X-Git-Url: http://git.silcnet.org/gitweb/?a=blobdiff_plain;f=apps%2Fsilcd%2Fprotocol.c;h=f232c3d84f94cb86384443fe1b7f766a502451d9;hb=413da0f8686910f5e627393157566ae729ca99c4;hp=aac2ff7f81254937dacd6d01315f433bd5d54c0a;hpb=b0db691094f0a4e0bb21bf21ffede78542808ce9;p=silc.git diff --git a/apps/silcd/protocol.c b/apps/silcd/protocol.c index aac2ff7f..f232c3d8 100644 --- a/apps/silcd/protocol.c +++ b/apps/silcd/protocol.c @@ -4,13 +4,13 @@ Author: Pekka Riikonen - Copyright (C) 1997 - 2002 Pekka Riikonen + Copyright (C) 1997 - 2003 Pekka Riikonen This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or (at your option) any later version. - + This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the @@ -33,17 +33,17 @@ SILC_TASK_CALLBACK(silc_server_protocol_rekey); * Key Exhange protocol functions */ -static bool +static bool silc_verify_public_key_internal(SilcServer server, SilcSocketConnection sock, SilcSocketType conn_type, - unsigned char *pk, SilcUInt32 pk_len, + unsigned char *pk, SilcUInt32 pk_len, SilcSKEPKType pk_type) { char file[256], filename[256], *fingerprint; struct stat st; if (pk_type != SILC_SKE_PK_TYPE_SILC) { - SILC_LOG_WARNING(("We don't support %s (%s) port %d public key type %d", + SILC_LOG_WARNING(("We don't support %s (%s) port %d public key type %d", sock->hostname, sock->ip, sock->port, pk_type)); return FALSE; } @@ -60,20 +60,20 @@ silc_verify_public_key_internal(SilcServer server, SilcSocketConnection sock, conn auth protocol with public key we MUST have the key already. */ return TRUE; /* Rest is unreachable code! */ - + memset(filename, 0, sizeof(filename)); memset(file, 0, sizeof(file)); - snprintf(file, sizeof(file) - 1, "serverkey_%s_%d.pub", sock->hostname, + snprintf(file, sizeof(file) - 1, "serverkey_%s_%d.pub", sock->hostname, sock->port); - snprintf(filename, sizeof(filename) - 1, SILC_ETCDIR "/serverkeys/%s", + snprintf(filename, sizeof(filename) - 1, SILC_ETCDIR "/serverkeys/%s", file); /* Create serverkeys directory if it doesn't exist. */ if (stat(SILC_ETCDIR "/serverkeys", &st) < 0) { /* If dir doesn't exist */ - if (errno == ENOENT) { + if (errno == ENOENT) { if (mkdir(SILC_ETCDIR "/serverkeys", 0755) < 0) { - SILC_LOG_ERROR(("Couldn't create `%s' directory\n", + SILC_LOG_ERROR(("Couldn't create `%s' directory\n", SILC_ETCDIR "/serverkeys")); return TRUE; } @@ -85,7 +85,7 @@ silc_verify_public_key_internal(SilcServer server, SilcSocketConnection sock, /* Take fingerprint of the public key */ fingerprint = silc_hash_fingerprint(NULL, pk, pk_len); - SILC_LOG_DEBUG(("Received server %s (%s) port %d public key (%s)", + SILC_LOG_DEBUG(("Received server %s (%s) port %d public key (%s)", sock->hostname, sock->ip, sock->port, fingerprint)); silc_free(fingerprint); @@ -94,7 +94,7 @@ silc_verify_public_key_internal(SilcServer server, SilcSocketConnection sock, /* We don't have it, then cache it. */ SILC_LOG_DEBUG(("New public key from server")); - silc_pkcs_save_public_key_data(filename, pk, pk_len, + silc_pkcs_save_public_key_data(filename, pk, pk_len, SILC_PKCS_FILE_PEM); return TRUE; } else { @@ -106,12 +106,12 @@ silc_verify_public_key_internal(SilcServer server, SilcSocketConnection sock, SILC_LOG_DEBUG(("We have the public key saved locally")); /* Load the key file */ - if (!silc_pkcs_load_public_key(filename, &public_key, + if (!silc_pkcs_load_public_key(filename, &public_key, SILC_PKCS_FILE_PEM)) - if (!silc_pkcs_load_public_key(filename, &public_key, + if (!silc_pkcs_load_public_key(filename, &public_key, SILC_PKCS_FILE_BIN)) { SILC_LOG_WARNING(("Could not load local copy of the %s (%s) port %d " - "server public key", sock->hostname, sock->ip, + "server public key", sock->hostname, sock->ip, sock->port)); /* Save the key for future checking */ @@ -120,7 +120,7 @@ silc_verify_public_key_internal(SilcServer server, SilcSocketConnection sock, SILC_PKCS_FILE_PEM); return TRUE; } - + /* Encode the key data */ encpk = silc_pkcs_public_key_encode(public_key, &encpk_len); if (!encpk) { @@ -135,7 +135,7 @@ silc_verify_public_key_internal(SilcServer server, SilcSocketConnection sock, if (memcmp(pk, encpk, encpk_len)) { SILC_LOG_WARNING(("%s (%s) port %d server public key does not match " - "with local copy", sock->hostname, sock->ip, + "with local copy", sock->hostname, sock->ip, sock->port)); SILC_LOG_WARNING(("It is possible that the key has expired or changed")); SILC_LOG_WARNING(("It is also possible that some one is performing " @@ -154,7 +154,7 @@ silc_verify_public_key_internal(SilcServer server, SilcSocketConnection sock, /* Callback that is