC_PROTOCOL_STATE_END;
- protocol->execute(server->timeout_queue, 0, protocol, fd, 0, 0);
+ silc_protocol_execute(protocol, server->schedule, 0, 0);
} else {
/*
case SILC_AUTH_PUBLIC_KEY:
{
- unsigned char sign[1024];
-
/* Public key authentication */
- silc_server_get_public_key_auth(server, ctx->auth_data,
- sign, &auth_data_len,
+ silc_server_get_public_key_auth(server, &auth_data, &auth_data_len,
ctx->ske);
- auth_data = silc_calloc(auth_data_len, sizeof(*auth_data));
- memcpy(auth_data, sign, auth_data_len);
break;
}
}
This was the timeout task to be executed if the protocol is
not completed fast enough. */
if (ctx->timeout_task)
- silc_task_unregister(server->timeout_queue, ctx->timeout_task);
+ silc_schedule_task_del(server->schedule, ctx->timeout_task);
+ /* Assure that after calling final callback there cannot be pending
+ executions for this protocol anymore. This just unregisters any
+ timeout callbacks for this protocol. */
+ silc_protocol_cancel(protocol, server->schedule);
+
/* Protocol has ended, call the final callback */
if (protocol->final_callback)
- protocol->execute_final(server->timeout_queue, 0, protocol, fd);
+ silc_protocol_execute_final(protocol, server->schedule);
else
silc_protocol_free(protocol);
}
This was the timeout task to be executed if the protocol is
not completed fast enough. */
if (ctx->timeout_task)
- silc_task_unregister(server->timeout_queue, ctx->timeout_task);
+ silc_schedule_task_del(server->schedule, ctx->timeout_task);
+ /* Assure that after calling final callback there cannot be pending
+ executions for this protocol anymore. This just unregisters any
+ timeout callbacks for this protocol. */
+ silc_protocol_cancel(protocol, server->schedule);
+
/* On error the final callback is always called. */
if (protocol->final_callback)
- protocol->execute_final(server->timeout_queue, 0, protocol, fd);
+ silc_protocol_execute_final(protocol, server->schedule);
else
silc_protocol_free(protocol);
}
This was the timeout task to be executed if the protocol is
not completed fast enough. */
if (ctx->timeout_task)
- silc_task_unregister(server->timeout_queue, ctx->timeout_task);
+ silc_schedule_task_del(server->schedule, ctx->timeout_task);
+ /* Assure that after calling final callback there cannot be pending
+ executions for this protocol anymore. This just unregisters any
+ timeout callbacks for this protocol. */
+ silc_protocol_cancel(protocol, server->schedule);
+
/* On error the final callback is always called. */
if (protocol->final_callback)
- protocol->execute_final(server->timeout_queue, 0, protocol, fd);
+ silc_protocol_execute_final(protocol, server->schedule);
else
silc_protocol_free(protocol);
break;
silc_server_protocol_rekey_validate(SilcServer server,
SilcServerRekeyInternalContext *ctx,
SilcIDListData idata,
- SilcSKEKeyMaterial *keymat)
+ SilcSKEKeyMaterial *keymat,
+ bool send)
{
if (ctx->responder == TRUE) {
- silc_cipher_set_key(idata->send_key, keymat->receive_enc_key,
- keymat->enc_key_len);
- silc_cipher_set_iv(idata->send_key, keymat->receive_iv);
- silc_cipher_set_key(idata->receive_key, keymat->send_enc_key,
- keymat->enc_key_len);
- silc_cipher_set_iv(idata->receive_key, keymat->send_iv);
+ if (send) {
+ silc_cipher_set_key(idata->send_key, keymat->receive_enc_key,
+ keymat->enc_key_len);
+ silc_cipher_set_iv(idata->send_key, keymat->receive_iv);
+ silc_hmac_set_key(idata->hmac_send, keymat->receive_hmac_key,
+ keymat->hmac_key_len);
+ } else {
+ silc_cipher_set_key(idata->receive_key, keymat->send_enc_key,
+ keymat->enc_key_len);
+ silc_cipher_set_iv(idata->receive_key, keymat->send_iv);
+ silc_hmac_set_key(idata->hmac_receive, keymat->send_hmac_key,
+ keymat->hmac_key_len);
+ }
} else {
- silc_cipher_set_key(idata->send_key, keymat->send_enc_key,
- keymat->enc_key_len);
- silc_cipher_set_iv(idata->send_key, keymat->send_iv);
- silc_cipher_set_key(idata->receive_key, keymat->receive_enc_key,
- keymat->enc_key_len);
- silc_cipher_set_iv(idata->receive_key, keymat->receive_iv);
+ if (send) {
+ silc_cipher_set_key(idata->send_key, keymat->send_enc_key,
+ keymat->enc_key_len);
+ silc_cipher_set_iv(idata->send_key, keymat->send_iv);
+ silc_hmac_set_key(idata->hmac_send, keymat->send_hmac_key,
