8 .ds RF FORMFEED[Page %]
17 Network Working Group P. Riikonen
19 draft-riikonen-silc-ke-auth-04.txt XXX
25 SILC Key Exchange and Authentication Protocols
26 <draft-riikonen-silc-ke-auth-04.txt>
31 This document is an Internet-Draft and is in full conformance with
32 all provisions of Section 10 of RFC 2026. Internet-Drafts are
33 working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), its
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37 Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
38 and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
39 time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
40 material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
42 The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at
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45 The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at
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48 The distribution of this memo is unlimited.
54 This memo describes two protocols used in the Secure Internet Live
55 Conferencing (SILC) protocol, specified in the Secure Internet Live
56 Conferencing, Protocol Specification internet-draft [SILC1]. The
57 SILC Key Exchange (SKE) protocol provides secure key exchange between
58 two parties resulting into shared secret key material. The protocol
59 is based on Diffie-Hellman key exchange algorithm and its functionality
60 is derived from several key exchange protocols. SKE uses best parts
61 of the SSH2 Key Exchange protocol, Station-To-Station (STS) protocol
62 and the OAKLEY Key Determination protocol [OAKLEY].
64 The SILC Connection Authentication protocol provides user level
65 authentication used when creating connections in SILC network. The
66 protocol is transparent to the authentication data which means that it
67 can be used to authenticate the user with, for example, passphrase
68 (pre-shared-secret) or public key (and certificate).
76 1 Introduction .................................................. 2
77 1.1 Requirements Terminology .................................. 3
78 2 SILC Key Exchange Protocol .................................... 3
79 2.1 Key Exchange Payloads ..................................... 4
80 2.1.1 Key Exchange Start Payload .......................... 4
81 2.1.2 Key Exchange Payload ................................ 8
82 2.2 Key Exchange Procedure .................................... 10
83 2.3 Processing the Key Material ............................... 12
84 2.4 SILC Key Exchange Groups .................................. 13
85 2.4.1 diffie-hellman-group1 ............................... 14
86 2.4.2 diffie-hellman-group2 ............................... 14
87 2.5 Key Exchange Status Types ................................. 15
88 3 SILC Connection Authentication Protocol ....................... 16
89 3.1 Connection Auth Payload ................................... 18
90 3.2 Connection Authentication Types ........................... 18
91 3.2.1 Passphrase Authentication ........................... 19
92 3.2.2 Public Key Authentication ........................... 19
93 3.3 Connection Authentication Status Types .................... 19
94 4 Security Considerations ....................................... 20
95 5 References .................................................... 20
96 6 Author's Address .............................................. 21
103 Figure 1: Key Exchange Start Payload
104 Figure 2: Key Exchange Payload
105 Figure 3: Connection Auth Payload
111 This memo describes two protocols used in the Secure Internet Live
112 Conferencing (SILC) protocol specified in the Secure Internet Live
113 Conferencing, Protocol Specification Internet-Draft [SILC1]. The
114 SILC Key Exchange (SKE) protocol provides secure key exchange between
115 two parties resulting into shared secret key material. The protocol
116 is based on Diffie-Hellman key exchange algorithm and its functionality
117 is derived from several key exchange protocols. SKE uses best parts
118 of the SSH2 Key Exchange protocol, Station-To-Station (STS) protocol
119 and the OAKLEY Key Determination protocol.
121 The SILC Connection Authentication protocol provides user level
122 authentication used when creating connections in SILC network. The
123 protocol is transparent to the authentication data which means that it
124 can be used to authenticate the user with, for example, pass phrase
125 (pre-shared- secret) or public key (and certificate).
127 The basis of secure SILC session requires strong and secure key exchange
128 protocol and authentication. The authentication protocol is entirely
129 secured and no authentication data is ever sent in the network without
130 encrypting and authenticating it first. Thus, authentication protocol
131 may be used only after the key exchange protocol has been successfully
134 This document refers constantly to other SILC protocol specification
135 Internet Drafts that are a must read for those who wants to understand
136 the function of these protocols. The most important references are
137 the Secure Internet Live Conferencing, Protocol Specification [SILC1]
138 and the SILC Packet Protocol [SILC2] Internet Drafts.
140 The protocol is intended to be used with the SILC protocol thus it
141 does not define own framework that could be used. The framework is
142 provided by the SILC protocol.
