return TRUE;
}
+ /* XXX For now, accept server keys without verification too. We are
+ currently always doing mutual authentication so the proof of posession
+ of the private key is verified, and if server is authenticated in
+ conn auth protocol with public key we MUST have the key already. */
+ return TRUE;
+ /* Rest is unreachable code! */
+
memset(filename, 0, sizeof(filename));
memset(file, 0, sizeof(file));
snprintf(file, sizeof(file) - 1, "serverkey_%s_%d.pub", sock->hostname,
/* Sets the negotiated key material into use for particular connection. */
-int silc_server_protocol_ke_set_keys(SilcSKE ske,
+int silc_server_protocol_ke_set_keys(SilcServer server,
+ SilcSKE ske,
SilcSocketConnection sock,
SilcSKEKeyMaterial *keymat,
SilcCipher cipher,
return FALSE;
}
+ if (!silc_hmac_alloc((char *)silc_hmac_get_name(hmac), NULL,
+ &idata->hmac_send)) {
+ silc_cipher_free(idata->send_key);
+ silc_cipher_free(idata->receive_key);
+ silc_free(conn_data);
+ return FALSE;
+ }
+
+ if (!silc_hmac_alloc((char *)silc_hmac_get_name(hmac), NULL,
+ &idata->hmac_receive)) {
+ silc_cipher_free(idata->send_key);
+ silc_cipher_free(idata->receive_key);
+ silc_hmac_free(idata->hmac_send);
+ silc_free(conn_data);
+ return FALSE;
+ }
+
if (is_responder == TRUE) {
silc_cipher_set_key(idata->send_key, keymat->receive_enc_key,
keymat->enc_key_len);
silc_cipher_set_key(idata->receive_key, keymat->send_enc_key,
keymat->enc_key_len);
silc_cipher_set_iv(idata->receive_key, keymat->send_iv);
+ silc_hmac_set_key(idata->hmac_send, keymat->receive_hmac_key,
+ keymat->hmac_key_len);
+ silc_hmac_set_key(idata->hmac_receive, keymat->send_hmac_key,
+ keymat->hmac_key_len);
} else {
silc_cipher_set_key(idata->send_key, keymat->send_enc_key,
keymat->enc_key_len);
silc_cipher_set_key(idata->receive_key, keymat->receive_enc_key,
keymat->enc_key_len);
silc_cipher_set_iv(idata->receive_key, keymat->receive_iv);
+ silc_hmac_set_key(idata->hmac_send, keymat->send_hmac_key,
+ keymat->hmac_key_len);
+ silc_hmac_set_key(idata->hmac_receive, keymat->receive_hmac_key,
+ keymat->hmac_key_len);
}
idata->rekey = silc_calloc(1, sizeof(*idata->rekey));
idata->rekey->pfs = TRUE;
idata->rekey->ske_group = silc_ske_group_get_number(group);
- /* Save the remote host's public key */
- silc_pkcs_public_key_decode(ske->ke1_payload->pk_data,
- ske->ke1_payload->pk_len, &idata->public_key);
-
/* Save the hash */
if (!silc_hash_alloc(hash->hash->name, &idata->hash)) {
silc_cipher_free(idata->send_key);
silc_cipher_free(idata->receive_key);
+ silc_hmac_free(idata->hmac_send);
+ silc_hmac_free(idata->hmac_receive);
silc_free(conn_data);
return FALSE;
}
- /* Save HMAC key to be used in the communication. */
- if (!silc_hmac_alloc(hmac->hmac->name, NULL, &idata->hmac_send)) {
- silc_cipher_free(idata->send_key);
- silc_cipher_free(idata->receive_key);
- silc_hash_free(idata->hash);
- silc_free(conn_data);
- return FALSE;
- }
- silc_hmac_set_key(idata->hmac_send, keymat->hmac_key, keymat->hmac_key_len);
- idata->hmac_receive = idata->hmac_send;
