idata->rekey->ske_group = silc_ske_group_get_number(group);
/* Save the hash */
- if (!silc_hash_alloc(hash->hash->name, &idata->hash)) {
+ if (!silc_hash_alloc(silc_hash_get_name(hash), &idata->hash)) {
silc_cipher_free(idata->send_key);
silc_cipher_free(idata->receive_key);
silc_hmac_free(idata->hmac_send);
silc_hmac_free(idata->hmac_receive);
silc_free(conn_data);
- SILC_LOG_ERROR(("Cannot allocate algorithm: %s", hash->hash->name));
+ SILC_LOG_ERROR(("Cannot allocate algorithm: %s",
+ silc_hash_get_name(hash)));
return FALSE;
}
sock->user_data = (void *)conn_data;
- SILC_LOG_INFO(("%s (%s) security properties: %s %s %s",
+ SILC_LOG_INFO(("%s (%s) security properties: %s %s %s %s",
sock->hostname, sock->ip,
idata->send_key->cipher->name,
(char *)silc_hmac_get_name(idata->hmac_send),
- idata->hash->hash->name));
+ silc_hash_get_name(idata->hash),
+ ske->prop->flags & SILC_SKE_SP_FLAG_PFS ? "PFS" : ""));
return TRUE;
}
SilcSKEStatus silc_ske_check_version(SilcSKE ske, unsigned char *version,
SilcUInt32 len, void *context)
{
- SilcSKEStatus status = SILC_SKE_STATUS_OK;
- char *cp;
- int maj = 0, min = 0, build = 0, maj2 = 0, min2 = 0, build2 = 0;
+ SilcUInt32 l_protocol_version = 0, r_protocol_version = 0;
SILC_LOG_INFO(("%s (%s) is version %s", ske->sock->hostname,
ske->sock->ip, version));
- /* Check for initial version string. Allowed "SILC-x.x-". More
- specific protocol version is checked later in session. */
- if (!strstr(version, "SILC-"))
- status = SILC_SKE_STATUS_BAD_VERSION;
-
- /* Check software version */
-
- cp = version + 9;
- if (!cp)
- status = SILC_SKE_STATUS_BAD_VERSION;
-
- maj = atoi(cp);
- cp = strchr(cp, '.');
- if (cp) {
- min = atoi(cp + 1);
- cp++;
- }
- if (cp) {
- cp = strchr(cp, '.');
- if (cp)
- build = atoi(cp + 1);
+ if (!silc_parse_version_string(version, &r_protocol_version, NULL, NULL,
+ NULL, NULL)) {
+ SILC_LOG_ERROR(("%s (%s) %s is not allowed/supported version",
+ ske->sock->hostname, ske->sock->ip, version));
+ return SILC_SKE_STATUS_BAD_VERSION;
}
- cp = silc_version_string + 9;
- if (!cp)
- status = SILC_SKE_STATUS_BAD_VERSION;
-
- maj2 = atoi(cp);
- cp = strchr(cp, '.');
- if (cp) {
- min2 = atoi(cp + 1);
- cp++;
- }
- if (cp) {
- cp = strchr(cp, '.');
- if (cp)
- build2 = atoi(cp + 1);
+ if (!silc_parse_version_string(silc_version_string,
+ &l_protocol_version, NULL, NULL,
+ NULL, NULL)) {
+ SILC_LOG_ERROR(("%s (%s) %s is not allowed/supported version",
+ ske->sock->hostname, ske->sock->ip, version));
+ return SILC_SKE_STATUS_BAD_VERSION;
}
- if (maj != maj2)
- status = SILC_SKE_STATUS_BAD_VERSION;
-
- if (status == SILC_SKE_STATUS_BAD_VERSION)
+ /* If remote is too new, don't connect */
+ if (l_protocol_version < r_protocol_version) {
SILC_LOG_ERROR(("%s (%s) %s is not allowed/supported version",
ske->sock->hostname, ske->sock->ip, version));
+ return SILC_SKE_STATUS_BAD_VERSION;
+ }
+
+ ske->sock->version = r_protocol_version;
- return status;
+ return SILC_SKE_STATUS_OK;
}
/* Callback that is called by the SKE to indicate that it is safe to
*/
SilcSKEKeyMaterial *keymat;
int key_len = silc_cipher_get_key_len(ctx->ske->prop->cipher);
- int hash_len = ctx->ske->prop->hash->hash->hash_len;
+ int hash_len = silc_hash_len(ctx->ske->prop->hash);
/* Process the key material */
keymat = silc_calloc(1, sizeof(*keymat));
*/
static int
-silc_server_password_authentication(SilcServer server, char *remote_auth,
- char *local_auth)
+silc_server_password_authentication(SilcServer server, char *local_auth,
+ char *remote_auth)
{
- if (!remote_auth || !local_auth)
+ if (!remote_auth || !local_auth || strlen(local_auth) != strlen(remote_auth))
return FALSE;
if (!memcmp(remote_auth, local_auth, strlen(local_auth)))
SilcIDListData idata = (SilcIDListData)ctx->sock->user_data;
SilcSKEKeyMaterial *keymat;
SilcUInt32 key_len = silc_cipher_get_key_len(idata->send_key);
- SilcUInt32 hash_len = idata->hash->hash->hash_len;
+ SilcUInt32 hash_len = silc_hash_len(idata->hash);
SILC_LOG_DEBUG(("Generating new %s session keys (no PFS)",
send ? "sending" : "receiving"));
SilcIDListData idata = (SilcIDListData)ctx->sock->user_data;
SilcSKEKeyMaterial *keymat;
