SILC_TASK_CALLBACK(silc_server_protocol_key_exchange);
SILC_TASK_CALLBACK(silc_server_protocol_rekey);
-extern char *silc_version_string;
-
/*
* Key Exhange protocol functions
*/
(SilcServerKEInternalContext *)protocol->context;
SilcServer server = (SilcServer)ctx->server;
- SILC_LOG_DEBUG(("Start"));
+ SILC_LOG_DEBUG(("Verifying received public key"));
- if (silc_verify_public_key_internal(server, ctx->sock,
- (ctx->responder == FALSE ?
- SILC_SOCKET_TYPE_ROUTER:
- ctx->sconfig.ref_ptr ? SILC_SOCKET_TYPE_SERVER :
- ctx->rconfig.ref_ptr ? SILC_SOCKET_TYPE_ROUTER :
- SILC_SOCKET_TYPE_CLIENT),
- pk_data, pk_len, pk_type))
+ if (silc_verify_public_key_internal(
+ server, ctx->sock,
+ (ctx->responder == FALSE ?
+ SILC_SOCKET_TYPE_ROUTER:
+ ctx->sconfig.ref_ptr ? SILC_SOCKET_TYPE_SERVER :
+ ctx->rconfig.ref_ptr ? SILC_SOCKET_TYPE_ROUTER :
+ SILC_SOCKET_TYPE_CLIENT),
+ pk_data, pk_len, pk_type))
completion(ske, SILC_SKE_STATUS_OK, completion_context);
else
completion(ske, SILC_SKE_STATUS_UNSUPPORTED_PUBLIC_KEY,
{
SilcUnknownEntry conn_data;
SilcIDListData idata;
+ const char *cname = silc_cipher_get_name(cipher);
- SILC_LOG_DEBUG(("Setting new key into use"));
+ SILC_LOG_DEBUG(("Setting new keys into use"));
conn_data = silc_calloc(1, sizeof(*conn_data));
idata = (SilcIDListData)conn_data;
/* Allocate cipher to be used in the communication */
- if (!silc_cipher_alloc(cipher->cipher->name, &idata->send_key)) {
+ if (!silc_cipher_alloc((char *)cname, &idata->send_key)) {
silc_free(conn_data);
- SILC_LOG_ERROR(("Cannot allocate algorithm: %s", cipher->cipher->name));
+ SILC_LOG_ERROR(("Cannot allocate algorithm: %s", cname));
return FALSE;
}
- if (!silc_cipher_alloc(cipher->cipher->name, &idata->receive_key)) {
+ if (!silc_cipher_alloc((char *)cname, &idata->receive_key)) {
silc_free(conn_data);
- SILC_LOG_ERROR(("Cannot allocate algorithm: %s", cipher->cipher->name));
+ SILC_LOG_ERROR(("Cannot allocate algorithm: %s", cname));
return FALSE;
}
idata->rekey->ske_group = silc_ske_group_get_number(group);
/* Save the hash */
- if (!silc_hash_alloc(hash->hash->name, &idata->hash)) {
+ if (!silc_hash_alloc(silc_hash_get_name(hash), &idata->hash)) {
silc_cipher_free(idata->send_key);
silc_cipher_free(idata->receive_key);
silc_hmac_free(idata->hmac_send);
silc_hmac_free(idata->hmac_receive);
silc_free(conn_data);
- SILC_LOG_ERROR(("Cannot allocate algorithm: %s", hash->hash->name));
+ SILC_LOG_ERROR(("Cannot allocate algorithm: %s",
+ silc_hash_get_name(hash)));
return FALSE;
}
sock->user_data = (void *)conn_data;
- SILC_LOG_INFO(("%s (%s) security properties: %s %s %s",
+ SILC_LOG_INFO(("%s (%s) security properties: %s %s %s %s",
sock->hostname, sock->ip,
- idata->send_key->cipher->name,
+ silc_cipher_get_name(idata->send_key),
(char *)silc_hmac_get_name(idata->hmac_send),
- idata->hash->hash->name));
+ silc_hash_get_name(idata->hash),
+ ske->prop->flags & SILC_SKE_SP_FLAG_PFS ? "PFS" : ""));
return TRUE;
}
SilcSKEStatus silc_ske_check_version(SilcSKE ske, unsigned char *version,
SilcUInt32 len, void *context)
{
- SilcSKEStatus status = SILC_SKE_STATUS_OK;
- char *cp;
- int maj = 0, min = 0, build = 0, maj2 = 0, min2 = 0, build2 = 0;
+ SilcUInt32 l_protocol_version = 0, r_protocol_version = 0;
SILC_LOG_INFO(("%s (%s) is version %s", ske->sock->hostname,
ske->sock->ip, version));
- /* Check for initial version string. Allowed "SILC-x.x-". More
- specific protocol version is checked later in session. */
- if (!strstr(version, "SILC-"))
- status = SILC_SKE_STATUS_BAD_VERSION;
-
- /* Check software version */
-
- cp = version + 9;
- if (!cp)
- status = SILC_SKE_STATUS_BAD_VERSION;
-
- maj = atoi(cp);
- cp = strchr(cp, '.');
- if (cp) {
- min = atoi(cp + 1);
- cp++;
- }
- if (cp) {
- cp = strchr(cp, '.');
- if (cp)
- build = atoi(cp + 1);
+ if (!silc_parse_version_string(version, &r_protocol_version, NULL, NULL,
+ NULL, NULL)) {
+ SILC_LOG_ERROR(("%s (%s) %s is not allowed/supported version",
+ ske->sock->hostname, ske->sock->ip, version));
+ return SILC_SKE_STATUS_BAD_VERSION;
}
- cp = silc_version_string + 9;
- if (!cp)
- status = SILC_SKE_STATUS_BAD_VERSION;
-
- maj2 = atoi(cp);
- cp = strchr(cp, '.');
- if (cp) {
- min2 = atoi(cp + 1);
- cp++;
- }
- if (cp) {
- cp = strchr(cp, '.');
- if (cp)
- build2 = atoi(cp + 1);
+ if (!silc_parse_version_string(silc_version_string,
+ &l_protocol_version, NULL, NULL,
+ NULL, NULL)) {