called when we have received KE2 payload from responder. We try to verify the public key now. */ -static void +static void silc_server_protocol_ke_verify_key(SilcSKE ske, unsigned char *pk_data, SilcUInt32 pk_len, @@ -164,14 +164,14 @@ silc_server_protocol_ke_verify_key(SilcSKE ske, void *completion_context) { SilcProtocol protocol = (SilcProtocol)context; - SilcServerKEInternalContext *ctx = + SilcServerKEInternalContext *ctx = (SilcServerKEInternalContext *)protocol->context; SilcServer server = (SilcServer)ctx->server; SILC_LOG_DEBUG(("Verifying received public key")); if (silc_verify_public_key_internal( - server, ctx->sock, + server, ctx->sock, (ctx->responder == FALSE ? SILC_SOCKET_TYPE_ROUTER: ctx->sconfig.ref_ptr ? SILC_SOCKET_TYPE_SERVER : @@ -180,7 +180,7 @@ silc_server_protocol_ke_verify_key(SilcSKE ske, pk_data, pk_len, pk_type)) completion(ske, SILC_SKE_STATUS_OK, completion_context); else - completion(ske, SILC_SKE_STATUS_UNSUPPORTED_PUBLIC_KEY, + completion(ske, SILC_SKE_STATUS_UNSUPPORTED_PUBLIC_KEY, completion_context); } @@ -193,7 +193,7 @@ static void silc_server_protocol_ke_send_packet(SilcSKE ske, void *context) { SilcProtocol protocol = (SilcProtocol)context; - SilcServerKEInternalContext *ctx = + SilcServerKEInternalContext *ctx = (SilcServerKEInternalContext *)protocol->context; SilcServer server = (SilcServer)ctx->server; @@ -235,49 +235,49 @@ int silc_server_protocol_ke_set_keys(SilcServer server, SILC_LOG_ERROR(("Cannot allocate algorithm: %s", cname)); return FALSE; } - - if (!silc_hmac_alloc((char *)silc_hmac_get_name(hmac), NULL, + + if (!silc_hmac_alloc((char *)silc_hmac_get_name(hmac), NULL, &idata->hmac_send)) { silc_cipher_free(idata->send_key); silc_cipher_free(idata->receive_key); silc_free(conn_data); - SILC_LOG_ERROR(("Cannot allocate algorithm: %s", + SILC_LOG_ERROR(("Cannot allocate algorithm: %s", silc_hmac_get_name(hmac))); return FALSE; } - if (!silc_hmac_alloc((char *)silc_hmac_get_name(hmac), NULL, + if (!silc_hmac_alloc((char *)silc_hmac_get_name(hmac), NULL, &idata->hmac_receive)) { silc_cipher_free(idata->send_key); silc_cipher_free(idata->receive_key); silc_hmac_free(idata->hmac_send); silc_free(conn_data); - SILC_LOG_ERROR(("Cannot allocate algorithm: %s", + SILC_LOG_ERROR(("Cannot allocate algorithm: %s", silc_hmac_get_name(hmac))); return FALSE; } if (is_responder == TRUE) { - silc_cipher_set_key(idata->send_key, keymat->receive_enc_key, + silc_cipher_set_key(idata->send_key, keymat->receive_enc_key, keymat->enc_key_len); silc_cipher_set_iv(idata->send_key, keymat->receive_iv); - silc_cipher_set_key(idata->receive_key, keymat->send_enc_key, + silc_cipher_set_key(idata->receive_key, keymat->send_enc_key, keymat->enc_key_len); silc_cipher_set_iv(idata->receive_key, keymat->send_iv); - silc_hmac_set_key(idata->hmac_send, keymat->receive_hmac_key, + silc_hmac_set_key(idata->hmac_send, keymat->receive_hmac_key, keymat->hmac_key_len); - silc_hmac_set_key(idata->hmac_receive, keymat->send_hmac_key, + silc_hmac_set_key(idata->hmac_receive, keymat->send_hmac_key, keymat->hmac_key_len); } else { - silc_cipher_set_key(idata->send_key, keymat->send_enc_key, + silc_cipher_set_key(idata->send_key, keymat->send_enc_key, keymat->enc_key_len); silc_cipher_set_iv(idata->send_key, keymat->send_iv); - silc_cipher_set_key(idata->receive_key, keymat->receive_enc_key, + silc_cipher_set_key(idata->receive_key, keymat->receive_enc_key, keymat->enc_key_len); silc_cipher_set_iv(idata->receive_key, keymat->receive_iv); - silc_hmac_set_key(idata->hmac_send, keymat->send_hmac_key, + silc_hmac_set_key(idata->hmac_send, keymat->send_hmac_key, keymat->hmac_key_len); - silc_hmac_set_key(idata->hmac_receive, keymat->receive_hmac_key, + silc_hmac_set_key(idata->hmac_receive, keymat->receive_hmac_key, keymat->hmac_key_len); } @@ -297,13 +297,13 @@ int silc_server_protocol_ke_set_keys(SilcServer server, silc_hmac_free(idata->hmac_send); silc_hmac_free(idata->hmac_receive); silc_free(conn_data); - SILC_LOG_ERROR(("Cannot allocate algorithm: %s", + SILC_LOG_ERROR(("Cannot allocate algorithm: %s", silc_hash_get_name(hash))); return FALSE; } /* Save the remote host's public key */ - silc_pkcs_public_key_decode(ske->ke1_payload->pk_data, + silc_pkcs_public_key_decode(ske->ke1_payload->pk_data, ske->ke1_payload->pk_len, &idata->public_key); if (ske->prop->flags & SILC_SKE_SP_FLAG_MUTUAL) silc_hash_make(server->sha1hash, ske->ke1_payload->pk_data, @@ -311,7 +311,7 @@ int silc_server_protocol_ke_set_keys(SilcServer server, sock->user_data = (void *)conn_data; - SILC_LOG_INFO(("%s (%s) security properties: %s %s %s %s", + SILC_LOG_INFO(("%s (%s) security properties: %s %s %s %s", sock->hostname, sock->ip, silc_cipher_get_name(idata->send_key), (char *)silc_hmac_get_name(idata->hmac_send), @@ -333,22 +333,22 @@ SilcSKEStatus silc_ske_check_version(SilcSKE ske, unsigned char *version, if (!silc_parse_version_string(version, &r_protocol_version, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL)) { - SILC_LOG_ERROR(("%s (%s) %s is not allowed/supported version", + SILC_LOG_ERROR(("%s (%s) %s is not allowed/supported version", ske->sock->hostname, ske->sock->ip, version)); return SILC_SKE_STATUS_BAD_VERSION; } - if (!silc_parse_version_string(silc_version_string, + if (!silc_parse_version_string(silc_version_string, &l_protocol_version, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL)) { - SILC_LOG_ERROR(("%s (%s) %s is not allowed/supported version", + SILC_LOG_ERROR(("%s (%s) %s is not allowed/supported version", ske->sock->hostname, ske->sock->ip, version)); return SILC_SKE_STATUS_BAD_VERSION; } /* If remote is too new, don't connect */ if (l_protocol_version < r_protocol_version) { - SILC_LOG_ERROR(("%s (%s) %s is not allowed/supported version", + SILC_LOG_ERROR(("%s (%s) %s is not allowed/supported version", ske->sock->hostname, ske->sock->ip, version)); return SILC_SKE_STATUS_BAD_VERSION; } @@ -369,7 +369,7 @@ SilcSKEStatus silc_ske_check_version(SilcSKE ske, unsigned char *version, static void silc_server_protocol_ke_continue(SilcSKE ske, void *context) { SilcProtocol protocol = (SilcProtocol)context; - SilcServerKEInternalContext *ctx = + SilcServerKEInternalContext *ctx = (SilcServerKEInternalContext *)protocol->context; SilcServer server = (SilcServer)ctx->server; @@ -393,7 +393,7 @@ static void silc_server_protocol_ke_continue(SilcSKE ske, void *context) protocol->state = SILC_PROTOCOL_STATE_END; } - /* Advance protocol state and call the next state if we are responder. + /* Advance protocol state and call the next state if we are responder. This happens when this callback was sent to silc_ske_responder_phase_2 function. */ if (ctx->responder == TRUE) { @@ -409,7 +409,7 @@ static void silc_server_protocol_ke_continue(SilcSKE ske, void *context) SILC_TASK_CALLBACK(silc_server_protocol_key_exchange) { SilcProtocol protocol = (SilcProtocol)context; - SilcServerKEInternalContext *ctx = + SilcServerKEInternalContext *ctx = (SilcServerKEInternalContext *)protocol->context; SilcServer server = (SilcServer)ctx->server; SilcSKEStatus status = SILC_SKE_STATUS_OK; @@ -429,12 +429,12 @@ SILC_TASK_CALLBACK(silc_server_protocol_key_exchange) /* Allocate Key Exchange object */ ctx->ske = ske = silc_ske_alloc(server->rng, server); - + silc_ske_set_callbacks(ske, silc_server_protocol_ke_send_packet, NULL, silc_server_protocol_ke_verify_key, silc_server_protocol_ke_continue, silc_ske_check_version, context); - + if (ctx->responder == TRUE) { /* Start the key exchange by processing the received security properties packet from initiator. */ @@ -448,7 +448,7 @@ SILC_TASK_CALLBACK(silc_server_protocol_key_exchange) SILC_LOG_DEBUG(("Send security property list (KE)")); /* Assemble security properties. */ - silc_ske_assemble_security_properties(ske, ctx->flags, + silc_ske_assemble_security_properties(ske, ctx->flags, silc_version_string, &start_payload); @@ -480,8 +480,8 @@ SILC_TASK_CALLBACK(silc_server_protocol_key_exchange) break; case 2: { - /* - * Phase 1 + /* + * Phase 1 */ if (ctx->responder == TRUE) { /* Sends the selected security properties to the initiator. */ @@ -518,8 +518,8 @@ SILC_TASK_CALLBACK(silc_server_protocol_key_exchange) break; case 3: { - /* - * Phase 2 + /* + * Phase 2 */ if (ctx->responder == TRUE) { /* Process the received Key Exchange 1 Payload packet from @@ -557,15 +557,15 @@ SILC_TASK_CALLBACK(silc_server_protocol_key_exchange) break; case 4: { - /* + /* * Finish protocol */ if (ctx->responder == TRUE) { /* This creates the key exchange material and sends our public parts to the initiator inside Key Exchange 2 Payload. */ SILC_LOG_DEBUG(("Process KE2 packet")); - status = silc_ske_responder_finish(ctx->ske, - server->public_key, + status = silc_ske_responder_finish(ctx->ske, + server->public_key, server->private_key, SILC_SKE_PK_TYPE_SILC); @@ -597,7 +597,7 @@ SILC_TASK_CALLBACK(silc_server_protocol_key_exchange) case SILC_PROTOCOL_STATE_END: { - /* + /* * End protocol */ SilcSKEKeyMaterial *keymat; @@ -628,14 +628,14 @@ SILC_TASK_CALLBACK(silc_server_protocol_key_exchange) silc_ske_end(ctx->ske); } - /* Unregister the timeout task since the