+ silc_schedule_task_del(server->schedule, ctx->timeout_task);
+
+ /* Assure that after calling final callback there cannot be pending
+ executions for this protocol anymore. This just unregisters any
+ timeout callbacks for this protocol. */
+ silc_protocol_cancel(protocol, server->schedule);
+
+ /* On error the final callback is always called. */
+ if (protocol->final_callback)
+ silc_protocol_execute_final(protocol, server->schedule);
+ else
+ silc_protocol_free(protocol);
+ break;
+
+ case SILC_PROTOCOL_STATE_UNKNOWN:
+ break;
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Re-key protocol routines
+ */
+
+/* Actually takes the new keys into use. */
+
+static void
+silc_server_protocol_rekey_validate(SilcServer server,
+ SilcServerRekeyInternalContext *ctx,
+ SilcIDListData idata,
+ SilcSKEKeyMaterial *keymat,
+ bool send)
+{
+ if (ctx->responder == TRUE) {
+ if (send) {
+ silc_cipher_set_key(idata->send_key, keymat->receive_enc_key,
+ keymat->enc_key_len);
+ silc_cipher_set_iv(idata->send_key, keymat->receive_iv);
+ silc_hmac_set_key(idata->hmac_send, keymat->receive_hmac_key,
+ keymat->hmac_key_len);
+ } else {
+ silc_cipher_set_key(idata->receive_key, keymat->send_enc_key,
+ keymat->enc_key_len);
+ silc_cipher_set_iv(idata->receive_key, keymat->send_iv);
+ silc_hmac_set_key(idata->hmac_receive, keymat->send_hmac_key,
+ keymat->hmac_key_len);
+ }
+ } else {
+ if (send) {
+ silc_cipher_set_key(idata->send_key, keymat->send_enc_key,
+ keymat->enc_key_len);
+ silc_cipher_set_iv(idata->send_key, keymat->send_iv);
+ silc_hmac_set_key(idata->hmac_send, keymat->send_hmac_key,
+ keymat->hmac_key_len);
+ } else {
+ silc_cipher_set_key(idata->receive_key, keymat->receive_enc_key,
+ keymat->enc_key_len);
+ silc_cipher_set_iv(idata->receive_key, keymat->receive_iv);
+ silc_hmac_set_key(idata->hmac_receive, keymat->receive_hmac_key,
+ keymat->hmac_key_len);
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Save the current sending encryption key */
+ if (!send) {
+ memset(idata->rekey->send_enc_key, 0, idata->rekey->enc_key_len);
+ silc_free(idata->rekey->send_enc_key);
+ idata->rekey->send_enc_key =
+ silc_calloc(keymat->enc_key_len / 8,
+ sizeof(*idata->rekey->send_enc_key));
+ memcpy(idata->rekey->send_enc_key, keymat->send_enc_key,
+ keymat->enc_key_len / 8);
+ idata->rekey->enc_key_len = keymat->enc_key_len / 8;
+ }
+}
+
+/* This function actually re-generates (when not using PFS) the keys and
+ takes them into use. */
+
+void silc_server_protocol_rekey_generate(SilcServer server,
+ SilcServerRekeyInternalContext *ctx,
+ bool send)
+{
+ SilcIDListData idata = (SilcIDListData)ctx->sock->user_data;
+ SilcSKEKeyMaterial *keymat;
+ uint32 key_len = silc_cipher_get_key_len(idata->send_key);
+ uint32 hash_len = idata->hash->hash->hash_len;
+
+ SILC_LOG_DEBUG(("Generating new %s session keys (no PFS)",
+ send ? "sending" : "receiving"));
+
+ /* Generate the new key */
+ keymat = silc_calloc(1, sizeof(*keymat));
+ silc_ske_process_key_material_data(idata->rekey->send_enc_key,
+ idata->rekey->enc_key_len,
+ 16, key_len, hash_len,