+ /* Save the remote host's public key */
+ silc_pkcs_public_key_decode(ske->ke1_payload->pk_data,
+ ske->ke1_payload->pk_len, &idata->public_key);
+ if (ske->prop->flags & SILC_SKE_SP_FLAG_MUTUAL)
+ silc_hash_make(server->sha1hash, ske->ke1_payload->pk_data,
+ ske->ke1_payload->pk_len, idata->fingerprint);
sock->user_data = (void *)conn_data;
+ SILC_LOG_INFO(("%s (%s) security properties: %s %s %s",
+ sock->hostname, sock->ip,
+ idata->send_key->cipher->name,
+ (char *)silc_hmac_get_name(idata->hmac_send),
+ idata->hash->hash->name));
+
return TRUE;
}
if (min > min2)
status = SILC_SKE_STATUS_BAD_VERSION;
+ /* XXX < 0.6 is not allowed */
+ if (maj == 0 && min < 5)
+ status = SILC_SKE_STATUS_BAD_VERSION;
+
+ /* XXX backward support for 0.6.1 */
+ if (maj == 0 && min == 6 && build < 2)
+ ske->backward_version = 1;
+
return status;
}
SILC_LOG_DEBUG(("Start"));
if (ske->status != SILC_SKE_STATUS_OK) {
- SILC_LOG_WARNING(("Error (type %d) during Key Exchange protocol",
- ske->status));
- SILC_LOG_DEBUG(("Error (type %d) during Key Exchange protocol",
- ske->status));
+ SILC_LOG_WARNING(("Error (%s) during Key Exchange protocol",
+ silc_ske_map_status(ske->status)));
+ SILC_LOG_DEBUG(("Error (%s) during Key Exchange protocol",
+ silc_ske_map_status(ske->status)));
protocol->state = SILC_PROTOCOL_STATE_ERROR;
silc_protocol_execute(protocol, server->schedule, 0, 300000);
properties packet from initiator. */
status = silc_ske_responder_start(ske, ctx->rng, ctx->sock,
silc_version_string,
- ctx->packet->buffer, FALSE);
+ ctx->packet->buffer, TRUE);
} else {
SilcSKEStartPayload *start_payload;
/* Assemble security properties. */
- silc_ske_assemble_security_properties(ske, SILC_SKE_SP_FLAG_NONE,
+ silc_ske_assemble_security_properties(ske, SILC_SKE_SP_FLAG_MUTUAL,
silc_version_string,
&start_payload);
return;
if (status != SILC_SKE_STATUS_OK) {
- SILC_LOG_WARNING(("Error (type %d) during Key Exchange protocol",
- status));
- SILC_LOG_DEBUG(("Error (type %d) during Key Exchange protocol",
- status));
+ SILC_LOG_WARNING(("Error (%s) during Key Exchange protocol",
+ silc_ske_map_status(status)));
+ SILC_LOG_DEBUG(("Error (%s) during Key Exchange protocol",
+ silc_ske_map_status(status)));
protocol->state = SILC_PROTOCOL_STATE_ERROR;
silc_protocol_execute(protocol, server->schedule, 0, 300000);
return;
if (status != SILC_SKE_STATUS_OK) {
- SILC_LOG_WARNING(("Error (type %d) during Key Exchange protocol",
- status));
- SILC_LOG_DEBUG(("Error (type %d) during Key Exchange protocol",
- status));
+ SILC_LOG_WARNING(("Error (%s) during Key Exchange protocol",
+ silc_ske_map_status(status)));
+ SILC_LOG_DEBUG(("Error (%s) during Key Exchange protocol",
+ silc_ske_map_status(status)));
protocol->state = SILC_PROTOCOL_STATE_ERROR;
silc_protocol_execute(protocol, server->schedule, 0, 300000);
return;
if (status != SILC_SKE_STATUS_OK) {
- SILC_LOG_WARNING(("Error (type %d) during Key Exchange protocol",
- status));
- SILC_LOG_DEBUG(("Error (type %d) during Key Exchange protocol",
- status));