146 1.1 Requirements Terminology
148 The keywords MUST, MUST NOT, REQUIRED, SHOULD, SHOULD NOT, RECOMMENDED,
149 MAY, and OPTIONAL, when they appear in this document, are to be
150 interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
154 2 SILC Key Exchange Protocol
156 SILC Key Exchange Protocol (SKE) is used to exchange shared secret
157 between connecting entities. The result of this protocol is a key
158 material used to secure the communication channel. The protocol uses
159 Diffie-Hellman key exchange algorithm and its functionality is derived
160 from several key exchange protocols. SKE uses best parts of the SSH2
161 Key Exchange protocol, Station-To-Station (STS) protocol and the OAKLEY
162 Key Determination protocol. The protocol does not claim any conformance
163 to any of these protocols, they were merely used as a reference when
164 designing this protocol.
166 The purpose of SILC Key Exchange protocol is to create session keys to
167 be used in current SILC session. The keys are valid only for some period
168 of time (usually an hour) or at most until the session ends. These keys
169 are used to protect packets like commands, command replies and other
170 communication between two entities. If connection is server to router
171 connection, the keys are used to protect all traffic between those
172 servers. In client connections usually all the packets are protected
173 with this key except channel messages; channels has their own keys and
174 they are not exchanged with this protocol.
176 The Diffie-Hellman implementation used in the SILC SHOULD be compliant
181 2.1 Key Exchange Payloads
183 During the key exchange procedure public data is sent between initiator
184 and responder. This data is later used in the key exchange procedure.
185 There are several payloads used in the key exchange. As for all SILC
186 packets, SILC Packet Header, described in [SILC2], is at the start of
187 all packets. The same is done with these payloads as well. All the
188 fields in the payloads are always in MSB (most significant byte first)
189 order. Following descriptions of these payloads.
193 2.1.1 Key Exchange Start Payload
195 The key exchange between two entities MUST be started by sending the
196 SILC_PACKET_KEY_EXCHANGE packet containing Key Exchange Start Payload.
197 Initiator sends the Key Exchange Start Payload to the responder filled
198 with all security properties it supports. The responder then checks
199 whether it supports the security properties.
201 It then sends a Key Exchange Start Payload to the initiator filled with
202 security properties it selected from the original payload. The payload
203 sent by responder MUST include only one chosen property per list.
205 The Key Exchange Start Payload is used to tell connecting entities what
206 security properties and algorithms should be used in the communication.
207 The Key Exchange Start Payload is sent only once per session. Even if
208 the PFS (Perfect Forward Secrecy) flag is set the Key Exchange Start
209 Payload is not re-sent. When PFS is desired the Key Exchange Payloads
210 are sent to negotiate new key material. The procedure is equivalent to
211 the very first negotiation except that the Key Exchange Start Payload
214 As this payload is used only with the very first key exchange the payload
215 is never encrypted, as there are no keys to encrypt it with.
217 A cookie is also sent in this payload. A cookie is used to randomize the
218 payload so that none of the key exchange parties can determine this
219 payload before the key exchange procedure starts. The cookie MUST be
220 returned to the original sender by the responder.
222 Following diagram represents the Key Exchange Start Payload. The lists
223 mentioned below are always comma (`,') separated and the list MUST NOT
224 include spaces (` ').
230 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
231 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
232 | RESERVED | Flags | Payload Length |
233 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
241 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
242 | Version String Length | |
243 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +
247 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
248 | Key Exchange Grp Length | |
249 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +
251 ~ Key Exchange Groups ~
253 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
254 | PKCS Alg Length | |
255 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +
259 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
260 | Encryption Alg Length | |
261 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +
263 ~ Encryption Algorithms ~
265 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
266 | Hash Alg Length | |
267 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +
271 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
273 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +
277 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
278 | Compression Alg Length | |
279 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +
281 ~ Compression Algorithms ~
283 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
287 Figure 1: Key Exchange Start Payload
292 o RESERVED (1 byte) - Reserved field. Sender fills this with
295 o Flags (1 byte) - Indicates flags to be used in the key
296 exchange. Several flags can be set at once by ORing the
297 flags together. The following flags are reserved for this
302 In this case the field is ignored.
306 If set the receiver of the payload does not reply to
311 Perfect Forward Secrecy (PFS) to be used in the
312 key exchange protocol. If not set, re-keying
313 is performed using the old key. See the [SILC1]
314 for more information on this issue. When PFS is
315 used, re-keying and creating new keys for any
316 particular purpose MUST cause new key exchange.