protocol has ended. + /* Unregister the timeout task since the protocol has ended. This was the timeout task to be executed if the protocol is not completed fast enough. */ if (ctx->timeout_task) silc_schedule_task_del(server->schedule, ctx->timeout_task); /* Assure that after calling final callback there cannot be pending - executions for this protocol anymore. This just unregisters any + executions for this protocol anymore. This just unregisters any timeout callbacks for this protocol. */ silc_protocol_cancel(protocol, server->schedule); @@ -655,14 +655,14 @@ SILC_TASK_CALLBACK(silc_server_protocol_key_exchange) /* Send abort notification */ silc_ske_abort(ctx->ske, ctx->ske->status); - /* Unregister the timeout task since the protocol has ended. + /* Unregister the timeout task since the protocol has ended. This was the timeout task to be executed if the protocol is not completed fast enough. */ if (ctx->timeout_task) silc_schedule_task_del(server->schedule, ctx->timeout_task); /* Assure that after calling final callback there cannot be pending - executions for this protocol anymore. This just unregisters any + executions for this protocol anymore. This just unregisters any timeout callbacks for this protocol. */ silc_protocol_cancel(protocol, server->schedule); @@ -678,17 +678,17 @@ SILC_TASK_CALLBACK(silc_server_protocol_key_exchange) * We have received failure from remote */ - /* Unregister the timeout task since the protocol has ended. + /* Unregister the timeout task since the protocol has ended. This was the timeout task to be executed if the protocol is not completed fast enough. */ if (ctx->timeout_task) silc_schedule_task_del(server->schedule, ctx->timeout_task); /* Assure that after calling final callback there cannot be pending - executions for this protocol anymore. This just unregisters any + executions for this protocol anymore. This just unregisters any timeout callbacks for this protocol. */ silc_protocol_cancel(protocol, server->schedule); - + /* On error the final callback is always called. */ if (protocol->final_callback) silc_protocol_execute_final(protocol, server->schedule); @@ -705,8 +705,8 @@ SILC_TASK_CALLBACK(silc_server_protocol_key_exchange) * Connection Authentication protocol functions */ -static int -silc_server_password_authentication(SilcServer server, char *local_auth, +static int +silc_server_password_authentication(SilcServer server, char *local_auth, char *remote_auth) { if (!remote_auth || !local_auth || strlen(local_auth) != strlen(remote_auth)) @@ -750,7 +750,7 @@ silc_server_public_key_authentication(SilcServer server, SILC_STR_END); /* Verify signature */ - if (silc_pkcs_verify_with_hash(pkcs, ske->prop->hash, sign, sign_len, + if (silc_pkcs_verify_with_hash(pkcs, ske->prop->hash, sign, sign_len, auth->data, auth->len)) { silc_pkcs_free(pkcs); silc_buffer_free(auth); @@ -787,7 +787,7 @@ silc_server_get_public_key_auth(SilcServer server, *auth_data = silc_calloc((silc_pkcs_get_key_len(pkcs) / 8) + 1, sizeof(**auth_data)); - if (silc_pkcs_sign_with_hash(pkcs, ske->prop->hash, auth->data, + if (silc_pkcs_sign_with_hash(pkcs, ske->prop->hash, auth->data, auth->len, *auth_data, auth_data_len)) { silc_buffer_free(auth); return TRUE; @@ -803,7 +803,7 @@ silc_server_get_public_key_auth(SilcServer server, /* Function that actually performs the authentication to the remote. This supports both passphrase and public key authentication. */ -static bool +static bool silc_server_get_authentication(SilcServerConnAuthInternalContext *ctx, char *local_passphrase, SilcHashTable local_publickeys, @@ -816,7 +816,7 @@ silc_server_get_authentication(SilcServerConnAuthInternalContext *ctx, /* If we don't have authentication data set at all we do not require authentication at all */ - if (!local_passphrase && (!local_publickeys || + if (!local_passphrase && (!local_publickeys || !silc_hash_table_count(local_publickeys))) { SILC_LOG_DEBUG(("No authentication required")); return TRUE; @@ -836,7 +836,7 @@ silc_server_get_authentication(SilcServerConnAuthInternalContext *ctx, /* Try public key authenetication */ if (!result && local_publickeys) { SilcPublicKey cached_key; - SilcPublicKey remote_key = + SilcPublicKey remote_key = ((SilcIDListData)ctx->sock->user_data)->public_key; SILC_LOG_DEBUG(("Public key authentication")); @@ -857,14 +857,14 @@ silc_server_get_authentication(SilcServerConnAuthInternalContext *ctx, return result; } -/* Performs connection authentication protocol. If responder, we +/* Performs connection authentication protocol. If responder, we