+Sun Nov 4 23:37:28 EET 2001 Pekka Riikonen <priikone@silcnet.org>
+
+ * Fixed a security problem found in SKE. The initiator's
+ public key too is now added to the HASH hash value creation
+ which is signed by the responder to create the SIGN value.
+ This will prevent anyone in the middle to lie to the responder
+ about the initiator's public key. If this is done now, the
+ man in the middle will get caught. Updated the protocol
+ specification.
+
Sun Nov 4 11:43:53 EET 2001 Pekka Riikonen <priikone@silcnet.org>
* Better installation directory handling. Configure module
1. Initiator generates a random number x, where 1 < x < q,
and computes e = g ^ x mod p. The result e is then
- encoded into Key Exchange Payload and sent to the
- responder.
+ encoded into Key Exchange Payload, with the public key
+ (or certificate) and sent to the responder.
If the Mutual Authentication flag is set then initiator
MUST also produce signature data SIGN_i which the responder
and computes f = g ^ y mod p. It then computes the
shared secret KEY = e ^ y mod p, and, a hash value
HASH = hash(Key Exchange Start Payload data | public
- key (or certificate) | e | f | KEY). It then signs
+ key (or certificate) | Initiator's public key (or
+ certificate) | e | f | KEY). It then signs
the HASH value with its private key resulting a signature
SIGN.