+ idata->hash, keymat);
+
+ /* Set the keys into use */
+ silc_server_protocol_rekey_validate(server, ctx, idata, keymat, send);
+
+ silc_ske_free_key_material(keymat);
+}
+
+/* This function actually re-generates (with PFS) the keys and
+ takes them into use. */
+
+void
+silc_server_protocol_rekey_generate_pfs(SilcServer server,
+ SilcServerRekeyInternalContext *ctx,
+ bool send)
+{
+ SilcIDListData idata = (SilcIDListData)ctx->sock->user_data;
+ SilcSKEKeyMaterial *keymat;
+ uint32 key_len = silc_cipher_get_key_len(idata->send_key);
+ uint32 hash_len = idata->hash->hash->hash_len;
+ unsigned char *tmpbuf;
+ uint32 klen;
+
+ SILC_LOG_DEBUG(("Generating new %s session keys (with PFS)",
+ send ? "sending" : "receiving"));
+
+ /* Encode KEY to binary data */
+ tmpbuf = silc_mp_mp2bin(ctx->ske->KEY, 0, &klen);
+
+ /* Generate the new key */
+ keymat = silc_calloc(1, sizeof(*keymat));
+ silc_ske_process_key_material_data(tmpbuf, klen, 16, key_len, hash_len,
+ idata->hash, keymat);
+
+ /* Set the keys into use */
+ silc_server_protocol_rekey_validate(server, ctx, idata, keymat, send);
+
+ memset(tmpbuf, 0, klen);
+ silc_free(tmpbuf);
+ silc_ske_free_key_material(keymat);
+}
+
+/* Packet sending callback. This function is provided as packet sending
+ routine to the Key Exchange functions. */
+
+static void
+silc_server_protocol_rekey_send_packet(SilcSKE ske,
+ SilcBuffer packet,
+ SilcPacketType type,
+ void *context)
+{
+ SilcProtocol protocol = (SilcProtocol)context;
+ SilcServerRekeyInternalContext *ctx =
+ (SilcServerRekeyInternalContext *)protocol->context;
+ SilcServer server = (SilcServer)ctx->server;
+
+ /* Send the packet immediately */
+ silc_server_packet_send(server, ctx->sock,
+ type, 0, packet->data, packet->len, FALSE);
+}
+
+/* Performs re-key as defined in the SILC protocol specification. */
+
+SILC_TASK_CALLBACK(silc_server_protocol_rekey)
+{
+ SilcProtocol protocol = (SilcProtocol)context;
+ SilcServerRekeyInternalContext *ctx =
+ (SilcServerRekeyInternalContext *)protocol->context;
+ SilcServer server = (SilcServer)ctx->server;
+ SilcIDListData idata = (SilcIDListData)ctx->sock->user_data;
+ SilcSKEStatus status;
+
+ SILC_LOG_DEBUG(("Start"));
+
+ if (protocol->state == SILC_PROTOCOL_STATE_UNKNOWN)
+ protocol->state = SILC_PROTOCOL_STATE_START;
+
+ SILC_LOG_DEBUG(("State=%d", protocol->state));
+
+ switch(protocol->state) {
+ case SILC_PROTOCOL_STATE_START:
+ {
+ /*
+ * Start protocol.
+ */
+
+ if (ctx->responder == TRUE) {
+ /*
+ * We are receiving party
+ */
+
+ if (ctx->pfs == TRUE) {
+ /*
+ * Use Perfect Forward Secrecy, ie. negotiate the key material
+ * using the SKE protocol.
+ */
+
+ if (ctx->packet->type != SILC_PACKET_KEY_EXCHANGE_1) {
+ /* Error in protocol */
+ protocol->state = SILC_PROTOCOL_STATE_ERROR;
+ silc_protocol_execute(protocol, server->schedule, 0, 300000);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ ctx->ske = silc_ske_alloc();
+ ctx->ske->rng = server->rng;
+ ctx->ske->prop = silc_calloc(1, sizeof(*ctx->ske->prop));
+ silc_ske_group_get_by_number(idata->rekey->ske_group,
+ &ctx->ske->prop->group);