+ SILC_LOG_ERROR(("%s (%s) %s is not allowed/supported version",
+ ske->sock->hostname, ske->sock->ip, version));
+ return SILC_SKE_STATUS_BAD_VERSION;
}
- if (maj != maj2)
- status = SILC_SKE_STATUS_BAD_VERSION;
-
- if (status == SILC_SKE_STATUS_BAD_VERSION)
+ /* If remote is too new, don't connect */
+ if (l_protocol_version < r_protocol_version) {
SILC_LOG_ERROR(("%s (%s) %s is not allowed/supported version",
ske->sock->hostname, ske->sock->ip, version));
+ return SILC_SKE_STATUS_BAD_VERSION;
+ }
- return status;
+ ske->sock->version = r_protocol_version;
+
+ return SILC_SKE_STATUS_OK;
}
/* Callback that is called by the SKE to indicate that it is safe to
(SilcServerKEInternalContext *)protocol->context;
SilcServer server = (SilcServer)ctx->server;
- SILC_LOG_DEBUG(("Start"));
-
if (ske->status != SILC_SKE_STATUS_OK) {
SILC_LOG_ERROR(("Error (%s) during Key Exchange protocol",
silc_ske_map_status(ske->status)));
/* Send Ok to the other end. We will end the protocol as responder
sends Ok to us when we will take the new keys into use. */
if (ctx->responder == FALSE) {
+ SILC_LOG_DEBUG(("Ending key exchange protocol"));
silc_ske_end(ctx->ske);
/* End the protocol on the next round */
SilcServer server = (SilcServer)ctx->server;
SilcSKEStatus status = SILC_SKE_STATUS_OK;
- SILC_LOG_DEBUG(("Start"));
-
if (protocol->state == SILC_PROTOCOL_STATE_UNKNOWN)
protocol->state = SILC_PROTOCOL_STATE_START;
- SILC_LOG_DEBUG(("State=%d", protocol->state));
+ SILC_LOG_DEBUG(("Current protocol state %d", protocol->state));
switch(protocol->state) {
case SILC_PROTOCOL_STATE_START:
if (ctx->responder == TRUE) {
/* Start the key exchange by processing the received security
properties packet from initiator. */
+ SILC_LOG_DEBUG(("Process security property list (KE)"));
status = silc_ske_responder_start(ske, ctx->rng, ctx->sock,
silc_version_string,
ctx->packet->buffer, ctx->flags);
} else {
SilcSKEStartPayload *start_payload;
+ SILC_LOG_DEBUG(("Send security property list (KE)"));
+
/* Assemble security properties. */
silc_ske_assemble_security_properties(ske, ctx->flags,
silc_version_string,
*/
if (ctx->responder == TRUE) {
/* Sends the selected security properties to the initiator. */
+ SILC_LOG_DEBUG(("Send security property list reply (KE)"));
status = silc_ske_responder_phase_1(ctx->ske);
} else {
/* Call Phase-1 function. This processes the Key Exchange Start
paylaod reply we just got from the responder. The callback
function will receive the processed payload where we will
save it. */
+ SILC_LOG_DEBUG(("Process security property list reply (KE)"));
status = silc_ske_initiator_phase_1(ctx->ske, ctx->packet->buffer);
}
the initiator. This also creates our parts of the Diffie
Hellman algorithm. The silc_server_protocol_ke_continue
will be called after the public key has been verified. */
+ SILC_LOG_DEBUG(("Process KE1 packet"));
status = silc_ske_responder_phase_2(ctx->ske, ctx->packet->buffer);
} else {
/* Call the Phase-2 function. This creates Diffie Hellman
key exchange parameters and sends our public part inside
Key Exhange 1 Payload to the responder. */
+ SILC_LOG_DEBUG(("Send KE1 packet"));
status = silc_ske_initiator_phase_2(ctx->ske,
server->public_key,
server->private_key,
if (ctx->responder == TRUE) {
/* This creates the key exchange material and sends our
public parts to the initiator inside Key Exchange 2 Payload. */
+ SILC_LOG_DEBUG(("Process KE2 packet"));
status = silc_ske_responder_finish(ctx->ske,
server->public_key,
server->private_key,
/* Finish the protocol. This verifies the Key Exchange 2 payload
sent by responder. The silc_server_protocol_ke_continue will
be called after the public key has been verified. */
+ SILC_LOG_DEBUG(("Send KE2 packet"));
status = silc_ske_initiator_finish(ctx->ske, ctx->packet->buffer);
}
*/
SilcSKEKeyMaterial *keymat;
int key_len = silc_cipher_get_key_len(ctx->ske->prop->cipher);
- int hash_len = ctx->ske->prop->hash->hash->hash_len;
+ int hash_len = silc_hash_len(ctx->ske->prop->hash);
+
+ SILC_LOG_DEBUG(("Process computed key material"));
/* Process the key material */
keymat = silc_calloc(1, sizeof(*keymat));
/* Send Ok to the other end if we are responder. If we are initiator
we have sent this already. */
- if (ctx->responder == TRUE)
+ if (ctx->responder == TRUE) {
+ SILC_LOG_DEBUG(("Ending key exchange protocol"));
silc_ske_end(ctx->ske);
+ }
/* Unregister the timeout task since the protocol has ended.
