.ds RF FORMFEED[Page %]
.ds CF
.ds LH Internet Draft
-.ds RH 22 July 2001
+.ds RH 21 August 2001
.ds CH
.na
.hy 0
.nf
Network Working Group P. Riikonen
Internet-Draft
-draft-riikonen-silc-spec-03.txt 22 July 2001
-Expires: 22 January 2002
+draft-riikonen-silc-spec-03.txt 21 August 2001
+Expires: 21 February 2002
.in 3
the SILC Network. The clients must be able to trust the servers they
are using.
+It must also be noted that if the client requires absolute security by
+not trusting any of the servers or routers in the SILC Network, this can
+be accomplished by negotiating private keys outside the SILC Network,
+either using SKE or some other key negotiation protocol, or to use some
+other external means for distributing the keys. This applies for all
+messages, private messages and channel messages. It is important to note
+that SILC, like any other security protocol is not full proof system and
+cannot secure from insecure environment; the SILC servers and routers could
+very well be compromised. However, to provide acceptable level of security
+and usability for end user the protocol uses many times session keys or
+other keys generated by the servers to secure the messages. If this is
+unacceptable for the client or end user, the private keys negotiatied
+outside the SILC Network should always be used. In the end it is always
+implementor's choice whether to negotiate private keys by default or
+whether to use the keys generated by the servers.
+
It is also recommended that router operators in the SILC Network would
form a joint forum to discuss the router and SILC Network management
issues. Also, router operators along with the cell's server operators
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
-
-
-
-
.ti 0
7 Author's Address
EMail: priikone@silcnet.org
-This Internet-Draft expires 22 January 2002
+This Internet-Draft expires 21 February 2002