+ SILC_LOG_WARNING(("Error (%s) during Key Exchange protocol",
+ silc_ske_map_status(status)));
+ SILC_LOG_DEBUG(("Error (%s) during Key Exchange protocol",
+ silc_ske_map_status(status)));
protocol->state = SILC_PROTOCOL_STATE_ERROR;
silc_protocol_execute(protocol, server->schedule, 0, 300000);
return;
if (status != SILC_SKE_STATUS_OK) {
- SILC_LOG_WARNING(("Error (type %d) during Key Exchange protocol",
- status));
- SILC_LOG_DEBUG(("Error (type %d) during Key Exchange protocol",
- status));
+ SILC_LOG_WARNING(("Error (%s) during Key Exchange protocol",
+ silc_ske_map_status(status)));
+ SILC_LOG_DEBUG(("Error (%s) during Key Exchange protocol",
+ silc_ske_map_status(status)));
protocol->state = SILC_PROTOCOL_STATE_ERROR;
silc_protocol_execute(protocol, server->schedule, 0, 300000);
SILC_STR_END);
/* Verify signature */
- if (silc_pkcs_verify(pkcs, sign, sign_len, auth->data, auth->len)) {
+ if (silc_pkcs_verify_with_hash(pkcs, ske->prop->hash, sign, sign_len,
+ auth->data, auth->len)) {
silc_pkcs_free(pkcs);
silc_buffer_free(auth);
return TRUE;
static int
silc_server_get_public_key_auth(SilcServer server,
- SilcPublicKey pub_key,
unsigned char *auth_data,
uint32 *auth_data_len,
SilcSKE ske)
SilcPKCS pkcs;
SilcBuffer auth;
- if (!pub_key)
- return FALSE;
-
- silc_pkcs_alloc(pub_key->name, &pkcs);
- if (!silc_pkcs_public_key_set(pkcs, pub_key)) {
- silc_pkcs_free(pkcs);
- return FALSE;
- }
+ pkcs = server->pkcs;
/* Make the authentication data. Protocol says it is HASH plus
KE Start Payload. */
ske->start_payload_copy->len),
SILC_STR_END);
- if (silc_pkcs_sign(pkcs, auth->data, auth->len, auth_data, auth_data_len)) {
- silc_pkcs_free(pkcs);
+ if (silc_pkcs_sign_with_hash(pkcs, ske->prop->hash, auth->data,
+ auth->len, auth_data, auth_data_len)) {
silc_buffer_free(auth);
return TRUE;
}
- silc_pkcs_free(pkcs);
silc_buffer_free(auth);
return FALSE;
}
unsigned char sign[1024];
/* Public key authentication */
- silc_server_get_public_key_auth(server, ctx->auth_data,
- sign, &auth_data_len,
+ silc_server_get_public_key_auth(server, sign, &auth_data_len,
ctx->ske);
auth_data = silc_calloc(auth_data_len, sizeof(*auth_data));
memcpy(auth_data, sign, auth_data_len);
silc_cipher_set_key(idata->send_key, keymat->receive_enc_key,
keymat->enc_key_len);
silc_cipher_set_iv(idata->send_key, keymat->receive_iv);
+ silc_hmac_set_key(idata->hmac_send, keymat->receive_hmac_key,
+ keymat->hmac_key_len);
} else {
silc_cipher_set_key(idata->receive_key, keymat->send_enc_key,
keymat->enc_key_len);
silc_cipher_set_iv(idata->receive_key, keymat->send_iv);
+ silc_hmac_set_key(idata->hmac_receive, keymat->send_hmac_key,
+ keymat->hmac_key_len);
}
} else {
if (send) {
silc_cipher_set_key(idata->send_key, keymat->send_enc_key,
keymat->enc_key_len);
silc_cipher_set_iv(idata->send_key, keymat->send_iv);
+ silc_hmac_set_key(idata->hmac_send, keymat->send_hmac_key,
+ keymat->hmac_key_len);
} else {
silc_cipher_set_key(idata->receive_key, keymat->receive_enc_key,
keymat->enc_key_len);
silc_cipher_set_iv(idata->receive_key, keymat->receive_iv);