317 In this key exchange only the Key Exchange Payload
318 is sent and the Key Exchange Start Payload MUST
319 NOT be sent. When doing PFS the Key Exchange
320 Payloads are encrypted with the old keys.
322 Mutual Authentication 0x04
324 Both of the parties will perform authentication
325 by providing signed data for the other party to
326 verify. By default, only responder will provide
327 the signature data. If this is set then the
328 initiator must also provide it. Initiator MAY
329 set this but also responder MAY set this even if
330 initiator did not set it.
332 Rest of the flags are reserved for the future and
335 o Payload Length (2 bytes) - Length of the entire Key Exchange
336 Start payload, not including any other field.
338 o Cookie (16 bytes) - Cookie that randomize this payload so
339 that each of the party cannot determine the payload before
342 o Version String Length (2 bytes) - The length of the Version
343 String field, not including any other field.
345 o Version String (variable length) - Indicates the version of
346 the sender of this payload. Initiator sets this when sending
347 the payload and responder sets this when it replies by sending
348 this payload. See [SILC1] for definition of the version
351 o Key Exchange Grp Length (2 bytes) - The length of the
352 key exchange group list, not including any other field.
354 o Key Exchange Group (variable length) - The list of
355 key exchange groups. See the section 2.4 SILC Key Exchange
356 Groups for definitions of these groups.
358 o PKCS Alg Length (2 bytes) - The length of the PKCS algorithms
359 list, not including any other field.
361 o PKCS Algorithms (variable length) - The list of PKCS
364 o Encryption Alg Length (2 bytes) - The length of the encryption
365 algorithms list, not including any other field.
367 o Encryption Algorithms (variable length) - The list of
368 encryption algorithms.
370 o Hash Alg Length (2 bytes) - The length of the Hash algorithm
371 list, not including any other field.
373 o Hash Algorithms (variable length) - The list of Hash
374 algorithms. The hash algorithms are mainly used in the
377 o HMAC Length (2 bytes) - The length of the HMAC list, not
378 including any other field.
380 o HMACs (variable length) - The list of HMACs. The HMAC's
381 are used to compute the Message Authentication Codes (MAC)
384 o Compression Alg Length (2 bytes) - The length of the
385 compression algorithms list, not including any other field.
387 o Compression Algorithms (variable length) - The list of
388 compression algorithms.
393 2.1.2 Key Exchange Payload
395 Key Exchange payload is used to deliver the public key (or certificate),
396 the computed Diffie-Hellman public value and possibly signature data
397 from one party to the other. When initiator is using this payload
398 and the Mutual Authentication flag is not set then the initiator MUST
399 NOT provide the signature data. If the flag is set then the initiator
400 MUST provide the signature data so that the responder can verify it.
402 The Mutual Authentication flag is usually used only if a separate
403 authentication protocol will not be executed for the initiator of the
404 protocol. This is case for example when the SKE is performed between
405 two SILC clients. In normal case, where client is connecting to the
406 server, or server is connecting to the router the Mutual Authentication
407 flag is not necessary.
409 When performing re-key with PFS selected this is the only payload that
410 is sent in the SKE protocol. The Key Exchange Start Payload MUST NOT
411 be sent at all. However, this payload does not have all the fields
412 present. In the re-key with PFS the public key and a possible signature
413 data SHOULD NOT be present. If they are present they MUST be ignored.
414 The only field that is present is the Public Data that is used to create
415 the new key material. In the re-key the Mutual Authentication flag, that
416 may be set in the initial negotiation, MUST also be ignored.
418 This payload is sent inside SILC_PACKET_KEY_EXCHANGE_1 and inside
419 SILC_PACKET_KEY_EXCHANGE_2 packet types. The initiator uses the
420 SILC_PACKET_KEY_EXCHANGE_1 and the responder the latter.
422 The following diagram represent the Key Exchange Payload.
428 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
429 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
430 | Public Key Length | Public Key Type |
431 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
433 ~ Public Key of the party (or certificate) ~
435 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
436 | Public Data Length | |
437 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +
441 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
442 | Signature Length | |
443 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +
447 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
451 Figure 2: Key Exchange Payload
455 o Public Key Length (2 bytes) - The length of the Public Key
456 (or certificate) field, not including any other field.