authenticate the remote data received. If initiator, we will send authentication data to the remote end. */ SILC_TASK_CALLBACK(silc_server_protocol_connection_auth) { SilcProtocol protocol = (SilcProtocol)context; - SilcServerConnAuthInternalContext *ctx = + SilcServerConnAuthInternalContext *ctx = (SilcServerConnAuthInternalContext *)protocol->context; SilcServer server = (SilcServer)ctx->server; @@ -876,7 +876,7 @@ SILC_TASK_CALLBACK(silc_server_protocol_connection_auth) switch(protocol->state) { case SILC_PROTOCOL_STATE_START: { - /* + /* * Start protocol. */ @@ -904,17 +904,17 @@ SILC_TASK_CALLBACK(silc_server_protocol_connection_auth) silc_protocol_execute(protocol, server->schedule, 0, 300000); return; } - + if (payload_len != ctx->packet->buffer->len) { SILC_LOG_ERROR(("Bad payload length in authentication packet")); protocol->state = SILC_PROTOCOL_STATE_ERROR; silc_protocol_execute(protocol, server->schedule, 0, 300000); return; } - + payload_len -= 4; - - if (conn_type < SILC_SOCKET_TYPE_CLIENT || + + if (conn_type < SILC_SOCKET_TYPE_CLIENT || conn_type > SILC_SOCKET_TYPE_ROUTER) { SILC_LOG_ERROR(("Bad connection type (%d) in authentication packet", conn_type)); @@ -922,12 +922,12 @@ SILC_TASK_CALLBACK(silc_server_protocol_connection_auth) silc_protocol_execute(protocol, server->schedule, 0, 300000); return; } - + if (payload_len > 0) { /* Get authentication data */ silc_buffer_pull(ctx->packet->buffer, 4); ret = silc_buffer_unformat(ctx->packet->buffer, - SILC_STR_UI_XNSTRING_ALLOC(&auth_data, + SILC_STR_UI_XNSTRING_ALLOC(&auth_data, payload_len), SILC_STR_END); if (ret == -1) { @@ -938,7 +938,7 @@ SILC_TASK_CALLBACK(silc_server_protocol_connection_auth) } } - /* + /* * Check the remote connection type and make sure that we have * configured this connection. If we haven't allowed this connection * the authentication must be failed. @@ -967,12 +967,12 @@ SILC_TASK_CALLBACK(silc_server_protocol_connection_auth) SILC_LOG_ERROR(("Authentication failed")); silc_free(auth_data); protocol->state = SILC_PROTOCOL_STATE_ERROR; - silc_protocol_execute(protocol, server->schedule, + silc_protocol_execute(protocol, server->schedule, 0, 300000); return; } } - + /* Remote end is server */ if (conn_type == SILC_SOCKET_TYPE_SERVER) { SilcServerConfigServer *serv = ctx->sconfig.ref_ptr; @@ -993,13 +993,13 @@ SILC_TASK_CALLBACK(silc_server_protocol_connection_auth) SILC_LOG_ERROR(("Remote server connection not configured")); SILC_LOG_ERROR(("Authentication failed")); protocol->state = SILC_PROTOCOL_STATE_ERROR; - silc_protocol_execute(protocol, server->schedule, + silc_protocol_execute(protocol, server->schedule, 0, 300000); silc_free(auth_data); return; } } - + /* Remote end is router */ if (conn_type == SILC_SOCKET_TYPE_ROUTER) { SilcServerConfigRouter *serv = ctx->rconfig.ref_ptr; @@ -1021,38 +1021,38 @@ SILC_TASK_CALLBACK(silc_server_protocol_connection_auth) SILC_LOG_ERROR(("Authentication failed")); silc_free(auth_data); protocol->state = SILC_PROTOCOL_STATE_ERROR; - silc_protocol_execute(protocol, server->schedule, + silc_protocol_execute(protocol, server->schedule, 0, 300000); return; } } - + silc_free(auth_data); /* Save connection type. This is later used to create the ID for the connection. */ ctx->conn_type = conn_type; - + /* Advance protocol state. */ protocol->state = SILC_PROTOCOL_STATE_END; silc_protocol_execute(protocol, server->schedule, 0, 0); } else { - /* + /* * We are initiator. We are authenticating ourselves to a * remote server. We will send the authentication data to the - * other end for verify. + * other end for verify. */ SilcBuffer packet; int payload_len = 0; unsigned char *auth_data = NULL; SilcUInt32 auth_data_len = 0; - + switch(ctx->auth_meth) { case SILC_AUTH_NONE: /* No authentication required */ break; - + case SILC_AUTH_PASSWORD: /* Password authentication */ if (ctx->auth_data && ctx->auth_data_len) { @@ -1061,7 +1061,7 @@ SILC_TASK_CALLBACK(silc_server_protocol_connection_auth) break; } break; - + case SILC_AUTH_PUBLIC_KEY: { /* Public key authentication */ @@ -1070,30 +1070,30 @@ SILC_TASK_CALLBACK(silc_server_protocol_connection_auth) break; } } - + payload_len = 4 + auth_data_len; packet = silc_buffer_alloc(payload_len); silc_buffer_pull_tail(packet, SILC_BUFFER_END(packet)); silc_buffer_format(packet, SILC_STR_UI_SHORT(payload_len), - SILC_STR_UI_SHORT(server->server_type + SILC_STR_UI_SHORT(server->server_type == SILC_SERVER ? SILC_SOCKET_TYPE_SERVER : SILC_SOCKET_TYPE_ROUTER), SILC_STR_UI_XNSTRING(auth_data, auth_data_len), SILC_STR_END); - + /* Send the