SilcUInt32 key_len = silc_cipher_get_key_len(idata->send_key);
- SilcUInt32 hash_len = idata->hash->hash->hash_len;
+ SilcUInt32 hash_len = silc_hash_len(idata->hash);
unsigned char *tmpbuf;
SilcUInt32 klen;
*/
if (ctx->packet->type != SILC_PACKET_KEY_EXCHANGE_1) {
- SILC_LOG_ERROR(("Error during Re-key (PFS): re-key state is "
- "incorrect (received %d, expected %d packet)",
- ctx->packet->type, SILC_PACKET_KEY_EXCHANGE_1));
+ SILC_LOG_ERROR(("Error during Re-key (R PFS): re-key state is "
+ "incorrect (received %d, expected %d packet), "
+ "with %s (%s)", ctx->packet->type,
+ SILC_PACKET_KEY_EXCHANGE_1, ctx->sock->hostname,
+ ctx->sock->ip));
protocol->state = SILC_PROTOCOL_STATE_ERROR;
silc_protocol_execute(protocol, server->schedule, 0, 300000);
return;
status = silc_ske_responder_phase_2(ctx->ske, ctx->packet->buffer);
if (status != SILC_SKE_STATUS_OK) {
- SILC_LOG_ERROR(("Error (%s) during Re-key (PFS)",
- silc_ske_map_status(status)));
+ SILC_LOG_ERROR(("Error (%s) during Re-key (R PFS), with %s (%s)",
+ silc_ske_map_status(status), ctx->sock->hostname,
+ ctx->sock->ip));
protocol->state = SILC_PROTOCOL_STATE_ERROR;
silc_protocol_execute(protocol, server->schedule, 0, 300000);
return;
status = silc_ske_initiator_phase_2(ctx->ske, NULL, NULL, 0);
if (status != SILC_SKE_STATUS_OK) {
- SILC_LOG_ERROR(("Error (%s) during Re-key (PFS)",
- silc_ske_map_status(status)));
+ SILC_LOG_ERROR(("Error (%s) during Re-key (I PFS), with %s (%s)",
+ silc_ske_map_status(status), ctx->sock->hostname,
+ ctx->sock->ip));
protocol->state = SILC_PROTOCOL_STATE_ERROR;
silc_protocol_execute(protocol, server->schedule, 0, 300000);
return;
status = silc_ske_responder_finish(ctx->ske, NULL, NULL,
SILC_SKE_PK_TYPE_SILC);
if (status != SILC_SKE_STATUS_OK) {
- SILC_LOG_ERROR(("Error (%s) during Re-key (PFS)",
- silc_ske_map_status(status)));
+ SILC_LOG_ERROR(("Error (%s) during Re-key (R PFS), with %s (%s)",
+ silc_ske_map_status(status), ctx->sock->hostname,
+ ctx->sock->ip));
protocol->state = SILC_PROTOCOL_STATE_ERROR;
silc_protocol_execute(protocol, server->schedule, 0, 300000);
return;
* The packet type must be KE packet
*/
if (ctx->packet->type != SILC_PACKET_KEY_EXCHANGE_2) {
- SILC_LOG_ERROR(("Error during Re-key (PFS): re-key state is "
- "incorrect (received %d, expected %d packet)",
- ctx->packet->type, SILC_PACKET_KEY_EXCHANGE_2));
+ SILC_LOG_ERROR(("Error during Re-key (I PFS): re-key state is "
+ "incorrect (received %d, expected %d packet), "
+ "with %s (%s)", ctx->packet->type,
+ SILC_PACKET_KEY_EXCHANGE_2, ctx->sock->hostname,
+ ctx->sock->ip));
protocol->state = SILC_PROTOCOL_STATE_ERROR;
silc_protocol_execute(protocol, server->schedule, 0, 300000);
return;
status = silc_ske_initiator_finish(ctx->ske, ctx->packet->buffer);
if (status != SILC_SKE_STATUS_OK) {
- SILC_LOG_ERROR(("Error (%s) during Re-key (PFS)",
- silc_ske_map_status(status)));
+ SILC_LOG_ERROR(("Error (%s) during Re-key (I PFS), with %s (%s)",
+ silc_ske_map_status(status), ctx->sock->hostname,
+ ctx->sock->ip));
protocol->state = SILC_PROTOCOL_STATE_ERROR;
silc_protocol_execute(protocol, server->schedule, 0, 300000);
return;
*/
if (ctx->packet->type != SILC_PACKET_REKEY_DONE) {
- SILC_LOG_ERROR(("Error during Re-key (PFS): re-key state is "
- "incorrect (received %d, expected %d packet)",
- ctx->packet->type, SILC_PACKET_REKEY_DONE));
+ SILC_LOG_ERROR(("Error during Re-key (%s PFS): re-key state is "
+ "incorrect (received %d, expected %d packet), "
+ "with %s (%s)", ctx->responder ? "R" : "I",
+ ctx->packet->type, SILC_PACKET_REKEY_DONE,
+ ctx->sock->hostname, ctx->sock->ip));
protocol->state = SILC_PROTOCOL_STATE_ERROR;
silc_protocol_execute(protocol, server->schedule, 0, 300000);
return;
/* We received the REKEY_DONE packet and all packets after this is
encrypted with the new key so set the decryption key to the new key */
- silc_server_protocol_rekey_generate(server, ctx, FALSE);
+ if (ctx->pfs == TRUE)
+ silc_server_protocol_rekey_generate_pfs(server, ctx, FALSE);
+ else
+ silc_server_protocol_rekey_generate(server, ctx, FALSE);
/* Assure that after calling final callback there cannot be pending
executions for this protocol anymore. This just unregisters any