458 o Public Key Type (2 bytes) - The public key (or certificate)
459 type. This field indicates the type of the public key in
460 the packet. Following types are defined:
462 1 SILC style public key (mandatory)
463 2 SSH2 style public key (optional)
464 3 X.509 Version 3 certificate (optional)
465 4 OpenPGP certificate (optional)
466 5 SPKI certificate (optional)
468 The only required type to support is type number 1. See
469 [SILC1] for the SILC public key specification. See
470 SSH public key specification in [SSH-TRANS]. See X.509v3
471 certificate specification in [PKIX-Part1]. See OpenPGP
472 certificate specification in [PGP]. See SPKI certificate
473 specification in [SPKI]. If this field includes zero (0)
474 or unsupported type number the protocol MUST be aborted
475 sending SILC_PACKET_FAILURE message and the connection SHOULD
476 be closed immediately.
478 o Public Key (or certificate) (variable length) - The
479 public key or certificate.
481 o Public Data Length (2 bytes) - The length of the Public Data
482 field, not including any other field.
484 o Public Data (variable length) - The public data to be
485 sent to the receiver. See section 2.2 Key Exchange
486 Procedure for detailed description how this field is
487 computed. This value is binary encoded.
489 o Signature Length (2 bytes) - The length of the signature,
490 not including any other field.
492 o Signature Data (variable length) - The signature signed
493 by the sender. The receiver of this signature MUST
494 verify it. The verification is done using the sender's
495 public key. See section 2.2 Key Exchange Procedure for
496 detailed description how to produce the signature. If
497 the Mutual Authentication flag is not set then initiator
498 MUST NOT provide this field and the Signature Length field
499 MUST be set to zero (0) value. If the flag is set then
500 also the initiator MUST provide this field. The responder
501 MUST always provide this field.
506 2.2 Key Exchange Procedure
508 The key exchange begins by sending SILC_PACKET_KEY_EXCHANGE packet with
509 Key Exchange Start Payload to select the security properties to be used
510 in the key exchange and later in the communication.
512 After Key Exchange Start Payload has been processed by both of the
513 parties the protocol proceeds as follows:
516 Setup: p is a large and public safe prime. This is one of the
517 Diffie Hellman groups. q is order of subgroup (largest
518 prime factor of p). g is a generator and is defined
519 along with the Diffie Hellman group.
521 1. Initiator generates a random number x, where 1 < x < q,
522 and computes e = g ^ x mod p. The result e is then
523 encoded into Key Exchange Payload and sent to the
526 If the Mutual Authentication flag is set then initiator
527 MUST also produce signature data SIGN_i which the responder
528 will verify. The initiator MUST compute a hash value
529 HASH_i = hash(Key Exchange Start Payload | public key
530 (or certificate) | e). It then signs the HASH_i value with
531 its private key resulting a signature SIGN_i.
533 2. Responder generates a random number y, where 1 < y < q,
534 and computes f = g ^ y mod p. It then computes the
535 shared secret KEY = e ^ y mod p, and, a hash value
536 HASH = hash(Key Exchange Start Payload data | public
537 key (or certificate) | e | f | KEY). It then signs
538 the HASH value with its private key resulting a signature
541 It then encodes its public key (or certificate), f and
542 SIGN into Key Exchange Payload and sends it to the
545 If the Mutual Authentication flag is set then the responder
546 SHOULD verify that the public key provided in the payload
547 is authentic, or if certificates are used it verifies the
548 certificate. The responder MAY accept the public key without
549 verifying it, however, doing so may result to insecure key
550 exchange (accepting the public key without verifying may be
551 desirable for practical reasons on many environments. For
552 long term use this is never desirable, in which case
553 certificates would be the preferred method to use). It then
554 computes the HASH_i value the same way initiator did in the
555 phase 1. It then verifies the signature SIGN_i from the
556 payload with the hash value HASH_i using the received public
559 3. Initiator verifies that the public key provided in
560 the payload is authentic, or if certificates are used
561 it verifies the certificate. The initiator MAY accept
562 the public key without verifying it, however, doing
563 so may result to insecure key exchange (accepting the
564 public key without verifying may be desirable for
565 practical reasons on many environments. For long term
566 use this is never desirable, in which case certificates
567 would be the preferred method to use).