+ keymat->hmac_key_len);
+ } else {
+ silc_cipher_set_key(idata->receive_key, keymat->receive_enc_key,
+ keymat->enc_key_len);
+ silc_cipher_set_iv(idata->receive_key, keymat->receive_iv);
+ silc_hmac_set_key(idata->hmac_receive, keymat->receive_hmac_key,
+ keymat->hmac_key_len);
+ }
}
- silc_hmac_set_key(idata->hmac, keymat->hmac_key, keymat->hmac_key_len);
-
/* Save the current sending encryption key */
- memset(idata->rekey->send_enc_key, 0, idata->rekey->enc_key_len);
- silc_free(idata->rekey->send_enc_key);
- idata->rekey->send_enc_key =
- silc_calloc(keymat->enc_key_len / 8,
- sizeof(*idata->rekey->send_enc_key));
- memcpy(idata->rekey->send_enc_key, keymat->send_enc_key,
- keymat->enc_key_len / 8);
- idata->rekey->enc_key_len = keymat->enc_key_len / 8;
+ if (!send) {
+ memset(idata->rekey->send_enc_key, 0, idata->rekey->enc_key_len);
+ silc_free(idata->rekey->send_enc_key);
+ idata->rekey->send_enc_key = silc_memdup(keymat->send_enc_key,
+ keymat->enc_key_len / 8);
+ idata->rekey->enc_key_len = keymat->enc_key_len / 8;
+ }
}
/* This function actually re-generates (when not using PFS) the keys and
takes them into use. */
void silc_server_protocol_rekey_generate(SilcServer server,
- SilcServerRekeyInternalContext *ctx)
+ SilcServerRekeyInternalContext *ctx,
+ bool send)
{
SilcIDListData idata = (SilcIDListData)ctx->sock->user_data;
SilcSKEKeyMaterial *keymat;
uint32 key_len = silc_cipher_get_key_len(idata->send_key);
uint32 hash_len = idata->hash->hash->hash_len;
- SILC_LOG_DEBUG(("Generating new session keys (no PFS)"));
+ SILC_LOG_DEBUG(("Generating new %s session keys (no PFS)",
+ send ? "sending" : "receiving"));
/* Generate the new key */
keymat = silc_calloc(1, sizeof(*keymat));
idata->hash, keymat);
/* Set the keys into use */
- silc_server_protocol_rekey_validate(server, ctx, idata, keymat);
+ silc_server_protocol_rekey_validate(server, ctx, idata, keymat, send);
silc_ske_free_key_material(keymat);
}
void
silc_server_protocol_rekey_generate_pfs(SilcServer server,
- SilcServerRekeyInternalContext *ctx)
+ SilcServerRekeyInternalContext *ctx,
+ bool send)
{
SilcIDListData idata = (SilcIDListData)ctx->sock->user_data;
SilcSKEKeyMaterial *keymat;
unsigned char *tmpbuf;
uint32 klen;
- SILC_LOG_DEBUG(("Generating new session keys (with PFS)"));
+ SILC_LOG_DEBUG(("Generating new %s session keys (with PFS)",
+ send ? "sending" : "receiving"));
/* Encode KEY to binary data */
tmpbuf = silc_mp_mp2bin(ctx->ske->KEY, 0, &klen);
idata->hash, keymat);
/* Set the keys into use */
- silc_server_protocol_rekey_validate(server, ctx, idata, keymat);
+ silc_server_protocol_rekey_validate(server, ctx, idata, keymat, send);
memset(tmpbuf, 0, klen);
silc_free(tmpbuf);
if (ctx->packet->type != SILC_PACKET_KEY_EXCHANGE_1) {
/* Error in protocol */
protocol->state = SILC_PROTOCOL_STATE_ERROR;
- protocol->execute(server->timeout_queue, 0, protocol, fd,
- 0, 300000);
+ silc_protocol_execute(protocol, server->schedule, 0, 300000);
+ return;
}
- ctx->ske = silc_ske_alloc();
- ctx->ske->rng = server->rng;
+ ctx->ske = silc_ske_alloc(server->rng, server);
ctx->ske->prop = silc_calloc(1, sizeof(*ctx->ske->prop));
- silc_ske_get_group_by_number(idata->rekey->ske_group,
+ silc_ske_group_get_by_number(idata->rekey->ske_group,
&ctx->ske->prop->group);
- status = silc_ske_responder_phase_2(ctx->ske, ctx->packet->buffer,
- NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+ silc_ske_set_callbacks(ctx->ske,
+ silc_server_protocol_rekey_send_packet,
+ NULL, NULL, NULL, silc_ske_check_version,
+ context);
+
+ status = silc_ske_responder_phase_2(ctx->ske, ctx->packet->buffer);
if (status != SILC_SKE_STATUS_OK) {
- SILC_LOG_WARNING(("Error (type %d) during Re-key (PFS)",
- status));
+ SILC_LOG_WARNING(("Error (%s) during Re-key (PFS)",
+ silc_ske_map_status(status)));
protocol->state = SILC_PROTOCOL_STATE_ERROR;
- protocol->execute(server->timeout_queue, 0,
- protocol, fd, 0, 300000);
+ silc_protocol_execute(protocol, server->schedule, 0, 300000);
return;
}
/* Advance the protocol state */
protocol->state++;
- protocol->execute(server->timeout_queue, 0, protocol, fd, 0, 0);
+ silc_protocol_execute(protocol, server->schedule, 0, 0);
} else {
/*
* Do normal and simple re-key.