packet to server */ silc_server_packet_send(server, ctx->sock, - SILC_PACKET_CONNECTION_AUTH, 0, + SILC_PACKET_CONNECTION_AUTH, 0, packet->data, packet->len, TRUE); - + if (auth_data) { memset(auth_data, 0, auth_data_len); silc_free(auth_data); } silc_buffer_free(packet); - + /* Next state is end of protocol */ protocol->state = SILC_PROTOCOL_STATE_END; } @@ -1102,7 +1102,7 @@ SILC_TASK_CALLBACK(silc_server_protocol_connection_auth) case SILC_PROTOCOL_STATE_END: { - /* + /* * End protocol */ unsigned char ok[4]; @@ -1113,17 +1113,17 @@ SILC_TASK_CALLBACK(silc_server_protocol_connection_auth) silc_server_packet_send(server, ctx->sock, SILC_PACKET_SUCCESS, 0, ok, 4, TRUE); - /* Unregister the timeout task since the protocol has ended. + /* Unregister the timeout task since the protocol has ended. This was the timeout task to be executed if the protocol is not completed fast enough. */ if (ctx->timeout_task) silc_schedule_task_del(server->schedule, ctx->timeout_task); /* Assure that after calling final callback there cannot be pending - executions for this protocol anymore. This just unregisters any + executions for this protocol anymore. This just unregisters any timeout callbacks for this protocol. */ silc_protocol_cancel(protocol, server->schedule); - + /* Protocol has ended, call the final callback */ if (protocol->final_callback) silc_protocol_execute_final(protocol, server->schedule); @@ -1143,17 +1143,17 @@ SILC_TASK_CALLBACK(silc_server_protocol_connection_auth) silc_server_packet_send(server, ctx->sock, SILC_PACKET_FAILURE, 0, error, 4, TRUE); - /* Unregister the timeout task since the protocol has ended. + /* Unregister the timeout task since the protocol has ended. This was the timeout task to be executed if the protocol is not completed fast enough. */ if (ctx->timeout_task) silc_schedule_task_del(server->schedule, ctx->timeout_task); /* Assure that after calling final callback there cannot be pending - executions for this protocol anymore. This just unregisters any + executions for this protocol anymore. This just unregisters any timeout callbacks for this protocol. */ silc_protocol_cancel(protocol, server->schedule); - + /* On error the final callback is always called. */ if (protocol->final_callback) silc_protocol_execute_final(protocol, server->schedule); @@ -1169,17 +1169,17 @@ SILC_TASK_CALLBACK(silc_server_protocol_connection_auth) SILC_LOG_ERROR(("Received Authentication Failure")); - /* Unregister the timeout task since the protocol has ended. + /* Unregister the timeout task since the protocol has ended. This was the timeout task to be executed if the protocol is not completed fast enough. */ if (ctx->timeout_task) silc_schedule_task_del(server->schedule, ctx->timeout_task); /* Assure that after calling final callback there cannot be pending - executions for this protocol anymore. This just unregisters any + executions for this protocol anymore. This just unregisters any timeout callbacks for this protocol. */ silc_protocol_cancel(protocol, server->schedule); - + /* On error the final callback is always called. */ if (protocol->final_callback) silc_protocol_execute_final(protocol, server->schedule); @@ -1198,7 +1198,7 @@ SILC_TASK_CALLBACK(silc_server_protocol_connection_auth) /* Actually takes the new keys into use. */ -static void +static void silc_server_protocol_rekey_validate(SilcServer server, SilcServerRekeyInternalContext *ctx, SilcIDListData idata, @@ -1207,30 +1207,30 @@ silc_server_protocol_rekey_validate(SilcServer server, { if (ctx->responder == TRUE) { if (send) { - silc_cipher_set_key(idata->send_key, keymat->receive_enc_key, + silc_cipher_set_key(idata->send_key, keymat->receive_enc_key, keymat->enc_key_len); silc_cipher_set_iv(idata->send_key, keymat->receive_iv); - silc_hmac_set_key(idata->hmac_send, keymat->receive_hmac_key, + silc_hmac_set_key(idata->hmac_send, keymat->receive_hmac_key, keymat->hmac_key_len); } else { - silc_cipher_set_key(idata->receive_key, keymat->send_enc_key, + silc_cipher_set_key(idata->receive_key, keymat->send_enc_key, keymat->enc_key_len); silc_cipher_set_iv(idata->receive_key, keymat->send_iv); - silc_hmac_set_key(idata->hmac_receive, keymat->send_hmac_key, + silc_hmac_set_key(idata->hmac_receive, keymat->send_hmac_key, keymat->hmac_key_len); } } else { if (send) { - silc_cipher_set_key(idata->send_key, keymat->send_enc_key, + silc_cipher_set_key(idata->send_key, keymat->send_enc_key, keymat->enc_key_len); silc_cipher_set_iv(idata->send_key, keymat->send_iv); - silc_hmac_set_key(idata->hmac_send, keymat->send_hmac_key, + silc_hmac_set_key(idata->hmac_send, keymat->send_hmac_key, keymat->hmac_key_len); } else { - silc_cipher_set_key(idata->receive_key, keymat->receive_enc_key, + silc_cipher_set_key(idata->receive_key, keymat->receive_enc_key, keymat->enc_key_len); silc_cipher_set_iv(idata->receive_key, keymat->receive_iv); - silc_hmac_set_key(idata->hmac_receive, keymat->receive_hmac_key, + silc_hmac_set_key(idata->hmac_receive, keymat->receive_hmac_key, keymat->hmac_key_len); } } @@ -1264,7 +1264,7 @@ void silc_server_protocol_rekey_generate(SilcServer server, keymat = silc_calloc(1, sizeof(*keymat)); silc_ske_process_key_material_data(idata->rekey->send_enc_key, idata->rekey->enc_key_len, - 16, key_len, hash_len, + 16, key_len, hash_len, idata->hash, keymat); /* Set the keys into use */ @@ -1276,7 +1276,7 @@ void silc_server_protocol_rekey_generate(SilcServer server, /* This function actually re-generates (with PFS) the keys and takes them into use. */ -void +void silc_server_protocol_rekey_generate_pfs(SilcServer server, SilcServerRekeyInternalContext *ctx, bool send) @@ -1296,7 +1296,7 @@ silc_server_protocol_rekey_generate_pfs(SilcServer server, /* Generate the new key */ keymat = silc_calloc(1, sizeof(*keymat)); - silc_ske_process_key_material_data(tmpbuf, klen, 16, key_len, hash_len, + silc_ske_process_key_material_data(tmpbuf, klen, 16, key_len, hash_len, idata->hash, keymat); /* Set the keys into use */ @@ -1310,14 +1310,14 @@ silc_server_protocol_rekey_generate_pfs(SilcServer server, /* Packet sending callback. This function is provided as packet sending routine to the Key Exchange functions. */ -static void +static void silc_server_protocol_rekey_send_packet(SilcSKE ske, SilcBuffer packet, SilcPacketType type, void *context) { SilcProtocol protocol = (SilcProtocol)context; - SilcServerRekeyInternalContext *ctx = + SilcServerRekeyInternalContext *ctx = (SilcServerRekeyInternalContext *)protocol->context; SilcServer server = (SilcServer)ctx->server; @@ -1331,7 +1331,7 @@ silc_server_protocol_rekey_send_packet(SilcSKE ske, SILC_TASK_CALLBACK(silc_server_protocol_rekey) { SilcProtocol protocol = (SilcProtocol)context; - SilcServerRekeyInternalContext *ctx = + SilcServerRekeyInternalContext *ctx = (SilcServerRekeyInternalContext *)protocol->context; SilcServer server = (SilcServer)ctx->server; SilcIDListData idata = (SilcIDListData)ctx->sock->user_data; @@ -1345,7 +1345,7 @@ SILC_TASK_CALLBACK(silc_server_protocol_rekey) switch(protocol->state) { case SILC_PROTOCOL_STATE_START: { - /* + /* * Start protocol. */ @@ -1355,7 +1355,7 @@ SILC_TASK_CALLBACK(silc_server_protocol_rekey) */ if (ctx->pfs == TRUE) { - /* + /* * Use Perfect Forward Secrecy, ie. negotiate the key material * using the SKE protocol. */ @@ -1363,7 +1363,7 @@ SILC_TASK_CALLBACK(silc_server_protocol_rekey) if (ctx->packet->type != SILC_PACKET_KEY_EXCHANGE_1) { SILC_LOG_ERROR(("Error during Re-key (R PFS): re-key state is " "incorrect (received %d, expected %d packet), " - "with %s (%s)", ctx->packet->type, + "with %s (%s)", ctx->packet->type, SILC_PACKET_KEY_EXCHANGE_1, ctx->sock->hostname, ctx->sock->ip)); protocol->state = SILC_PROTOCOL_STATE_ERROR; @@ -1376,11 +1376,11 @@ SILC_TASK_CALLBACK(silc_server_protocol_rekey) silc_ske_group_get_by_number(idata->rekey->ske_group, &ctx->ske->prop->group); - silc_ske_set_callbacks(ctx->ske, - silc_server_protocol_rekey_send_packet, + silc_ske_set_callbacks(ctx->ske, + silc_server_protocol_rekey_send_packet, NULL, NULL, NULL, silc_ske_check_version, context); - + status = silc_ske_responder_phase_2(ctx->ske, ctx->packet->buffer); if (status != SILC_SKE_STATUS_OK) { SILC_LOG_ERROR(("Error (%s) during Re-key (R PFS), with %s (%s)", @@ -1407,11 +1407,12 @@ SILC_TASK_CALLBACK(silc_server_protocol_rekey) key to the new key since all packets after this packet must encrypted with the new key. */ silc_server_protocol_rekey_generate(server, ctx, TRUE); + silc_server_packet_queue_purge(server, ctx->sock); /* The protocol ends in next stage. */ protocol->state = SILC_PROTOCOL_STATE_END; } - + } else { /* * We are the initiator of this protocol @@ -1422,7 +1423,7 @@ SILC_TASK_CALLBACK(silc_server_protocol_rekey) 0, NULL, 0, FALSE); if (ctx->pfs == TRUE) { - /* + /* * Use Perfect Forward Secrecy, ie. negotiate the key material * using the SKE protocol. */ @@ -1431,11 +1432,11 @@ SILC_TASK_CALLBACK(silc_server_protocol_rekey) silc_ske_group_get_by_number(idata->rekey->ske_group, &ctx->ske->prop->group); - silc_ske_set_callbacks(ctx->ske, - silc_server_protocol_rekey_send_packet, + silc_ske_set_callbacks(ctx->ske, + silc_server_protocol_rekey_send_packet, NULL, NULL, NULL, silc_ske_check_version, context); - + status = silc_ske_initiator_phase_2(ctx->ske, NULL, NULL, 0); if (status != SILC_SKE_STATUS_OK) { SILC_LOG_ERROR(("Error (%s) during Re-key (I PFS), with %s (%s)", @@ -1453,8 +1454,8 @@ SILC_TASK_CALLBACK(silc_server_protocol_rekey) * Do normal and simple re-key. */ - /* Send the REKEY_DONE to indicate we will take new keys into use - now. */ + /* Send the REKEY_DONE to indicate we will take new keys into use + now. */ silc_server_packet_send(server, ctx->sock, SILC_PACKET_REKEY_DONE, 0, NULL, 0, FALSE); @@ -1462,6 +1463,7 @@ SILC_TASK_CALLBACK(silc_server_protocol_rekey) key to the new key since all packets after this packet must encrypted with the new key. */ silc_server_protocol_rekey_generate(server, ctx, TRUE); + silc_server_packet_queue_purge(server, ctx->sock); /* The protocol ends in next stage. */ protocol->state = SILC_PROTOCOL_STATE_END; @@ -1472,15 +1474,15 @@ SILC_TASK_CALLBACK(silc_server_protocol_rekey) case 2: /* - * Second state, used only when oding re-key with PFS. + * Second state, used only when doing re-key with PFS. */ if (ctx->responder == TRUE) { if (ctx->pfs == TRUE) { /* - * Send our KE packe to the initiator now that we've processed + * Send our KE packet to the initiator now that we've processed * the initiator's KE packet. */ - status = silc_ske_responder_finish(ctx->ske, NULL, NULL, + status = silc_ske_responder_finish(ctx->ske, NULL, NULL, SILC_SKE_PK_TYPE_SILC); if (status != SILC_SKE_STATUS_OK) { SILC_LOG_ERROR(("Error (%s) during Re-key (R PFS), with %s (%s)", @@ -1500,14 +1502,14 @@ SILC_TASK_CALLBACK(silc_server_protocol_rekey) if (ctx->packet->type != SILC_PACKET_KEY_EXCHANGE_2) { SILC_LOG_ERROR(("Error during Re-key (I PFS): re-key state is " "incorrect (received %d, expected %d packet), " - "with %s (%s)", ctx->packet->type, + "with %s (%s)", ctx->packet->type, SILC_PACKET_KEY_EXCHANGE_2, ctx->sock->hostname, ctx->sock->ip)); protocol->state = SILC_PROTOCOL_STATE_ERROR; silc_protocol_execute(protocol, server->schedule, 0, 300000); return; } - + status = silc_ske_initiator_finish(ctx->ske, ctx->packet->buffer); if (status != SILC_SKE_STATUS_OK) { SILC_LOG_ERROR(("Error (%s) during Re-key (I PFS), with %s (%s)", @@ -1520,11 +1522,11 @@ SILC_TASK_CALLBACK(silc_server_protocol_rekey) } } - /* Send the REKEY_DONE to indicate we will take new keys into use - now. */ + /* Send the REKEY_DONE to indicate we will take new keys into use + now. */ silc_server_packet_send(server, ctx->sock, SILC_PACKET_REKEY_DONE, 0, NULL, 0, FALSE); - + /* After we send REKEY_DONE we must set the sending encryption key to the new key since all packets after this packet must encrypted with the new key. */ @@ -1535,7 +1537,7 @@ SILC_TASK_CALLBACK(silc_server_protocol_rekey) break; case SILC_PROTOCOL_STATE_END: - /* + /* * End protocol */ @@ -1558,10 +1560,10 @@ SILC_TASK_CALLBACK(silc_server_protocol_rekey) silc_server_protocol_rekey_generate(server, ctx, FALSE); /* Assure that after calling final callback there cannot be pending - executions for this protocol anymore. This just unregisters any + executions for this protocol anymore. This just unregisters any timeout callbacks for this protocol. */ silc_protocol_cancel(protocol, server->schedule); - + /* Protocol has ended, call the final callback */ if (protocol->final_callback) silc_protocol_execute_final(protocol, server->schedule); @@ -1579,10 +1581,10 @@ SILC_TASK_CALLBACK(silc_server_protocol_rekey) silc_ske_abort(ctx->ske, ctx->ske->status); /* Assure that after calling final callback there cannot be pending - executions for this protocol anymore. This just unregisters any + executions for this protocol anymore. This just unregisters any timeout callbacks for this protocol. */ silc_protocol_cancel(protocol, server->schedule); - + /* On error the final callback is always called. */ if (protocol->final_callback) silc_protocol_execute_final(protocol, server->schedule); @@ -1598,10 +1600,10 @@ SILC_TASK_CALLBACK(silc_server_protocol_rekey) SILC_LOG_ERROR(("Error during Re-Key: received Failure")); /* Assure that after calling final callback there cannot be pending - executions for this protocol anymore. This just unregisters any + executions for this protocol anymore. This just unregisters any timeout callbacks for this protocol. */ silc_protocol_cancel(protocol, server->schedule); - + /* On error the final callback is always called. */ if (protocol->final_callback) silc_protocol_execute_final(protocol, server->schedule);