569 Initiator then computes the shared secret KEY =
570 f ^ x mod p, and, a hash value HASH in the same way as
571 responder did in phase 2. It then verifies the
572 signature SIGN from the payload with the hash value
573 HASH using the received public key.
576 If any of these phases is to fail the SILC_PACKET_FAILURE MUST be sent
577 to indicate that the key exchange protocol has failed, and the connection
578 SHOULD be closed immediately. Any other packets MUST NOT be sent or
579 accepted during the key exchange except the SILC_PACKET_KEY_EXCHANGE_*,
580 SILC_PACKET_FAILURE and SILC_PACKET_SUCCESS packets.
582 The result of this protocol is a shared secret key material KEY and
583 a hash value HASH. The key material itself is not fit to be used as
584 a key, it needs to be processed further to derive the actual keys to be
585 used. The key material is also used to produce other security parameters
586 later used in the communication. See section 2.3 Processing the Key
587 Material for detailed description how to process the key material.
589 If the Mutual Authentication flag was set the protocol produces also
590 a hash value HASH_i. This value, however, must be discarded.
592 After the keys are processed the protocol is ended by sending the
593 SILC_PACKET_SUCCESS packet. Both entities send this packet to
594 each other. After this both parties will start using the new keys.
598 2.3 Processing the Key Material
600 Key Exchange protocol produces secret shared key material KEY. This
601 key material is used to derive the actual keys used in the encryption
602 of the communication channel. The key material is also used to derive
603 other security parameters used in the communication. Key Exchange
604 protocol produces a hash value HASH as well.
606 The keys MUST be derived from the key material as follows:
609 Sending Initial Vector (IV) = hash(0 | KEY | HASH)
610 Receiving Initial Vector (IV) = hash(1 | KEY | HASH)
611 Sending Encryption Key = hash(2 | KEY | HASH)
612 Receiving Encryption Key = hash(3 | KEY | HASH)
613 Sending HMAC Key = hash(4 | KEY | HASH)
614 Receiving HMAC Key = hash(5 | KEY | HASH)
618 The Initial Vector (IV) is used in the encryption when doing for
619 example CBC mode. As many bytes as needed are taken from the start of
620 the hash output for IV. Sending IV is for sending key and receiving IV
621 is for receiving key. For receiving party, the receiving IV is actually
622 sender's sending IV, and, the sending IV is actually sender's receiving
623 IV. Initiator uses IV's as they are (sending IV for sending and
624 receiving IV for receiving).
626 The Encryption Keys are derived as well from the hash(). If the hash()
627 output is too short for the encryption algorithm more key material MUST
628 be produced in the following manner:
631 K1 = hash(2 | KEY | HASH)
632 K2 = hash(KEY | HASH | K1)
633 K3 = hash(KEY | HASH | K1 | K2) ...
635 Sending Encryption Key = K1 | K2 | K3 ...
638 K1 = hash(3 | KEY | HASH)
639 K2 = hash(KEY | HASH | K1)
640 K3 = hash(KEY | HASH | K1 | K2) ...
642 Receiving Encryption Key = K1 | K2 | K3 ...
646 The key is distributed by hashing the previous hash with the original
647 key material. The final key is a concatenation of the hash values.
648 For Receiving Encryption Key the procedure is equivalent. Sending key
649 is used only for encrypting data to be sent. The receiving key is used
650 only to decrypt received data. For receiving party, the receive key is
651 actually sender's sending key, and, the sending key is actually sender's
652 receiving key. Initiator uses generated keys as they are (sending key
653 for sending and receiving key for receiving).
655 The HMAC keys are used to create MAC values to packets in the
656 communication channel. As many bytes as needed are taken from the start
657 of the hash output to generate the MAC keys.
659 These procedures are performed by all parties of the key exchange
660 protocol. This MUST be done before the protocol has been ended by
661 sending the SILC_PACKET_SUCCESS packet.
663 This same procedure is used in the SILC in some other circumstances
664 as well. Any changes to this procedure is mentioned separately when
665 this procedure is needed. See the [SILC1] and the [SILC2] for these
670 2.4 SILC Key Exchange Groups
672 The Following groups may be used in the SILC Key Exchange protocol.
673 The first group diffie-hellman-group1 is REQUIRED, other groups MAY be
674 negotiated to be used in the connection with Key Exchange Start Payload
675 and SILC_PACKET_KEY_EXCHANGE packet. However, the first group MUST be
676 proposed in the Key Exchange Start Payload regardless of any other
677 requested group (however, it does not have to be the first in the list).