This was the timeout task to be executed if the protocol is
*/
static int
-silc_server_password_authentication(SilcServer server, char *remote_auth,
- char *local_auth)
+silc_server_password_authentication(SilcServer server, char *local_auth,
+ char *remote_auth)
{
- if (!remote_auth || !local_auth)
+ if (!remote_auth || !local_auth || strlen(local_auth) != strlen(remote_auth))
return FALSE;
if (!memcmp(remote_auth, local_auth, strlen(local_auth)))
ske->start_payload_copy->len),
SILC_STR_END);
- *auth_data = silc_calloc(silc_pkcs_get_key_len(pkcs), sizeof(**auth_data));
+ *auth_data = silc_calloc((silc_pkcs_get_key_len(pkcs) / 8) + 1,
+ sizeof(**auth_data));
if (silc_pkcs_sign_with_hash(pkcs, ske->prop->hash, auth->data,
auth->len, *auth_data, auth_data_len)) {
silc_buffer_free(auth);
return TRUE;
}
+ SILC_LOG_ERROR(("Error computing signature"));
+
silc_free(*auth_data);
silc_buffer_free(auth);
return FALSE;
remote_auth_len, ske);
}
+ SILC_LOG_DEBUG(("Authentication %s", result ? "successful" : "failed"));
+
return result;
}
(SilcServerConnAuthInternalContext *)protocol->context;
SilcServer server = (SilcServer)ctx->server;
- SILC_LOG_DEBUG(("Start"));
-
if (protocol->state == SILC_PROTOCOL_STATE_UNKNOWN)
protocol->state = SILC_PROTOCOL_STATE_START;
- SILC_LOG_DEBUG(("State=%d", protocol->state));
+ SILC_LOG_DEBUG(("Current protocol state %d", protocol->state));
switch(protocol->state) {
case SILC_PROTOCOL_STATE_START:
SilcIDListData idata = (SilcIDListData)ctx->sock->user_data;
SilcSKEKeyMaterial *keymat;
SilcUInt32 key_len = silc_cipher_get_key_len(idata->send_key);
- SilcUInt32 hash_len = idata->hash->hash->hash_len;
+ SilcUInt32 hash_len = silc_hash_len(idata->hash);
SILC_LOG_DEBUG(("Generating new %s session keys (no PFS)",
send ? "sending" : "receiving"));
SilcIDListData idata = (SilcIDListData)ctx->sock->user_data;
SilcSKEKeyMaterial *keymat;
SilcUInt32 key_len = silc_cipher_get_key_len(idata->send_key);
- SilcUInt32 hash_len = idata->hash->hash->hash_len;
+ SilcUInt32 hash_len = silc_hash_len(idata->hash);
unsigned char *tmpbuf;
SilcUInt32 klen;
SilcIDListData idata = (SilcIDListData)ctx->sock->user_data;
SilcSKEStatus status;
- SILC_LOG_DEBUG(("Start"));
-
if (protocol->state == SILC_PROTOCOL_STATE_UNKNOWN)
protocol->state = SILC_PROTOCOL_STATE_START;
- SILC_LOG_DEBUG(("State=%d", protocol->state));
+ SILC_LOG_DEBUG(("Current protocol state %d", protocol->state));
switch(protocol->state) {
case SILC_PROTOCOL_STATE_START:
/* We received the REKEY_DONE packet and all packets after this is
encrypted with the new key so set the decryption key to the new key */
- silc_server_protocol_rekey_generate(server, ctx, FALSE);
+ if (ctx->pfs == TRUE)
+ silc_server_protocol_rekey_generate_pfs(server, ctx, FALSE);
+ else
+ silc_server_protocol_rekey_generate(server, ctx, FALSE);
/* Assure that after calling final callback there cannot be pending
executions for this protocol anymore. This just unregisters any