silc_server_packet_send(server, ctx->sock, SILC_PACKET_REKEY_DONE,
0, NULL, 0, FALSE);
+ /* After we send REKEY_DONE we must set the sending encryption
+ key to the new key since all packets after this packet must
+ encrypted with the new key. */
+ silc_server_protocol_rekey_generate(server, ctx, TRUE);
+
/* The protocol ends in next stage. */
protocol->state = SILC_PROTOCOL_STATE_END;
}
* Use Perfect Forward Secrecy, ie. negotiate the key material
* using the SKE protocol.
*/
- ctx->ske = silc_ske_alloc();
- ctx->ske->rng = server->rng;
+ ctx->ske = silc_ske_alloc(server->rng, server);
ctx->ske->prop = silc_calloc(1, sizeof(*ctx->ske->prop));
- silc_ske_get_group_by_number(idata->rekey->ske_group,
+ silc_ske_group_get_by_number(idata->rekey->ske_group,
&ctx->ske->prop->group);
- status =
- silc_ske_initiator_phase_2(ctx->ske, NULL, NULL,
- silc_server_protocol_rekey_send_packet,
- context);
-
+ silc_ske_set_callbacks(ctx->ske,
+ silc_server_protocol_rekey_send_packet,
+ NULL, NULL, NULL, silc_ske_check_version,
+ context);
+
+ status = silc_ske_initiator_phase_2(ctx->ske, NULL, NULL, 0);
if (status != SILC_SKE_STATUS_OK) {
- SILC_LOG_WARNING(("Error (type %d) during Re-key (PFS)",
- status));
+ SILC_LOG_WARNING(("Error (%s) during Re-key (PFS)",
+ silc_ske_map_status(status)));
protocol->state = SILC_PROTOCOL_STATE_ERROR;
- protocol->execute(server->timeout_queue, 0,
- protocol, fd, 0, 300000);
+ silc_protocol_execute(protocol, server->schedule, 0, 300000);
return;
}
silc_server_packet_send(server, ctx->sock, SILC_PACKET_REKEY_DONE,
0, NULL, 0, FALSE);
+ /* After we send REKEY_DONE we must set the sending encryption
+ key to the new key since all packets after this packet must
+ encrypted with the new key. */
+ silc_server_protocol_rekey_generate(server, ctx, TRUE);
+
/* The protocol ends in next stage. */
protocol->state = SILC_PROTOCOL_STATE_END;
}
* Send our KE packe to the initiator now that we've processed
* the initiator's KE packet.