681 2.4.1 diffie-hellman-group1
683 The length of this group is 1024 bits. This is REQUIRED group.
684 The prime is 2^1024 - 2^960 - 1 + 2^64 * { [2^894 pi] + 129093 }.
689 179769313486231590770839156793787453197860296048756011706444
690 423684197180216158519368947833795864925541502180565485980503
691 646440548199239100050792877003355816639229553136239076508735
692 759914822574862575007425302077447712589550957937778424442426
693 617334727629299387668709205606050270810842907692932019128194
697 Its hexadecimal value is
700 FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF C90FDAA2 2168C234 C4C6628B 80DC1CD1
701 29024E08 8A67CC74 020BBEA6 3B139B22 514A0879 8E3404DD
702 EF9519B3 CD3A431B 302B0A6D F25F1437 4FE1356D 6D51C245
703 E485B576 625E7EC6 F44C42E9 A637ED6B 0BFF5CB6 F406B7ED
704 EE386BFB 5A899FA5 AE9F2411 7C4B1FE6 49286651 ECE65381
709 The generator used with this prime is g = 2. The group order q is
712 This group was taken from the OAKLEY specification.
716 2.4.2 diffie-hellman-group2
718 The length of this group is 1536 bits. This is OPTIONAL group.
719 The prime is 2^1536 - 2^1472 - 1 + 2^64 * { [2^1406 pi] + 741804 }.
724 241031242692103258855207602219756607485695054850245994265411
725 694195810883168261222889009385826134161467322714147790401219
726 650364895705058263194273070680500922306273474534107340669624
727 601458936165977404102716924945320037872943417032584377865919
728 814376319377685986952408894019557734611984354530154704374720
729 774996976375008430892633929555996888245787241299381012913029
730 459299994792636526405928464720973038494721168143446471443848
731 8520940127459844288859336526896320919633919
734 Its hexadecimal value is
737 FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF C90FDAA2 2168C234 C4C6628B 80DC1CD1
738 29024E08 8A67CC74 020BBEA6 3B139B22 514A0879 8E3404DD
739 EF9519B3 CD3A431B 302B0A6D F25F1437 4FE1356D 6D51C245
740 E485B576 625E7EC6 F44C42E9 A637ED6B 0BFF5CB6 F406B7ED
741 EE386BFB 5A899FA5 AE9F2411 7C4B1FE6 49286651 ECE45B3D
742 C2007CB8 A163BF05 98DA4836 1C55D39A 69163FA8 FD24CF5F
743 83655D23 DCA3AD96 1C62F356 208552BB 9ED52907 7096966D
744 670C354E 4ABC9804 F1746C08 CA237327 FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF
747 The generator used with this prime is g = 2. The group order q is
750 This group was taken from the OAKLEY specification.
754 2.5 Key Exchange Status Types
756 This section defines all key exchange protocol status types that may
757 be returned in the SILC_PACKET_SUCCESS or SILC_PACKET_FAILURE packets
758 to indicate the status of the protocol. Implementations may map the
759 status types to human readable error message. All types except the
760 SILC_SKE_STATUS_OK type MUST be sent in SILC_PACKET_FAILURE packet.
761 The length of status is 32 bits (4 bytes). The following status types
767 Protocol were executed successfully.
770 1 SILC_SKE_STATUS_ERROR
772 Unknown error occurred. No specific error type is defined.
775 2 SILC_SKE_STATUS_BAD_PAYLOAD
777 Provided KE payload were malformed or included bad fields.
780 3 SILC_SKE_STATUS_UNSUPPORTED_GROUP
782 None of the provided groups were supported.
785 4 SILC_SKE_STATUS_UNSUPPORTED_CIPHER
787 None of the provided ciphers were supported.
790 5 SILC_SKE_STATUS_UNSUPPORTED_PKCS
792 None of the provided public key algorithms were supported.
795 6 SILC_SKE_STATUS_UNSUPPORTED_HASH_FUNCTION
797 None of the provided hash functions were supported.
800 7 SILC_SKE_STATUS_UNSUPPORTED_HMAC
802 None of the provided HMACs were supported.
805 8 SILC_SKE_STATUS_UNSUPPORTED_PUBLIC_KEY
807 Provided public key type is not supported.
810 9 SILC_SKE_STATUS_INCORRECT_SIGNATURE
812 Provided signature was incorrect.
815 10 SILC_SKE_STATUS_BAD_VERSION
817 Provided version string was not acceptable.
819 11 SILC_SKE_STATUS_INVALID_COOKIE
821 The cookie in the Key Exchange Start Payload was malformed,
822 because responder modified the cookie.