+ silc_hmac_set_key(idata->hmac_receive, keymat->receive_hmac_key,
+ keymat->hmac_key_len);
}
}
- if (send) {
- silc_hmac_alloc(idata->hmac_send->hmac->name, NULL, &idata->hmac_send);
- silc_hmac_set_key(idata->hmac_send, keymat->hmac_key,
- keymat->hmac_key_len);
- } else {
- silc_hmac_free(idata->hmac_receive);
- idata->hmac_receive = idata->hmac_send;
- }
-
/* Save the current sending encryption key */
if (!send) {
memset(idata->rekey->send_enc_key, 0, idata->rekey->enc_key_len);
ctx->ske = silc_ske_alloc();
ctx->ske->rng = server->rng;
ctx->ske->prop = silc_calloc(1, sizeof(*ctx->ske->prop));
- silc_ske_get_group_by_number(idata->rekey->ske_group,
+ silc_ske_group_get_by_number(idata->rekey->ske_group,
&ctx->ske->prop->group);
silc_ske_set_callbacks(ctx->ske,
status = silc_ske_responder_phase_2(ctx->ske, ctx->packet->buffer);
if (status != SILC_SKE_STATUS_OK) {
- SILC_LOG_WARNING(("Error (type %d) during Re-key (PFS)",
- status));
+ SILC_LOG_WARNING(("Error (%s) during Re-key (PFS)",
+ silc_ske_map_status(status)));
protocol->state = SILC_PROTOCOL_STATE_ERROR;
silc_protocol_execute(protocol, server->schedule, 0, 300000);
ctx->ske = silc_ske_alloc();
ctx->ske->rng = server->rng;
ctx->ske->prop = silc_calloc(1, sizeof(*ctx->ske->prop));
- silc_ske_get_group_by_number(idata->rekey->ske_group,
+ silc_ske_group_get_by_number(idata->rekey->ske_group,
&ctx->ske->prop->group);
silc_ske_set_callbacks(ctx->ske,
status = silc_ske_initiator_phase_2(ctx->ske, NULL, NULL);
if (status != SILC_SKE_STATUS_OK) {
- SILC_LOG_WARNING(("Error (type %d) during Re-key (PFS)",
- status));
+ SILC_LOG_WARNING(("Error (%s) during Re-key (PFS)",
+ silc_ske_map_status(status)));
protocol->state = SILC_PROTOCOL_STATE_ERROR;
silc_protocol_execute(protocol, server->schedule, 0, 300000);
status = silc_ske_responder_finish(ctx->ske, NULL, NULL,
SILC_SKE_PK_TYPE_SILC);
if (status != SILC_SKE_STATUS_OK) {
- SILC_LOG_WARNING(("Error (type %d) during Re-key (PFS)",
- status));
+ SILC_LOG_WARNING(("Error (%s) during Re-key (PFS)",
+ silc_ske_map_status(status)));
protocol->state = SILC_PROTOCOL_STATE_ERROR;
silc_protocol_execute(protocol, server->schedule, 0, 300000);
status = silc_ske_initiator_finish(ctx->ske, ctx->packet->buffer);
if (status != SILC_SKE_STATUS_OK) {
- SILC_LOG_WARNING(("Error (type %d) during Re-key (PFS)",
- status));
+ SILC_LOG_WARNING(("Error (%s) during Re-key (PFS)",
+ silc_ske_map_status(status)));
protocol->state = SILC_PROTOCOL_STATE_ERROR;
silc_protocol_execute(protocol, server->schedule, 0, 300000);
silc_server_protocol_key_exchange);
silc_protocol_register(SILC_PROTOCOL_SERVER_REKEY,
silc_server_protocol_rekey);
+ silc_protocol_register(SILC_PROTOCOL_SERVER_BACKUP,
+ silc_server_protocol_backup);
}
/* Unregisters protocols */
silc_server_protocol_key_exchange);
silc_protocol_unregister(SILC_PROTOCOL_SERVER_REKEY,
silc_server_protocol_rekey);
+ silc_protocol_unregister(SILC_PROTOCOL_SERVER_BACKUP,
+ silc_server_protocol_backup);
}
projects / silc.git / blobdiff