*/
- status =
- silc_ske_responder_finish(ctx->ske, NULL, NULL,
- SILC_SKE_PK_TYPE_SILC,
- silc_server_protocol_rekey_send_packet,
- context);
-
- if (status != SILC_SKE_STATUS_OK) {
- SILC_LOG_WARNING(("Error (type %d) during Re-key (PFS)",
- status));
-
- protocol->state = SILC_PROTOCOL_STATE_ERROR;
- protocol->execute(server->timeout_queue, 0,
- protocol, fd, 0, 300000);
- return;
- }
+ status = silc_ske_responder_finish(ctx->ske, NULL, NULL,
+ SILC_SKE_PK_TYPE_SILC);
+ if (status != SILC_SKE_STATUS_OK) {
+ SILC_LOG_WARNING(("Error (%s) during Re-key (PFS)",
+ silc_ske_map_status(status)));
+
+ protocol->state = SILC_PROTOCOL_STATE_ERROR;
+ silc_protocol_execute(protocol, server->schedule, 0, 300000);
+ return;
+ }
}
} else {
if (ctx->packet->type != SILC_PACKET_KEY_EXCHANGE_2) {
/* Error in protocol */
protocol->state = SILC_PROTOCOL_STATE_ERROR;
- protocol->execute(server->timeout_queue, 0, protocol, fd, 0, 300000);
+ silc_protocol_execute(protocol, server->schedule, 0, 300000);
+ return;
}
- status = silc_ske_initiator_finish(ctx->ske, ctx->packet->buffer,
- NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+ status = silc_ske_initiator_finish(ctx->ske, ctx->packet->buffer);
if (status != SILC_SKE_STATUS_OK) {
- SILC_LOG_WARNING(("Error (type %d) during Re-key (PFS)",
- status));
+ SILC_LOG_WARNING(("Error (%s) during Re-key (PFS)",
+ silc_ske_map_status(status)));
protocol->state = SILC_PROTOCOL_STATE_ERROR;
- protocol->execute(server->timeout_queue, 0,
- protocol, fd, 0, 300000);
+ silc_protocol_execute(protocol, server->schedule, 0, 300000);
return;
}
}
silc_server_packet_send(server, ctx->sock, SILC_PACKET_REKEY_DONE,
0, NULL, 0, FALSE);
+ /* After we send REKEY_DONE we must set the sending encryption
+ key to the new key since all packets after this packet must
+ encrypted with the new key. */
+ silc_server_protocol_rekey_generate_pfs(server, ctx, TRUE);
+
/* The protocol ends in next stage. */
protocol->state = SILC_PROTOCOL_STATE_END;
break;
if (ctx->packet->type != SILC_PACKET_REKEY_DONE) {
/* Error in protocol */
protocol->state = SILC_PROTOCOL_STATE_ERROR;
- protocol->execute(server->timeout_queue, 0, protocol, fd, 0, 0);
+ silc_protocol_execute(protocol, server->schedule, 0, 300000);
+ return;
}
+ /* We received the REKEY_DONE packet and all packets after this is
+ encrypted with the new key so set the decryption key to the new key */
+ silc_server_protocol_rekey_generate(server, ctx, FALSE);
+
+ /* Assure that after calling final callback there cannot be pending
+ executions for this protocol anymore. This just unregisters any
+ timeout callbacks for this protocol. */
+ silc_protocol_cancel(protocol, server->schedule);
+
/* Protocol has ended, call the final callback */
if (protocol->final_callback)
- protocol->execute_final(server->timeout_queue, 0, protocol, fd);
+ silc_protocol_execute_final(protocol, server->schedule);
else
silc_protocol_free(protocol);
break;
if (ctx->pfs == TRUE) {
/* Send abort notification */
- silc_ske_abort(ctx->ske, ctx->ske->status,
- silc_server_protocol_ke_send_packet,
- context);
+ silc_ske_abort(ctx->ske, ctx->ske->status);
}
+ /* Assure that after calling final callback there cannot be pending
+ executions for this protocol anymore. This just unregisters any
+ timeout callbacks for this protocol. */
+ silc_protocol_cancel(protocol, server->schedule);
+
/* On error the final callback is always called. */
if (protocol->final_callback)
- protocol->execute_final(server->timeout_queue, 0, protocol, fd);
+ silc_protocol_execute_final(protocol, server->schedule);
else
silc_protocol_free(protocol);
break;
* We have received failure from remote
*/
+ /* Assure that after calling final callback there cannot be pending
+ executions for this protocol anymore. This just unregisters any
+ timeout callbacks for this protocol. */
+ silc_protocol_cancel(protocol, server->schedule);
+
/* On error the final callback is always called. */
if (protocol->final_callback)
- protocol->execute_final(server->timeout_queue, 0, protocol, fd);
+ silc_protocol_execute_final(protocol, server->schedule);
else
silc_protocol_free(protocol);
break;
silc_server_protocol_key_exchange);
silc_protocol_register(SILC_PROTOCOL_SERVER_REKEY,
silc_server_protocol_rekey);
+ silc_protocol_register(SILC_PROTOCOL_SERVER_BACKUP,
+ silc_server_protocol_backup);
}
/* Unregisters protocols */
silc_server_protocol_key_exchange);
silc_protocol_unregister(SILC_PROTOCOL_SERVER_REKEY,
silc_server_protocol_rekey);
+ silc_protocol_unregister(SILC_PROTOCOL_SERVER_BACKUP,
+ silc_server_protocol_backup);
}
projects / silc.git / blobdiff