827 3 SILC Connection Authentication Protocol
829 Purpose of Connection Authentication protocol is to authenticate the
830 connecting party with server. Usually connecting party is client but
831 server may connect to router server as well. Its other purpose is to
832 provide information for the server about which type of connection this
833 is. The type defines whether this is client, server or router
834 connection. Server uses this information to create the ID for the
837 After the authentication protocol has been successfully completed
838 SILC_PACKET_NEW_ID must be sent to the connecting client by the server.
839 See the [SILC1] for the details of the connecting procedure.
841 Server MUST verify the authentication data received and if it is to fail
842 the authentication MUST be failed by sending SILC_PACKET_FAILURE packet.
843 If everything checks out fine the protocol is ended by server by sending
844 SILC_PACKET_SUCCESS packet.
846 The protocol is executed after the SILC Key Exchange protocol. It MUST
847 NOT be executed in any other time. As it is performed after key exchange
848 protocol all traffic in the connection authentication protocol is
849 encrypted with the exchanged keys.
851 The protocol MUST be started by the connecting party by sending the
852 SILC_PACKET_CONNECTION_AUTH packet with Connection Auth Payload,
853 described in the next section. This payload MUST include the
854 authentication data. The authentication data is set according
855 authentication method that MUST be known by both parties. If connecting
856 party does not know what is the mandatory authentication method it MAY
857 request it from the server by sending SILC_PACKET_CONNECTION_AUTH_REQUEST
858 packet. This packet is not part of this protocol and is described in
859 section Connection Auth Request Payload in [SILC2]. However, if
860 connecting party already knows the mandatory authentication method
861 sending the request is not necessary.
863 See [SILC1] and section Connection Auth Request Payload in [SILC2] also
864 for the list of different authentication methods. Authentication method
865 MAY also be NONE, in which case the server does not require
866 authentication at all. However, in this case the protocol still MUST be
867 executed; the authentication data just is empty indicating no
868 authentication is required.
870 If authentication method is passphrase the authentication data is
871 plaintext passphrase. As the payload is entirely encrypted it is safe
872 to have plaintext passphrase. See the section 3.2.1 Passphrase
873 Authentication for more information.
875 If authentication method is public key authentication the authentication
876 data is a signature of the hash value of hash HASH plus Key Exchange
877 Start Payload, established by the SILC Key Exchange protocol. This
878 signature MUST then be verified by the server. See the section 3.2.2
879 Public Key Authentication for more information.
881 The connecting client of this protocol MUST wait after successful execution
882 of this protocol for the SILC_PACKET_NEW_ID packet where it will receive
883 the ID it will be using in the SILC network. The connecting client cannot
884 start normal SILC session (sending messages or commands) until it has
885 received its ID. The ID's are always created by the server except
886 for server to router connection where servers create their own ID's.
890 3.1 Connection Auth Payload
892 Client sends this payload to authenticate itself to the server. Server
893 connecting to another server also sends this payload. Server receiving
894 this payload MUST verify all the data in it and if something is to fail
895 the authentication MUST be failed by sending SILC_PACKET_FAILURE packet.
897 The payload may only be sent with SILC_PACKET_CONNECTION_AUTH packet.
898 It MUST NOT be sent in any other packet type. The following diagram
899 represent the Connection Auth Payload.
905 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
906 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
907 | Payload Length | Connection Type |
908 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
910 ~ Authentication Data ~
912 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
916 Figure 3: Connection Auth Payload
920 o Payload Length (2 bytes) - Length of the entire Connection
923 o Connection Type (2 bytes) - Indicates the type of the
924 connection. See section Connection Auth Request Payload
925 in [SILC2] for the list of connection types. This field MUST
926 include valid connection type or the packet MUST be discarded
927 and authentication MUST be failed.
929 o Authentication Data (variable length) - The actual
930 authentication data. Contents of this depends on the
931 authentication method known by both parties. If no
932 authentication is required this field does not exist.
937 3.2 Connection Authentication Types
939 SILC supports two authentication types to be used in the connection
940 authentication protocol; passphrase or public key based authentication.
941 The following sections defines the authentication methods. See [SILC2]
942 for defined numerical authentication method types.
946 3.2.1 Passphrase Authentication
948 Passphrase authentication or pre-shared-key based authentication is
949 simply an authentication where the party that wants to authenticate
950 itself to the other end sends the passphrase that is required by
951 the other end, for example server.
953 If the passphrase matches with the one in the server's end the
954 authentication is successful. Otherwise SILC_PACKET_FAILURE MUST be
955 sent to the sender and the protocol execution fails.
