updates

[crypto.git] / doc / draft-riikonen-silc-ke-auth-06.nroff

diff --git a/doc/draft-riikonen-silc-ke-auth-06.nroff b/doc/draft-riikonen-silc-ke-auth-06.nroff
index 6b768a3d767bf31e98c91a51da4b078b8643ec75..624fa81ec8ac96a7839d1db5ad2bf2f42d6000a1 100644 (file)
--- a/doc/draft-riikonen-silc-ke-auth-06.nroff
+++ b/doc/draft-riikonen-silc-ke-auth-06.nroff
@@ -483,17 +483,18 @@ o Public Key Type (2 bytes) - The public key (or certificate)
   be closed immediately.
 
 o Public Key (or certificate) (variable length) - The
-  public key or certificate.  The public key or certificate
-  in this field is encoded in the manner as defined in their
-  respective definitions;  see previous field.
+  public key or certificate of the party.  This public key
+  is used to verify the digital signature.  The public key
+  or certificate in this field is encoded in the manner as
+  defined in their respective definitions; see previous field.
 
 o Public Data Length (2 bytes) - The length of the Public Data
   field, not including any other field.
 
 o Public Data (variable length) - The public data to be
-  sent to the receiver.  See section 2.2 Key Exchange 
-  Procedure for detailed description how this field is
-  computed.  This value is binary encoded.
+  sent to the receiver (Diffie-Hellman public values).  See
+  section 2.2 Key Exchange Procedure for detailed description
+  how this field is computed.  This value is binary encoded.
 
 o Signature Length (2 bytes) - The length of the signature,
   not including any other field.
@@ -535,16 +536,16 @@ Setup:  p is a large and public safe prime.  This is one of the
         If the Mutual Authentication flag is set then initiator
         MUST also produce signature data SIGN_i which the responder
         will verify.  The initiator MUST compute a hash value
-        HASH_i = hash(Key Exchange Start Payload | public key
-        (or certificate) | e).  It then signs the HASH_i value with
-        its private key resulting a signature SIGN_i.
+        HASH_i = hash(Initiator's Key Exchange Start Payload |
+        public key (or certificate) | e).  It then signs the HASH_i
+        value with its private key resulting a signature SIGN_i.
 
     2.  Responder generates a random number y, where 1 < y < q,
         and computes f = g ^ y mod p.  It then computes the
         shared secret KEY = e ^ y mod p, and, a hash value 
-        HASH = hash(Key Exchange Start Payload data | public 
-        key (or certificate) | Initiator's public key (or
-        certificate) | e | f | KEY).  It then signs
+        HASH = hash(Initiator's Key Exchange Start Payload |
+        public key (or certificate) | Initiator's public key
+        (or certificate) | e | f | KEY).  It then signs
         the HASH value with its private key resulting a signature
         SIGN.  
 
@@ -616,12 +617,12 @@ protocol produces a hash value HASH as well.
 The keys MUST be derived from the key material as follows:
 
 .in 6
-Sending Initial Vector (IV)     = hash(0 | KEY | HASH)
-Receiving Initial Vector (IV)   = hash(1 | KEY | HASH)
-Sending Encryption Key          = hash(2 | KEY | HASH)
-Receiving Encryption Key        = hash(3 | KEY | HASH)
-Sending HMAC Key                = hash(4 | KEY | HASH)
-Receiving HMAC Key              = hash(5 | KEY | HASH)
+Sending Initial Vector (IV)     = hash(0x0 | KEY | HASH)
+Receiving Initial Vector (IV)   = hash(0x1 | KEY | HASH)
+Sending Encryption Key          = hash(0x2 | KEY | HASH)
+Receiving Encryption Key        = hash(0x3 | KEY | HASH)
+Sending HMAC Key                = hash(0x4 | KEY | HASH)
+Receiving HMAC Key              = hash(0x5 | KEY | HASH)
 .in 3
 
 
@@ -638,14 +639,14 @@ output is too short for the encryption algorithm more key material MUST
 be produced in the following manner:
 
 .in 6
-K1 = hash(2 | KEY | HASH)
+K1 = hash(0x2 | KEY | HASH)
 K2 = hash(KEY | HASH | K1)
 K3 = hash(KEY | HASH | K1 | K2)  ...
 
 Sending Encryption Key = K1 | K2 | K3 ...
 
 
-K1 = hash(3 | KEY | HASH)
+K1 = hash(0x3 | KEY | HASH)
 K2 = hash(KEY | HASH | K1)
 K3 = hash(KEY | HASH | K1 | K2)  ...