957 This is REQUIRED authentication method to be supported by all SILC
960 When password authentication is used it is RECOMMENDED that maximum
961 amount of padding is applied to the SILC packet. This way it is not
962 possible to approximate the length of the password from the encrypted
967 3.2.2 Public Key Authentication
969 Public key authentication may be used if passphrase based authentication
970 is not desired. The public key authentication works by sending a
971 signature as authentication data to the other end, say, server. The
972 server MUST then verify the signature by the public key of the sender,
973 which the server has received earlier in SKE protocol.
975 The signature is computed using the private key of the sender by signing
976 the HASH value provided by the SKE protocol previously, and the Key
977 Exchange Start Payload from SKE protocol that was sent to the server.
978 These are concatenated and hash function is used to compute a hash value
979 which is then signed.
981 auth_hash = hash(HASH | Key Exchange Start Payload);
982 signature = sign(auth_hash);
984 The hash() function used to compute the value is the hash function negotiated
985 in the SKE protocol. The server MUST verify the data, thus it must keep
986 the HASH and the Key Exchange Start Payload saved during SKE and
987 authentication protocols.
989 If the verified signature matches the sent signature, the authentication
990 were successful and SILC_PACKET_SUCCESS is sent. If it failed the protocol
991 execution is stopped and SILC_PACKET_FAILURE is sent.
993 This is REQUIRED authentication method to be supported by all SILC
998 3.3 Connection Authentication Status Types
1000 This section defines all connection authentication status types that
1001 may be returned in the SILC_PACKET_SUCCESS or SILC_PACKET_FAILURE packets
1002 to indicate the status of the protocol. Implementations may map the
1003 status types to human readable error message. All types except the
1004 SILC_AUTH_STATUS_OK type MUST be sent in SILC_PACKET_FAILURE packet.
1005 The length of status is 32 bits (4 bytes). The following status types
1012 Protocol was executed successfully.
1017 Authentication failed.
1021 4 Security Considerations
1023 Security is central to the design of this protocol, and these security
1024 considerations permeate the specification. Common security considerations
1025 such as keeping private keys truly private and using adequate lengths for
1026 symmetric and asymmetric keys must be followed in order to maintain the
1027 security of this protocol.
1033 [SILC1] Riikonen, P., "Secure Internet Live Conferencing (SILC),
1034 Protocol Specification", Internet Draft, April 2001.
1036 [SILC2] Riikonen, P., "SILC Packet Protocol", Internet Draft,
1039 [SILC4] Riikonen, P., "SILC Commands", Internet Draft, April 2001.
1041 [IRC] Oikarinen, J., and Reed D., "Internet Relay Chat Protocol",
1044 [IRC-ARCH] Kalt, C., "Internet Relay Chat: Architecture", RFC 2810,
1047 [IRC-CHAN] Kalt, C., "Internet Relay Chat: Channel Management", RFC
1050 [IRC-CLIENT] Kalt, C., "Internet Relay Chat: Client Protocol", RFC
1053 [IRC-SERVER] Kalt, C., "Internet Relay Chat: Server Protocol", RFC
1056 [SSH-TRANS] Ylonen, T., et al, "SSH Transport Layer Protocol",
1059 [PGP] Callas, J., et al, "OpenPGP Message Format", RFC 2440,
1062 [SPKI] Ellison C., et al, "SPKI Certificate Theory", RFC 2693,
1065 [PKIX-Part1] Housley, R., et al, "Internet X.509 Public Key
1066 Infrastructure, Certificate and CRL Profile", RFC 2459,
1069 [Schneier] Schneier, B., "Applied Cryptography Second Edition",
1070 John Wiley & Sons, New York, NY, 1996.
1072 [Menezes] Menezes, A., et al, "Handbook of Applied Cryptography",
1075 [OAKLEY] Orman, H., "The OAKLEY Key Determination Protocol",
1076 RFC 2412, November 1998.
1078 [ISAKMP] Maughan D., et al, "Internet Security Association and
1079 Key Management Protocol (ISAKMP)", RFC 2408, November
1082 [IKE] Harkins D., and Carrel D., "The Internet Key Exchange
1083 (IKE)", RFC 2409, November 1998.
1085 [HMAC] Krawczyk, H., "HMAC: Keyed-Hashing for Message
1086 Authentication", RFC 2104, February 1997.
1088 [PKCS1] Kalinski, B., and Staddon, J., "PKCS #1 RSA Cryptography
1089 Specifications, Version 2.0", RFC 2437, October 1998.
1091 [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key Words for use in RFCs to Indicate
1092 Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
1100 Snellmanninkatu 34 A 15
1104 EMail: priikone@silcnet.org
1106 This Internet-Draft expires XXX